Support for democracy under authoritarianism: post-communist political learning in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus by Look, Emily
 1 
Support for democracy under authoritarianism: 
 
Post-communist political learning in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Emily Look 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of The Australian 
National University 
November 2019 
 
 
 
 
 
© Copyright by Emily Look 2019 
All Rights Reserved 
 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Declaration 
 
This PhD thesis contains no material that has been submitted previously, in whole or in 
part, for a degree or diploma in any tertiary institution. To the best of my knowledge and 
belief, this thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, 
except where otherwise indicated in the text. 
 
This research was supported by an Australian Government Research Training Program 
(RTP) Scholarship. 
 
Emily Look  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
First and foremost I want to thank my supervisor, Ian McAllister, for providing incredibly 
swift and valuable feedback throughout the research process. I’m indebted to him for his 
guidance, patience, and great skill at dealing with paperwork. I also appreciate the help of 
my panel members, Dr Svitlana Chernykh and Dr Matthew Kerby. 
In no particular order I immensely thank Dr Jill Sheppard, Ed Handby, Nathan Attrill, Pat 
Leslie and Medha Majumdar for the endless help, support, lunches and tea breaks.  
Many other people and organisations provided support throughout my PhD. The 
Department of Education and Training awarded me an Endeavour Scholarship, without 
which I would not have been able to complete a Visiting Fellowship at the Davis Center for 
Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard University in 2018. The School of Politics and 
International Relations at ANU was very generous with conference and travel funding 
throughout my candidature. I am also grateful to all involved with the World Values Survey 
and Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian Research Surveys for making their data publicly 
available. 
Last but not least, I would like to thank my parents for supporting my education every step 
of the way, and Candace Smith, whose love and support means everything. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4 
Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the role of generational and lifecycle effects in generating 
support for democracy in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. It applies theories of political 
learning and socialisation to the post-Soviet space to address the puzzle of how people in 
authoritarian regimes acquire supportive attitudes towards democracy. The study tests the 
assumption of political socialisation theories that being socialised into higher levels of 
democracy should correspond to stronger democratic support. It also evaluates three 
competing models of democratic support: social modernisation, regime performance, and 
democratic knowledge. 
 
Russia, Ukraine and Belarus are valuable case studies due to their shared Soviet 
history and variation in their post-Soviet trajectories. Moreover, earlier waves of regime 
change did not coincide with readily available survey data. This thesis uses the 1996, 2011 
and 2017 World Values Surveys, supplemented by McAllister and White’s surveys for 
Russia (2018), Ukraine (2010) and Belarus (2006). It employs ordinary least squares 
regression analyses and factor analysis to test each model. First, it finds little support for 
generational and lifecycle effects in any country, demonstrating that socialisation cannot 
account for generational differences in democratic support. Second, the explanatory power 
of social modernisation has declined over time, with urban residence being the most 
consistent predictor of democratic support. Third, testing the performance model shows 
that the positive effect of seeing elections as fair is strongest among Putin supporters. 
Lastly, democratic knowledge has a positive effect across all generational cohorts. 
However, the thesis challenges these models of regime support by highlighting their limited 
explanatory power among younger citizens. The findings therefore have implications for 
understanding how young people socialised into authoritarian or hybrid systems develop 
supportive attitudes towards democracy, as well as what generates democratic support in 
authoritarian and hybrid regimes more broadly. 
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Introduction 
 
 In recent years, democracy has increasingly come to be seen as weathering a crisis. 
Scholars warn that ten democracies have failed over the past decade (Mechkova et al. 
2017), a stark contrast to the gradual growth in democracy from around 1975 to the early 
years of this century (Diamond 2015). The ‘qualified optimism’ in democracy originally 
found among analysts in the early 1990s has been replaced by an acknowledgement of an 
‘authoritarian surge’ (Diamond & Plattner 1996, Diamond et al. 2016, p.4). Authoritarian 
regimes seem to be ‘showing a new boldness’ as democracy wanes (Plattner 2017, p.6); in 
Huntington’s terms, the world may be facing ‘a third reverse wave of democratisation’ 
(Norris 2017, p.1). The ‘real question’, one scholar argues, is not so much whether 
democracy is under threat but ‘why the condition of democracy has become so troubled’ 
(Platter 2017, p.7). 
 The focus, however, is on the ‘fading allure’ of democracy among ordinary citizens 
(Plattner 2017), among whom democracy is said to be facing a ‘crisis of confidence’ (Wike 
& Fetterolf 2018, p.136). Citizens are claimed to be cynical about democracy, feel less 
efficacious, are increasingly interested in authoritarian alternatives, and indifferent as to 
whether their country is democratic or not (Foa & Mounk 2016, p.7, Foa & Mounk 2017, 
p.17). They are frustrated with their political systems and more willing to consider ‘less 
democratic approaches to governing’ (Wike & Fetterolf 2018, p.149). Other research, 
however, suggests that support for democracy is globally stable, but that it is support for 
alternative autocratic options that is increasing (Steenekamp & Toit 2017, p.1, Wike & 
Fetterolf 2018). Moreover, this is a threat to democratic values in new democracies in 
particular (Steenekamp & Toit 2017, p.1). Democratic constitutions, then, ‘must be 
defended’ by regular citizens (Levitsky & Ziblatt 2018). 
 This decline in democratic support has also received great attention with regard to 
young people. Foa and Mounk claim that American and European millennials are far more 
critical of democracy than their elders, and that this is a generational effect where their 
attitudes will not change over time (2016, p.8). Whether this is a generational effect or a 
lifecycle effect that will see young people become more supportive of democracy over time 
is disputed (Norris 2017), as is whether younger people are less supportive in the first place 
(Voeten 2017). However, concern remains that young people in the advanced democracies 
are turning away from democracy (Denemark et al. 2016, Norris 2017). 
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 While debates about the increasing openness to authoritarianism in democracies 
continue, less attention is paid to citizens who support democracy despite living in an 
authoritarian country. Moreno-Alvarez and Welzel (2014) have called this a paradox of 
democracy, where democratic support can emerge among citizens who have not 
necessarily experienced it. Possibly, a ‘relative lack of democracy makes people want more 
of it’ (Maseland & van Hoorn 2011, p.494). At any rate, popular support for democracy in 
authoritarian societies leads to a lack of legitimacy for the regime (Kirsch & Welzel 2019). 
 The narrative around young people and democracy also has stark contrasts 
between those in democracies and autocracies. With the fall of the Soviet Union, young 
people were widely found to be most enthused about democracy (Gibson et al. 1992, 
Gibson 1996, Reisinger et al. 1994), and this finding persisted over the following decade 
(Haerpfer 2002, Hahn & Logvinenko 2008). It led scholars to argue that because younger 
people were more likely to support democracy and reject alternatives, generational turnover 
would lead to greater aggregate support for the new regime (Rose 2004, p.212). Similarly, 
nostalgia for communism would decrease as younger generations grew up in the new 
system (Rose & Carnaghan 1995, p.28), as it increasingly was argued that growing up 
under communism had fostered opposition to democracy (Pop-Eleches & Tucker 2017, 
p.134). Now, however, attention focuses on the ‘Puteens’: young Russians who have ‘no 
memory of life before Mr Putin’ (The Economist 2018). This ‘Generation Putin’ are among 
the autocratic leader’s most loyal supporters (Krastev 2018, Volkov & Kolesnikov 2018). 
 These debates lead to this study’s central puzzle. A broad range of research argues 
that citizens in democracies learn to support the system through socialisation - that is, 
merely by growing up in a democracy (Fuchs et al. 1995, Dalton 2004). Throughout 
adulthood, this is reinforced by experiencing representative government and civil and 
political rights (Mattes & Bratton 2007, Mattes et al. 2016, Rose et al. 1998). Put simply, 
growing up in a democracy and being socialised into its norms and procedures as ‘normal 
politics’ means that democracy can ‘generate its own popular support’ (Mattes et al. 2016, 
p.3). The main question motivating this study is therefore how citizens living in authoritarian 
or hybrid regimes come to support democracy when these socialisation influences are non-
existent.1 The study takes Russia, Ukraine and Belarus as its case studies, where older 
 
1 ‘Authoritarian and hybrid regimes’ reflect the regime classifications given to Russia, Ukraine and Belarus by 
Freedom House. While regime type does vary across the time period covered by this thesis, it does so only 
between the authoritarian and hybrid categories; thus, the thesis studies both hybrid and authoritarian regimes. 
Regime classifications are cross-referenced with other sources such as Varieties of Democracy indices; refer to 
chapter 4 for a full discussion. 
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citizens were socialised into Soviet authoritarianism and younger cohorts were socialised 
into the period of limited democratisation immediately following the collapse of communism 
or a later consolidated authoritarian regime of a different kind. 
 
Explaining support for democracy 
 This study focuses on the central puzzle of how citizens socialised into authoritarian 
and hybrid regimes develop support for democracy. Its focus is therefore testing theories of 
political socialisation, which hold that growing up in a democratic system should create 
support for democracy (Fuchs et al. 1995, Dalton 2004, Mattes et al. 2016). In contrast, 
citizens socialised into communism ‘were not simply expected to accept the rule of the 
communists, but rather additionally to embrace and embody the precepts of socialism’ 
(Pop-Eleches & Tucker 2017, p.3). Support for democracy among people who grew up in 
the Soviet Union therefore contradicts the tenets of socialisation theory. By testing for 
generational effects, where the experiences of early life should influence attitudes 
throughout adulthood, and for lifecycle effects, where attitudes change over the life course, 
this thesis will explore the extent to which growing up under a certain regime affects 
attitudes towards democracy. It also tests three competing models of democratic support - 
social modernisation, regime performance, and democratic knowledge - to determine 
where support for democracy under authoritarianism may originate. 
 The political socialisation literature argues that political attitudes are acquired during 
childhood, or at minimum that the experiences of childhood form foundations for later 
beliefs (Easton & Dennis 1969, Jennings & Niemi 1974). The idea that young people 
growing up under shared historical circumstances form ‘generations’ originates from 
Mannheim (1952); empirically, this is often termed ‘generational’ or ‘cohort’ effects. The 
‘impressionable years’ early in life mean that political values and attitudes are formed early, 
‘followed by a period of modest to strong crystallisation’ (Jennings 2007, p.33), and 
become a basis for relating to political issues throughout one’s life (Mattes et al. 2016). If a 
society is to have an aggregate change in political attitudes, then, this would be due to 
generational turnover rather than ‘a change in the beliefs of individuals’ (Bermeo 1992, 
p.279). The alternative view is that attitudes may change throughout the lifecycle as ‘social 
roles change with age or as the accumulation of social experience increases’ (Neundorf & 
Niemi 2014, p.2). Given that studies have found socialisation into communism decreases 
support for democracy (Pop-Eleches & Tucker 2017) and that socialisation into democracy 
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creates democratic support (Mattes et al. 2016), the apparently high levels of demand for 
democracy in authoritarian regimes warrants further investigation.  
 The second model of democratic support tested in this study is social 
modernisation. The key tenets of modernisation theory were develop by Lipset (1959a), 
who argued that increasing education, wealth and urbanisation creates fertile ground for 
democratisation, and that broadly that ‘the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the 
chances it will sustain democracy’ (1960, pp.48–50). At the individual level, products of 
socio-economic development such as education and increasing wealth should prompt 
increasing demand for political and civil rights (Inglehart & Welzel 2005). Such demands 
and ‘self-expression values’ are, of course, ‘less compatible with autocracy and more 
functional for democracy’ (Inglehart & Welzel 2005, p.164). Those in the ‘modern parts of 
society’ who can move to cities, gain an education or increase their wealth should be more 
likely to ‘become supporters of reform’ and participate in politics (Bratton et al. 2005, p.36). 
An emerging middle class holding more wealth and education should also want protection 
for their property rights through the rule of law (Goldman 2006, p.322). Social 
modernisation is rarely investigated with regard to socialisation and given that Putin derives 
a broad level of popular support from delivering economic growth (White & McAllister 
2014), testing whether the effect of social modernisation varies depending on how an 
individual is socialised is yet another puzzle to address. 
 Another view is that the performance of a regime affects its popular support (Dahl 
1971, Linz 1978). In other words, citizen attitudes towards a political system are determined 
by what a regime is able to deliver (Rose et al. 1998). While political socialisation 
emphasises early life experiences, performance theories focus on evaluations throughout 
adulthood. While performance and socialisation theories are ‘often presented as rival’, both 
‘conceive support as a product of experience’ and can therefore be seen as component 
parts of a ‘developmental model of lifetime political learning’ (Rose et al. 1998, pp.117-118). 
Rational citizens should support any regime that delivers political or economic goods; 
performance theories are thus a ‘broader interpretation of rational choice theory’ (Huang et 
al. 2008, p.51). Most studies testing this model, however, focus on democratic countries, 
and very few ask whether positive performance evaluations in autocracies lead to lower 
support for democracy (Magalhães 2014). Since the performance of a new regime becomes 
more important than memories of a prior regime over time (Mishler & Rose 2001, Rose et al. 
1998), testing performance theories alongside political socialisation marks a clear gap in the 
literature. 
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 Lastly, this study tests the emerging theory on the ‘cognitive origin’ of democratic 
support (Cho 2014, p.1). Democratic knowledge theories have received far less attention 
than other models of support for democracy (Cho 2014), despite the fact that citizens 
learning ‘democratic norms, principles and values’ is essential to democratisation (Dahl 
1992, p.45, Diamond 2006, p.110). When citizens learn more about democracy, they also 
‘become politically more tolerant and active’, which in itself is a crucial factor in building a 
successful democracy (Shin 2012, p.224). One part of the puzzle addressed by this thesis is 
that authoritarian regimes often claim to be democratic (Marquez 2016). Socialisation into a 
such a regime often results in ‘democratic novices’ who concurrently support aspects of 
both democracy and authoritarianism (Shin 2015, p.13). This in itself is puzzling given that 
much of the current literature on democracy in crisis finds that support for authoritarian 
regimes is rising in advanced democracies (Steenekamp & Toit 2017, Wilke & Fetterolf 
2018). Testing democratic knowledge theories may shed light on this, given that much of 
the growing body of research finds that knowing more about democracy tends to develop 
democratic support regardless of regime type (Bratton & Mattes 2001, Cho 2014, Miller et 
al. 1997, Norris 2011). Knowing more about democracy means understanding that it 
provides more rights and freedoms than an authoritarian system does, which is often put 
forward as the causal mechanism (Mattes & Bratton 2007, see also Cho 2014). The 
arguments here therefore imply that citizens socialised into authoritarian systems should 
know less about democracy. However, it is less clear on whether knowing more about 
democracy increases democratic support regardless of how an individual was socialised.  
 Given these debates, this study will test for generational differences in support for 
democracy across time and test four competing theories of democratic support. There is a 
clear gap in the literature for disentangling generational and lifecycle effects and 
determining the extent to which other theories explain democratic support in authoritarian 
regimes. There are also a number of puzzling contradictions and gaps in the literature that 
require further investigation. First, the existence of support for democracy in authoritarian 
countries contradicts the central arguments of socialisation theory. Second, while the 
question of whether the effect of early socialisation persists after a regime change has 
received some scholarly attention, little considers the effect of multiple regime changes, 
such as that seen in the post-Soviet period. Moreover, it is rarely asked whether such 
experiences modify the effect of other models of democratic support that do not make 
explicit reference to socialisation or later learning, such as those under consideration in this 
thesis. Third, if citizens in authoritarian regimes know less about democracy, to what extent 
is this affected by previous socialisation under, for instance, communism? Lastly, and most 
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broadly, these models of democratic support are rarely tested alongside each other so that 
the effects of each might be disentangled with regard to political learning and socialisation. 
This is the key gap in the literature to which this thesis aims to contribute. 
 
Summary: models of democratic support 
Theory Overview Prediction 
Political socialisation Political attitudes shaped by 
experiences in early life and 
crystallise by young adulthood 
Socialisation into an 
authoritarian regime decreases 
support for democracy 
Social modernisation Products of economic 
development such as 
education, increasing wealth 
and urbanisation create 
demand for democracy 
Modernisation at the individual 
level increases support for 
democracy 
Regime performance Citizen evaluations of regime 
performance determine their 
level of support for the system 
Approving of authoritarian 
regime performance decreases 
support for democracy 
Democratic knowledge Knowing more about 
democracy sensitises citizens 
to the rights and freedoms it 
offers 
Knowledge of democracy 
increases support for 
democracy 
 
Why does support for democracy actually matter? 
 Democracy has long been argued to rely on mass support. Fifty years on, Almond 
and Verba’s (1963, p.498) argument that ‘a stable and effective government… depends 
upon the orientations that people have to the political process’ remains a key area of public 
opinion research. The theory that political attitudes matter for a regime’s survival continued 
through Eckstein’s theory of congruence (1966) and Easton’s claim that systems require a 
‘reservoir of good will’ to survive crises (1975, p.44). Linz and Stepan (1996, p.5) famously 
added that ‘democracy becomes the only game in town when, even in the face of severe 
political and economic crises, the overwhelming majority of the people [support a] 
democratic formula’. In other words, there must be a widespread ‘normative and 
behavioural consensus’ that democracy is the appropriate system regardless of its 
performance (Diamond 1999, p.65). Essentially, democracy is stable and legitimate when it 
receives public support, but without this support democracy is vulnerable (Diamond 1999, 
Easton 1965, Mattes & Bratton 2007, Norris 2011, Rose et al. 1998). Public support is even 
more crucial for transitional regimes or new democracies, where no existing ‘reservoir of 
good will’ exists (Easton 1975, p.44, Gibson 2001, p.104) and given ‘the greater stress and 
competition they face from potential alternative regimes’ (Mishler & Rose 2001, p.315). 
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 Democracy, then, ‘stands or falls’ with mass support (Diamond 2008, p.x): if citizens 
are loyal ‘to democratic institutions and processes’, this is a key sign of consolidation 
(Gibson 2001, p.104). Conversely, if support for democracy is high in an authoritarian 
regime, the system suffers from a lack of legitimacy and may be a step towards 
democratisation (Mishler & Rose 2002). The third wave of democracy, for instance, saw 
mass public involvement in ‘broadly based campaigns for civil and political freedom’ 
(Welzel 2006, p.874). Empirical studies provide further evidence of the role of public 
opinion. When large proportions of the population prefer authoritarian governance to a 
democratic system, a ‘country’s level of democracy tends to be low, and the linkage is 
relatively strong’ (Inglehart 2003, p. 54). Inglehart and Welzel (2005) also find that support 
for democracy and levels of democracy are positively associated. Claassen’s (2019) study 
of 135 countries found that democratic support positively affects future democratisation 
and has an even stronger effect on democratic endurance. The existence of mass support 
for democracy is also inherent to many definitions of consolidation, such as Linz and 
Stepan’s ‘only game in town’ benchmark (1996, p.5). Similar definitions are offered by di 
Palma (1990), who argues that democratic institutions must be accompanied by democratic 
public attitudes, and Merkel (1998, p.59), who called public support ‘key to democratic 
consolidation’.  
 Unless otherwise specified, ‘support for democracy’ throughout the thesis refers to 
the measure of democratic support employed in analysis; that is, the World Values Survey 
battery that taps support for a democratic system as well as authoritarian regimes. This 
index is known variously as a ‘Democracy/Autocracy Index’ (Inglehart 2003, p.54), 
‘democratic regime index’ (Dalton & Shin 2006, p.81) or ‘democracy - autocracy scale’ 
(Klingemann et al. 2006, p.5), and is explained in full in chapter 3. By following the bulk of 
the literature in using this robust measure of democratic support (see Bratton et al. 2005, 
Dalton 2004, Klingemann et al. 2006, Magalhães 2014, Mattes et al. 2016, Norris 2011), this 
study ensures that respondents genuinely believe that democracy is preferable to other 
options (Sartori 1987, p.274). The question of what citizens in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus 
know about democracy is tackled in chapter 7, where the findings demonstrate that 
individuals understand that democracy is a political system involving free and fair elections 
and civil rights.  
 Support for democracy is not the only important survey item on democracy, of 
course. Satisfaction with democracy is an important indicator of how a system is working in 
practice (Linde & Ekman 2003), while general support for civil and political freedom also has 
a positive effect on democratisation (Welzel 2006). Support for a democratic system, 
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however, is the most common and fundamental measure of attitudes towards democracy 
and is taken as the dependent variable throughout this study. 
 
Thesis outline 
 This thesis is structured in two parts. In the first part, chapters 1, 2 and 3 lay out the 
theoretical literature and hypotheses, review the empirical literature and present the data, 
cases, measures and method used throughout the thesis. The second part begins empirical 
testing of the hypotheses in chapters 4, 5, 6, 7. These chapters are organised by theoretical 
model rather than by country so as to make comparisons between the three cases. Finally, 
the conclusion discusses the contribution made to the literature, the limitations of the 
current study, and avenues for future research. 
 Chapter 1 shows why democratic support is normatively and empirically important 
and provides an overview of the political learning and socialisation literature. It traces a 
path through the early socialisation literature’s key works from scholars such as Easton and 
Dennis (1969) and Jennings and Niemi (1974), through to the development of lifetime 
learning models from Rose and McAllister (1990) and Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer (1998). It 
then moves to a more specific discussion of these theories vis a vis support for democracy 
in authoritarian (or formerly authoritarian) and hybrid regimes and why political learning and 
socialisation is worth testing in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Following this review, it lays 
out the competing hypotheses that 1) socialisation into an authoritarian regime should 
depress support for democracy, yet 2) this effect may lessen over time as citizens react to 
later political experiences. It also provides an overview of the competing theories of social 
modernisation, regime performance and the lifetime learning model, and democratic 
knowledge, as well as each set of hypotheses pertaining to these models.  
 To provide an overview of the existing empirical literature, chapter 2 begins by 
discussing what we know about support for democracy in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. It 
then focuses on democratic support with regard to learning and socialisation. Next, it 
reviews the literature on social modernisation, performance models and democratic 
knowledge and identifies the gaps in knowledge that will be explored throughout this study. 
 The study next presents the data, cases, measures and methods used to 
operationalise the research questions. Chapter 3 shows that Russia, Ukraine and Belarus 
are valuable case studies and gives an overview of the World Values Survey and McAllister 
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and White’s surveys. The operationalisation of the dependent variable and independent 
variables is specified, and an overview of the research design is provided. 
 To begin testing the effects of political socialisation on support for democracy, 
chapter 4 discusses the post-Soviet history of each country to identify the political 
generations used in the regression models throughout the thesis. Then, it uses the World 
Values Survey to chart democratic support over time, and tests for generational effects on 
support for democracy and whether any such effects remain when controlling for lifecycle 
effects. 
 How do rising living standards and economic development affect support for 
democracy? Chapter 5 considers the arguments of key works such as Lipset (1959a) and 
Inglehart and Welzel (2005) that indicators of individual-level modernisation such as 
income, educational level, occupation, membership of the middle class and urban 
residence develop support for democracy. It provides an overview of each indicator by 
generational cohort before testing the effect of the social modernisation model on 
democratic support. Lastly, it tests the model separately on each cohort to determine 
whether its effect varies according to how each generation was socialised. 
 Does the performance of a hybrid or authoritarian regime affect support for 
democracy? Chapter 6 places this question in the larger context of lifetime learning, which 
holds that experience with political systems later in life may surpass any effects of early 
socialisation (Mishler & Rose 2001, Rose et al 1998). Performance theories argue that 
effective regimes are likely to command the approval of their citizens (Dahl 1971, Linz 
1978), which may mean that a well-performing authoritarian regime reduces demand for 
democracy (Magalhães 2014). The chapter tests the effect of perceived electoral integrity, 
corruption and economic performance as well as whether an individual has been exposed 
to democratic rule by visiting a democracy. 
 Lastly, an emerging literature is examining how ordinary citizens understand 
‘democracy’ and how this affects support for a democratic system (Cho 2014, Norris 2011). 
Chapter 7 rounds out the empirical analysis by investigating what attributes citizens in 
Russia, Ukraine and Belarus associate with democratic systems. It then tests whether this 
differs by generational cohort, and the effect that knowing more about democracy has on 
support for a democratic system.  
 The conclusion summarises the findings of the thesis. It considers the theoretical 
and empirical implications of the study, outlines the contributions this study makes to the 
literature, and suggests avenues for further study. 
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Theories of democratic support 
 
All regimes, democratic or not, are widely accepted to depend, in some measure, on 
public support. In established democracies, citizens are socialised into believing 
democracy is a legitimate way of governing their country (Fuchs et al. 1995), which 
establishes a ‘reservoir of good will’ that can help the system to survive during times of 
crisis (Easton 1975, p.444). A regime is consolidated when ‘each new generation is 
socialised to take it for granted’ (Rose 2009, p.168) – in other words, when citizens believe 
it to be ‘the only game in town’ (Linz & Stepan 1996, p.5).  In short, democracies rely 
normatively and empirically on support for or at least consent to the system; autocracies, 
with a presumed absence of support, must manufacture support or repress support for 
alternatives. A ‘democracy without democrats’ (Bracher 1957) has little prospect for survival 
or, according to most political theory, is no democracy at all. 
An obvious puzzle is therefore how support for democracy emerges among people 
socialised in authoritarian, hybrid or transitional regimes. Despite Russia, Ukraine and 
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Belarus being hybrid regimes at best,2 over half of their citizenries report that ‘having a 
democratic political system’ is ‘good’ or ‘very good’.3 Moreover, regime changes from the 
collapse of communism to the consolidation of authoritarian systems mean that citizens in 
these countries have been socialised under very different circumstances. The study of 
societies where different generations grew up under different political systems allows the 
exploration of key debates in the political learning and socialisation literature: namely, 
whether political values formed in childhood are resistant to later change (Easton & Dennis 
1969) or that political orientations develop throughout the lifecycle in response to 
experience (see Bermeo 1992). To examine these theories and expectations closely, this 
thesis tests theories of political learning and socialisation, as well as three competing 
models of democratic support: social modernisation, regime performance and democratic 
knowledge. 
This chapter will show why public support for democracy is worthy of study. First, it 
will show why support for democracy is normatively important. Second, it will demonstrate 
why democratic support is empirically relevant. Third, it will discuss how the acquisition of 
democratic values occurs according to socialisation theories and political learning. Lastly, it 
will give an overview of three competing models of regime support: social modernisation, 
performance theories and democratic knowledge. 
 
1.1 Democracy and public support 
Institutions are not sufficient for ‘democracy’. As described by Rose, Mishler and 
Haerpfer (1998, p.8), institutions are only the ‘hardware’ of democracy; a healthy 
democracy also requires ‘software’ in the form of a supportive and compatible citizenry 
(Shin 2015b, p.11). Dahl (1971) cites belief in the legitimacy of democracy as a crucial factor 
affecting the development of democracy. As noted by Gibson, Duch and Tedin (1992), 
Dahl’s focus was on ‘political activists’; however, this did not mean that ‘the beliefs held 
among the less influential strata are irrelevant’ (Dahl 1971, p.127). Indeed, as will be shown 
in the empirical section below, the political attitudes of the mass citizenry are a key site of 
analysis. 
 
2 See chapter 4 for an overview.  
3 World Values Survey 2011. See chapters 3 and 4 for measurement. 
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The notion of public support for democracy is central to many theoretical works. 
Plato acknowledged that ‘governments vary as the dispositions of men vary’ and that the 
type and nature of a political system were essentially constituted of ‘the human natures 
which are in them’ (Plato 1948, p.778). Montesquieu argued that political systems reflect 
the citizenry’s dominant orientation; in the case of democracy, the people must possess a 
‘civic’ orientation (1989). Rousseau, too, contended that political systems must be modified 
‘in accordance with the local situation and the temper of the inhabitants’ (Rousseau 2003, 
p.34). Writing specifically with regard to democracy, de Tocqueville identified public 
attitudes and values as key to the emergence and maintenance of democratic politics when 
he concluded that the ‘manners of the people’ were one of the ‘great general causes’ of 
American democracy (de Tocqueville 1945, p.299). Mill (2001, p.11) argued simply that ‘the 
people for whom the government is intended must be willing to accept it’. For Rawls, the 
very ‘exercise of political power’ is ‘justifiable only when exercised in accordance with a 
constitution… which all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse’ (2011, p.393). An 
explicit focus on the legitimacy of political systems was developed influentially by Easton  
(1965, p.278), who defined it as the conviction of the citizen that it was ‘right… to abide by 
the requirements of the regime’.  
Democracy entails a wide set of beliefs beyond nominal support for the system. 
These can include tolerance of out-groups, post-materialist values or trust in public 
institutions, among others (Inglehart 2003, Claassen 2019a). Whether one subscribes to 
Schumpeter’s minimalist concept of democracy ‘that institutional arrangement for arriving 
at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a 
competitive struggle for the people’s vote’ (1942, p.260), or a more idealist understanding 
such as Held’s ‘democracy autonomy’, which promotes ‘tough social and economic rights 
[and] the implementation of social and economic liberties’ (2006, p.264), the base 
requirement is public consent to a democratic means of governing. As noted by Linz, 
‘political democracy does not necessarily ensure even a reasonable approximation of what 
we would call a democratic society’ (1978a, p.97). It entails a broad set of values and 
beliefs such as approving elections as fair, the rule of law and the expectation of 
accountability (Beetham 2004). Taking ‘support for democracy’ as the dependent variable is 
intended to tap broad attitudes towards democracy and explore, in Linz and Stepan’s 
terms, the extent to which democracy might be regarded as ‘the only game in town’ (1996, 
p.5). In summary, public support of democracy is central to the idea that citizens must 
consent to a democratic system and, as the next section shows, to the survival of 
democracy itself.   
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1.2 Empirical support for democracy 
Why does support for democracy matter empirically? Diamond’s argument that 
democracy ‘stands or falls’ with public support (2008a, p.x) is an apt summary. Support for 
democracy either implies or accompanies ‘rejection of antidemocratic movements whose 
proponents aim to undermine or overthrow a newly emerging democratic regime’ (Haerpfer 
& Kizilova 2014, p.167). As put by Dalton, ‘citizens must be supportive of the political 
system if it is to endure… democracy is at least partially based on public endorsement of 
the political decision-making process’ (Dalton 2004, p.10). Schedler (2001, p.75) likewise 
argues that ‘high reserves of mass support provide a valuable cushion that help 
democracies to prevent the emergence of crises’. Support for democracy is particularly 
crucial in young democracies, where it helps ‘to overcome critical moments as they arise’ 
(Schedler 2001, p.75). Public opinion, in short, ‘has a practical influence on politics’ (Dalton 
2007, p.11), whether in terms of system stability, consolidation of a regime, or its 
legitimacy. 
As noted by Almond and Verba (Almond & Verba 1963, p.31), the majority of political 
science research until the mid-twentieth century had focused on ‘the structure and function 
of political systems, institutions, and agencies, and their effect on public policy’. It was 
Almond and Verba who advanced the line of enquiry with the first empirical comparative 
survey of the relationship between public attitudes and democratic stability: their work The 
Civic Culture (1963) made the case that mass attitudes are relevant for the structure and 
stability of democratic states, demonstrating that political attitudes and values differ across 
polities and are shaped by individual circumstance such as socio-economic position and 
life experience. 
 The Civic Culture pioneered a field of empirical study bridging macro and micro-
level politics. It was quickly followed by Moore’s Social Origins of Dictatorship and 
Democracy (1967) and Eckstein’s theory of congruence (1966). Moore linked political 
attitudes with the emergence of democracy in Britain, arguing that it required ‘many subtle 
changes in attitude’ and for ‘bourgeois attitudes’ to ‘become stronger’ so as to prevent 
‘upper class opposition to demands for reform… [and] competition for popular support’ 
(1966, p.425). In his study of Norway, Eckstein concluded that ‘democracies… tend to be 
stable if governmental and social authority patterns are highly congruent’ (1966, p.186). As 
elaborated below, Eckstein’s focus on ‘social authority patterns’ in schools and families is 
mirrored in much of the early socialisation literature. Indeed, as highlighted by Bermeo 
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(1992, p.280), implicit in Eckstein’s theory is the notion that authoritarian systems produce 
‘real or would-be’ authoritarians and democracies produce ‘real or would-be’ democrats.  
As noted by Dalton and Shin (2006, p.5), these early studies were particularly 
important in the emerging study of democratisation as they sought to establish the social 
prerequisites of democracy. Almond himself (1980, p.15) stated that the advancements in 
survey methodology taking place in the 1960s allowed the systematic testing of these 
arguments and assumptions regarding relationships between social and individual 
characteristics and political attitudes, opinion and behaviour. Further advancements in 
statistical methods also allowed researchers to move from description to inference when 
studying these relationships (Almond 1980, pp.15–16, Brady 2000). Accordingly, the ideas 
originating from Almond and Verba (1963) and Eckstein (1966) have persisted and exerted a 
great deal of influence on subsequent research. Dalton and Shin (2006, p.5), for instance, 
note that stable political systems, whether democratic or not, tend to have ‘cultures and 
institutions that are congruent with one another’ – for example, authoritarian regimes are 
argued to ‘depend on a deferential public that accepts the power of the state’.  
Despite this, debates concerning the causal directions of these works’ claims 
gained momentum. Barry (1970, p.51) questioned whether democratic values ‘might be the 
effect rather than the cause of democratic institutions’. These criticisms persisted, 
spawning a range of ‘institutionalist’ (Rohrschneider 1999) works that questioned or 
disputed the utility of mass attitudes as a variable or unit of study. Almond and Verba noted 
in The Civic Culture, however, that socialisation, values and institutions ought to be 
regarded as ‘separate values in a complex, multidirectional system of causality’ (1963, 
p.35). More recently, while arguing that political attitudes do indeed affect political structure 
and performance, Almond acknowledged that ‘the causal arrows between culture and 
structure… go both ways’ (1990, p.144).  
 Moreover, these criticisms tend to overlook the issue of how support for democracy 
may develop before or very quickly after a regime change; that is, when there has been little 
opportunity for democratic institutions to generate support. Societies involved in Third 
Wave transitions tended to support democracy at a surprisingly high rate immediately after 
democratisation (Inglehart 2003; Rose, Mishler & Haerpfer 1998). This pattern suggests that 
other forces, such as economic development or international media, are influencing mass 
attitudes in non-democracies (Dalton & Shin 2006; Inglehart & Welzel 2005; Welzel 2013).  
 Mass support for democracy also contributes to its consolidation and ongoing 
stability. Linz argues that democracy requires the widespread view among its public that 
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the regime is legitimate, and that this is key to its survival (1978, pp.16-18). This is 
advanced most famously by Linz and Stepan (1996, p.6), who outlined that democracies 
must be behaviourally consolidated, with no significant actors attempting to install a non-
democratic regime; attitudinally consolidated, with a strong majority in favour of 
democracy; and constitutionally consolidated, with all actors resigned to resolving conflict 
via democratic norms. This definition is echoed broadly by di Palma (1990, p.138), who 
described consolidation as the ‘contemporaneous formation of both valid democratic 
institutions and a democratic political culture’, and Merkel (1998, p.59), who called public 
support ‘key to democratic consolidation’.  
For a democracy to be stable, then, the majority of the citizenry must acquire ‘a 
deep and resilient commitment’ to the system (Chang et al. 2007, p.66). Diamond proposes 
a threshold of 70% of the public believing that ‘democracy is preferable to any form of 
government’ for a democracy to be considered ‘consolidated’, and no more than 15% must 
prefer an authoritarian alternative (1999, p.69). For Rose (2009, p.168), attitudinal 
consolidation is more passive: regardless of ‘preferences for forms of rule’, individuals must 
accept that the regime is not going to be replaced. A regime is consolidated when ‘each 
new generation is socialised to take it for granted’ (Rose 2009, p.168). In transitional or 
recently democratised societies, this presents a problem. Those with living memory of the 
prior regime know that the current system ‘is not the only way in which the country can be 
governed’ and this may create an expectation of further regime change (Rose 2009, p.168). 
Generational and lifecycle effects must therefore be accounted for when exploring the 
dynamics of political learning and regime support.  
Returning to Easton’s view of political support provides a simple underlying closing 
point. The orientation of an individual towards a system has important implications for the 
regime in question. Normative support for a regime is ‘more efficient than coercion or 
material inducements in securing compliance with laws’ (Rose & Mishler 2002, p.3; Easton 
1965). Compliance with laws is essential for effective authority (Rose & Mishler 2002), and it 
follows that mass support for an alternative form of governance presents a problem even 
for authoritarian regimes. 
Interest in the structure and sources of mass political attitudes has prompted a 
focus on ‘how ordinary citizens view democracy’ rather than the notion of ‘civic culture’ 
(Shin 2015, p. 11). Key studies have examined Latin America (Booth & Seligson 2009), 
Africa (Bratton et al. 2005), East Asia (Chu et al. 2008, Dalton & Shin 2006), and post-
communist Europe (Rose, Mishler & Haerpfer 1998). Given that a clear understanding of 
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how attitudes towards democracy operate in non-democratic regimes is still ‘missing’ 
(Pietsch et al. 2015, p.2), this thesis aims to explore the dynamics of political learning in 
Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. 
 
1.3 Developing support for democracy 
 A central question is therefore how people in authoritarian and hybrid regimes 
acquire supportive attitudes towards democracy. Growing up in a democracy and being 
socialised into its norms and procedures as ‘normal politics’ means that democracy is able 
to ‘generate its own popular support’ (Mattes et al. 2016, p.3). If an established democracy 
is in crisis, it can therefore draw on ‘a reservoir of good will’ (Easton 1975, p.444). New or 
transitioning democracies may lack this reservoir of support when citizens have not been 
socialised into supporting a democratic system. 
 As pointed out by Eckstein (1988, p.791), ‘orientations are not acquired in some 
automatic way; they must be learned’; in Moore’s words, political beliefs ‘do not descend 
from heaven’ (1967, p.486). The central issue, however, is whether differences between age 
cohorts in political views are because they ‘represent cohorts growing up under different 
circumstances, or because they have reached different stages in the lifecycle’ (Hellevik 
2002, p.291). We still ‘know relatively little about when and why socialisation experiences 
lead to generation differences in how citizens perceive and evaluate politics’ (Neundorf & 
Niemi 2014, p.1). The aim here is test for generational effects while controlling for age to 
parse out the relative effect of each on democratic support. 
 Much of the pioneering literature argues that political beliefs are essentially acquired 
during childhood, or at least that childhood is when foundations for later beliefs are laid 
(Easton & Dennis 1969, Jennings & Niemi 1974). The presumption that those of a similar 
age ‘shared similar socialising experiences, especially during late adolescence and early 
adulthood’ (Markus 1985, p.261) is often termed ‘generational’ or ‘cohort’ effects. Derived 
from Mannheim’s work on political generations, formed by age cohorts ‘experiencing the 
same concrete historical problems’ in their youth that structure their political beliefs (1952, 
p.302), this perspective generally assumes that individual beliefs are unlikely to be 
influenced by political change. Aggregate changes in beliefs, then, would be due to ‘a 
change in the cast of political actors rather than a change in the beliefs of individuals’ 
(Bermeo 1992, p.279). In the language of the literature discussed previously, a democracy 
would not be consolidated until generational change had replaced older generations with 
younger citizens socialised into supporting democracy.  
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 Lifecycle effects, on the other hand, assume less of an aggregate influence, 
because ‘older generations are subject to the same influences as those who went before 
them, and those who will follow them’ (Hayes & McAllister 1999). These effects refer to 
changes that occur as individuals progress through the lifecycle, such as how ‘social roles 
change with age or as the accumulation of social experience increases’ (Neundorf & Niemi 
2014, p.2). In order to identify generational effects, lifecycle effects must be controlled for 
to ensure that differences between cohorts are not actually a result of attitude change over 
the life course (Huang et al. 2016). While there is no clear hypothesis with regard to the 
influence of lifecycle effects on support for democracy in the existing literature, prior 
research on Russia has found that democratic support declines with age (Mishler & Rose 
2007, Rose et al. 2006). Given that all citizens are subject to lifecycle effects, the aggregate 
effect ought to be less severe than that assumed by generational effects. 
 An alternate view is that political attitudes can be learned or altered at any stage in 
the lifecycle. Termed ‘political learning’, this view is ‘based on the premise that beliefs are 
not fixed immutably in childhood, and that they can be “affected by political events” such 
as the replacement of one regime with another’ (Bermeo 1992, p.274). Political attitudes 
thus reflect ‘a lifetime of learning’ (Rose & McAllister 1990, p.35) whereby any generational 
differences can be altered by later experiences or events (Mishler & Rose 2007; Rose, 
Mishler & Haerpfer 1998). Table 1.1 provides a comparison of generational effects with 
lifecycle effects and political learning. 
Table 1.1: Theoretical overview 
Theory Overview Prediction 
Generational effect Generational cohorts are socialised 
into supporting the regime during 
their formative years. Aggregate 
change only occurs with generational 
replacement 
Socialisation into democracy 
increases support for 
democracy 
Lifecycle effect Political attitudes change as 
individuals progress through the 
lifecycle. Aggregate effect less severe 
because all citizens are subject to 
lifecycle effects 
Support for democracy 
declines over the lifecycle 
among all generational cohorts 
Political learning Generational differences mitigated by 
political learning over the lifecycle 
Support for democracy 
changes in response to 
experiences later in life 
 
 ‘All political systems,’ notes Almond (1960, p.27), ‘tend to perpetuate their cultures 
and structures through time’, and ‘they do this mainly by means of the socialising 
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influences… through which the young of the society pass in the process of maturation’. 
Given the general expectation that norms and behaviour will be passed from parents to 
their children (Jennings & Niemi 1974), it must be asked how young Russians, Belarusians 
and Ukrainians are acquiring positive views towards a system that they and their parents 
are unlikely to have direct experience of.4 
 Why does political learning present a particular problem in the context of regime 
change? The answer is straightforward: ‘the abrupt introduction of democratic institutions 
into a society in which most citizens have been socialised into undemocratic norms creates 
cognitive dissonance’ (Mishler & Rose 2002, p.7). Citizens must recalibrate their behaviour 
and opinions and learn how to exist under a new and, at least to some extent, unfamiliar 
system. In established democracies, it is typically argued, individuals learn during 
socialisation that ‘the institutional structure and the values correspond with each other in 
their country’ and thereby develop support for the system (Fuchs, Guidorossi & Svensson 
1995, p.327). In new or non-democracies, this socialisation is lacking, and the sources of 
democratic support are less clear. 
   In an early review of the existing literature in the field, Hyman’s Political Socialisation 
(1959, p.25) named the sub-discipline and defined it as the ‘learning of social patterns 
corresponding to [the individual’s] societal positions as mediated through various agencies 
of society’. Many early works focused on childhood due to the assumption that early 
learning influenced, or even determined, the political attitudes of the adult. Perhaps best 
known is the work of Greenstein (1965), who interviewed schoolchildren regarding their 
feelings toward politics and, in the words of one reviewer, prompted a ‘flood’ of political 
socialisation research (Litt 1969, p.426). One such work was Butler and Stokes’ Political 
Change in Britain (1969), which argued that party loyalties passed from parent to child kept 
the political system relatively stable. Given that individuals should therefore be unlikely to 
change their allegiance, their argument followed that only demographic change was likely 
to alter societal levels of party support. 
 One assumption made in these early works, then, was that ‘childhood learning is 
relatively enduring throughout life’ (Searing et al. 1973, p.415). Some studies even argued 
that political socialisation was essentially complete before adulthood (Hess & Torney 1967). 
Termed the ‘primacy principle’, the idea was that the ‘earlier a person adopts a given set of 
political orientations, the less likely it is that these orientations will be eroded later in life’ 
 
4 See chapter 3 for an elaboration and discussion of levels of democracy in these states. 
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(Dennis 1968, p.99), or at the very least, that early learning would structure and influence 
later learning (Searing et al. 1976). Young people were worthy of study ‘to see what values 
and norms they acquire which may have a bearing on later adult political behaviour’ (Sigel 
1965, p.4). As noted by Niemi and Sobieszek (1977), the assumption in studies such as 
Hess and Torney (1967) that political socialisation was essentially complete before 
adulthood has been significantly modified. 
 More recently, research has shifted to a ‘lifelong learning’ perspective to 
acknowledge the ‘linked and cumulative’ nature of influences on the individual (Rose & 
McAllister 1990, p.35). In the context of voting, the sequential model begins with family 
socialisation and progresses to socio-economic interests, political values, spatial context 
(where one lives - for instance, in a strongly held constituency), party performance and, 
finally, the vote (Rose & McAllister 1990, p.36). Indeed, key reviews of the field such as 
those from Niemi and Hepburn (1995), Jennings (2007) and Sapiro (2004) have called for 
research to focus more on the dynamics of lifelong learning, as well as on young adulthood 
during the ‘years of most rapid change’ (Niemi & Hepburn 1995, p.7). Niemi and Sobieszek 
(1997, pp.216-217) also questioned the justifications for focusing solely on ‘preadults and 
especially preteenagers’ and argued for a greater focus on the influence of early 
socialisation on adult political attitudes and behaviour. 
  Lifetime learning models are particularly valuable when considering the impact of 
regime change, which is, of course, experienced by all citizens regardless of age. While 
many of the studies discussed above focused on party affiliation and other aspects of a 
stable democratic system, many have raised the issue of how socialisation processes 
operate during and after a regime change. Verba (1965, p.130) recognised this issue when 
considering the case of West Germany, noting that socialisation was especially important 
for new polities: to create a stable political system, ‘the problem of citizen-making’ must be 
tackled. If a society must pass its pattern of core values ‘from generation to generation’, it 
follows that a new system cannot provide an older generation from whom to source these 
values (Verba 1965, p.130).  
 The collapse of a regime and the establishment of a new democratic system is likely 
to create ‘cognitive dissonance’ among those who grew up under the previous system 
(Mishler & Rose 2002, p.7). In the terms of Linz and Stepan (1996), a new democracy 
cannot be consolidated until it is accepted as the ‘only game in town’, and its citizens have 
been socialised into a supportive position. Diamond (1999, p.162) argues that experience 
with each distinct type of regime has ‘sizeable independent effects on political attitudes and 
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values’, which may overpower individual factors such as socio-economic position. In sum, 
then, early life socialisation under non-democratic systems is generally expected to 
influence attitudes towards a new political regime, and slow adaptation to its norms and 
values. 
 In terms of how these theories are borne out in the context of actual regime 
transitions, different patterns emerge. Studies of newly democratic West Germany and 
Spain find that democratic values developed most efficiently among the young, while value 
change was more incremental among those who had lived most of their lives under the 
previous non-democratic system (Baker et al. 1981, Conradt 1974, Conradt 1980, Montero 
et al. 1997). These cases, at least, seem to support Eckstein’s (1997, p. 25) observations 
that ‘advanced and complex learning always builds on earlier and simpler learning’, and 
that ‘earlier learning limits greatly the extent and ease of later learning’. Later transitions, 
namely those following the fall of the Berlin Wall, saw a far more rapid increase in support 
for democracy (Inglehart 2003, Mishler & Rose 2007, Rose et al. 1998), raising the question 
as to how learning and socialisation processes were operating in these contexts.  
 To summarise, socialisation theory argues that political attitudes are formed by 
young adulthood and are resistant to change (see Jennings 2007, Mattes et al. 2016). 
According to this theory, citizens socialised into an authoritarian system should be less 
supportive of democracy. The first hypothesis of this study is therefore that older 
generations and particularly those with a longer exposure to communism will report lower 
support for democracy than younger citizens. To identify these generational effects, 
however, analyses must control for lifecycle effects to confirm that any differences between 
cohorts are not simply due to attitudes changing as people grow older (Huang et al. 2016). 
Prior research has found that democratic support may decline over the lifecycle (Mishler & 
Rose 2007, Rose et al. 2006) and this constitutes the second hypothesis. Lastly, as Bermeo 
argues, ‘political learning occurs at the individual level, and since the stimuli in each 
individual’s learning environment differ, the timing and nature of the learning experience 
may vary between individuals’ (1992, p.275). This study tackles this problem by testing 
three additional models of regime support. 
H1. Generational effects: socialisation into an authoritarian system will have a negative effect 
on democratic support. 
H2. Lifecycle effects: support for democracy will decline over the lifecycle. 
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1.4 Competing models of regime support 
 Because public support for democracy is so critical in transitional phases (Bermeo 
2003), scholars have developed many theories on the sources of democratic support. 
Russia, Ukraine and Belarus are valuable case studies for testing theories of political 
learning and socialisation given that we now have access to the kind of cross-national 
survey data that was unavailable for earlier waves of regime changes, and the almost three 
decades that have passed since the fall of the Soviet Union provide new cohorts that have 
come of age in the post-Soviet period. While the focus of this thesis is therefore leveraging 
this data to test for generational and lifecycle effects, it also tests three competing models 
of democratic support: social modernisation, regime performance and democratic 
knowledge. 
 
Social modernisation 
 Modernisation theory began with the assumption that socio-economic development 
had a progressive effect on politics (Deutsch 1963, Pye & Verba 1965) via rising income and 
educational levels. Lipset’s argument that ‘the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the 
chances it will sustain democracy’ (1960, pp.48–50) is the most famous summary of 
modernisation theory. As scholarship progressed, however, the relationship between socio-
economic development and democracy became increasingly one that featured mass 
attitudes as a crucial ‘intervening variable’ (Inglehart 1988, p.1220).  
As people’s material resources increase, their higher autonomy and security allows 
them to value things that ‘were previously given lower priority, including the pursuit of 
freedom’ (Inglehart & Welzel 2005, p.2). Higher levels of education and literacy, along with 
other products of socio-economic development, prompt the micro-level changes in political 
attitudes and behaviour that create fertile conditions for democracy (Sorensen 2008). 
Inglehart and Welzel (2005, p.2) developed a ‘revised’ theory of modernisation, whereby 
socio-economic development fosters rising ‘self-expression values’ - demands for ‘civil and 
political liberties, gender equality, and responsive government’ – which in turn help to 
establish and maintain democracy. Socio-economic development is able to facilitate 
democratic progress ‘because it tends to shape mass values in ways that make them less 
compatible with autocracy and more functional for democracy’ (Inglehart & Welzel 2005, 
p.164).  
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The increasing access to education and information associated with socio-
economic development increases individual capability and ambition to exercise freedoms 
and, therefore, to prompt people to ‘perceive freedoms as valuable enough to struggle for 
their legalization whenever they see themselves capable to handle these freedoms’ (Welzel 
2011, p.6). Moreover, those with higher education and income, for example, experience ‘an 
increased exposure to norms that might encourage democratic values’ (Dalton & Shin 2006, 
p.89). A prosperous, educated middle class also has an interest in a political system that 
will safeguard personal property and the rule of law (Goldman 2006, p.322). In Russia, 
Ukraine and Belarus specifically, the post-communist rise in private property means that an 
emerging middle class would want to defend their assets and support democratisation as a 
result (Frye 2003, p.26). Indeed, ‘like model democratic citizens’, Russians began to see 
‘uniformly enforced law as the instrument that would defend their rights, property, and 
freedom’ in the post-Soviet period (Carnaghan 2001, p.361). As well as prompting citizens 
to see democratic rights and freedoms as worth fighting for (Welzel 2011), then, individual 
experiences such as rising wealth or a middle-class identity create incentive to support 
democracy as a means of protecting private property through the rule of law (Goldman 
2006). 
 Of all factors included in this thesis, an individual’s level of education is arguably 
regarded as the strongest predictor of support for democracy. Lipset’s conclusion that high 
levels of education come ‘close to being a necessary condition for democracy’ (1959a, 
p.80) is echoed in many of the key works in the field. Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barry (1996, p.2) 
note that education is ‘almost with no exception the strongest factor in explaining what 
citizens do in politics and how they think about politics’. Almond and Verba argue that 
‘none [of the other key demographic factors] compares with the educational variable to the 
extent in which it seems to determine political attitudes’ (1963, p.379). 
Why is education so widely regarded as a key influence on political attitudes? In 
Lipset’s terms, education ‘broadens [people’s] outlooks, enables them to understand the 
need for norms of tolerance, restrains them from adhering to extremist and monistic 
doctrines, and increases their capacity to make rational electoral choices’ (1959a, p.79). For 
Almond and Verba, the act of learning assisted the development of ‘skills useful for political 
participation’ (1963, p.379). Education ought to increase ‘one’s capacity for understanding 
and working with complex, abstract and intangible subjects’ such as politics (Wolfinger & 
Rosenstone 1980, p.18). Put simply, education has consistently been found to develop 
‘cognitive skills with which to understand democracy and compare it with its authoritarian 
alternatives’ (Cho 2014a, p.7). Higher education specifically creates a group who tend to be 
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well-informed as well as critical, and this group ought to be supportive of democracy 
(Schofer & Meyer 2005). A university education, moreover, develops civic and associational 
skills necessary for understanding and participating in politics (Galston 2001, Hillygus 
2005). In turn, this increases demand for a democratic regime that allows for political 
involvement (Glaeser et al. 2007).  
Higher income, class status and non-manual work are generally also associated 
with higher support for democracy. Those with higher incomes have frequently been found 
to be more likely to value ‘political self-expression’ and the democratic rights that might 
provide it (Inglehart & Welzel 2005, p.164), while an independent middle class keen to 
transform ‘state-society relations’ should also be supportive of democracy (Diamond 
2008b, p.26). Non-manual work, too, develops cognitive autonomy, agency and creativity, 
which like education should increase demand for greater political rights and freedoms 
(Welzel & Inglehart 2006). As all of these broadly tap economic prosperity, class status, 
income and non-manual work should all lead citizens to demand a democratic system that 
will protect their assets (Goldman 2006) and allow them a voice in how society is ruled 
(Aron 2013). 
Lastly, urban residents should also tend to be more supportive of democracy. 
Urbanisation is central to modernisation theory (Lerner 1958, Lipset 1959a): as society 
modernises and people move from rural areas to cities, they are exposed to a more diverse 
range of people and ideas (Dalton & Shin 2006, p.91). It also becomes easier for citizens to 
connect with others who share their political views (Rose et al. 1998, p.89). Overall, urban 
residence should serve to increase democratic support.  
Resources such as education and income may increase with age, in line with the 
expectation of lifecycle effects. The effects may also be indirect; young people with well-
educated or higher-earning parents may grow up experiencing more political discussions 
(Verba et al. 1995). However, social modernisation theory provides clear hypotheses to test 
in chapter 5. Urban residence and higher education expose citizens to a broader range of 
people and ideas (Dalton & Shin 2006), and the latter generates civic and associational 
skills necessary for democratic participation (Galston 2001, Hillygus 2005). Income, non-
manual work and middle-class status similarly lead citizens to desire civil and political rights 
(Inglehart & Welzel 2005), and non-manual work should additionally develop cognitive 
autonomy that in turn increases demand for democratic freedoms (Welzel & Inglehart 2006). 
Income, middle class identification and a non-manual occupation in particular should foster 
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a desire to protect property rights with a democratic system and rule of law (Frye 2003, 
Goldman 2006). The hypotheses derived from the social modernisation literature are thus: 
 
H3: Tertiary education will positively affect support for democracy. 
H4: Having a higher income will positively affect support for democracy. 
H5: Identifying as middle-class will positively affect support for democracy. 
H6: Being employed in non-manual work will positively affect support for democracy. 
H7: Urban residence will positively affect support for democracy. 
 
Performance models 
 While political socialisation emphasises the experiences of early life, performance 
models focus on political evaluations made throughout adulthood. Both, however, 
emphasise political attitudes as ‘a product of experience’, and together are components of 
a lifetime learning model where attitudes are modified in response to experiences over the 
life course (Rose et al. 1998, p.117, Mishler & Rose 2002, p.8). Specifically, performance 
models take ongoing political evaluations into account – in other words, ‘what has society 
done for me lately?’ (Mishler & Rose 1997, p.434). For generations who have experienced 
regime change, the lifetime learning model predicts that their current evaluations of regime 
performance will become more important than memories of the old regime (Mishler & Rose 
2001b, p.309). The ‘accumulation of a lifetime of learning’, then, is especially relevant for 
societies in which cohorts have been socialised under different regime types (Rose & 
McAllister 1990, p.35). 
 Performance theories are a ‘broader interpretation of rational choice theory’ (Huang 
et al. 2008, p.51), where rational citizens ought to support any regime that delivers political 
goods such as civil liberties or free elections. Support for a new democracy may wither if 
citizens are not satisfied with its performance, which in turn may lead them to prefer the old 
authoritarian regime (Schmitter 1994). Similarly, if autocratic governance is effective and 
citizens judge its performance favourably, performance theories suggest that citizens may 
have little reason to support democracy over the existing regime (Magalhães 2014). 
Whether approving of authoritarian regime performance leads to lower support for 
democracy is a far less studied hypothesis, and one that will be tested in this thesis given 
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that Russia, Belarus and Ukraine are not considered democratic by most measures.5 
 Given that democracy requires free elections at minimum (Dahl 1971, Schumpeter 
1942), perceptions of electoral fairness are central to democratisation itself. Free elections 
are essential for democracy’s survival (Birch 2008) and create system legitimacy (Banducci 
& Karp 2003). Experiencing free elections helps to consolidate democracies by developing 
support for the system (Elklit & Reynolds 2002) and encourages citizens to vote, which 
promotes a democratic political culture (Anderson 2005). As citizens experience free 
elections over time, they should come to value democracy intrinsically rather than, for 
example, any economic benefits it may bring (Mattes et al. 2016). 
 What about elections that only claim to be free and fair? While elections can be 
used as ‘a way for governments to enhance citizens’ attachment to the system’ (Anderson 
et al. 2005, p.22), unfair elections should reduce the legitimacy of the regime and public 
support for the system (Rose & Mishler 2009). When elections are manipulated, media 
coverage and public awareness means that citizens are able to judge the integrity of 
elections better than other measures of procedural fairness (Birch 2008). However, as Rose 
and Mishler note, ‘whether your party wins is more important than how it wins’ (2009, 
p.125). In other words, support for the incumbent can function as a heuristic when 
evaluating electoral integrity (Zaller 1992) and is therefore controlled for in this thesis with 
an interaction term. Although voters for the victor will be more likely to see the election as 
fair and support the existing regime (Anderson & Tverdova 2003), perceiving the election as 
fair should itself generate support for a democratic system (Elklit & Reynolds 2002). 
 The second measure of regime performance is the degree to which citizens perceive 
corruption in the regime, or ‘the misuse of public office for private gain’ (Sandholtz & 
Koetzle 2000, p.32). Specifically, corruption can involve ‘the abuse, misuse or stealing of 
state or public office and resources by elected or appointed state and government officials 
for private gain’ (Treisman 2000, p.399). By restricting access to public goods to those with 
connections or money, corruption erodes support for democracy by violating the principles 
of equality and accountability (Treisman 2000, Dahl 1971). In short, corruption ‘makes life 
difficult, expensive and unpredictable’ for ordinary citizens (Collins & Gambrel 2017, 
p.1286). 
 Perceiving more corruption should therefore produce dissatisfaction with the regime 
(Rose & Mishler 2010), given that support is modified by continuing interactions between 
 
5 Refer to chapter 4 for an overview of regime classifications.  
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government and public demands (Easton 1965). In general, citizens have a ‘rational and 
symbolic preference for clean government’ and broadly expect to be treated equally 
(Collins & Gambrel 2017, p.1286). Where citizens perceive corruption as high, they should 
‘expect democracy to be an improvement over corrupt or hybrid regimes’ (Collins & 
Gambrel 2017, p.1286) and be less supportive of the current corrupt regime (Linde & 
Ekman 2003). Ultimately, alongside generating dissatisfaction with the system, people may 
participate less in politics or protest for regime change (Rose & Mishler 2010). Perceiving 
higher levels of corruption should thus generate support for a democracy, either because 
citizens ‘distinguish between a corrupt hybrid regime and a clean democratic one’ (Collins 
& Gambrel 2017, p.1286), or their dissatisfaction with the current regime’s corruption simply 
leads them to prefer an alternative (Magalhães 2014). 
 While democracy may offer many political benefits, regimes are also judged by their 
ability to deliver ‘economic and physical security’ (Mattes et al. 2016, p.9). Chu et al. (2008, 
p.85) argue that citizens with little experience of democracy can still ‘distinguish between 
political and economic dimensions of regime performance’.  As citizens may make separate 
sociotropic and egocentric evaluations of the economy, it is important to distinguish 
between the two (Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier 2007). They may overlap, however: those 
pleased with their personal circumstances may project this onto their judgments of the 
national economy (McAllister & White 2011b). After a transition to democracy, improving 
economic performance ‘may help to legitimate democracy’ among its citizens (Bratton et al. 
2005, p.42). 
 For post-communist societies, the legacy of socialism means that individuals may 
put the national economy over their immediate personal interests (Waldron-Moore 1999). A 
growing economy also gives citizens more of a ‘stake in their society’ (Evans & Whitefield 
1995, p.490). Poor economic performance, on the other hand, can erode enthusiasm for 
democratisation, particularly where citizens were used to the state ensuring their ‘economic 
wellbeing’ (Waldron-Moore 1999, p.38). Many Russians were willing to forgo 
democratisation in exchange for Putin delivering economic growth and preventing a crisis 
like that of the 1990s (White & McAllister 2014, p.82). Indeed, Przeworski argues that new 
post-communist democracies would depend for their survival ‘on their economic 
performance’ (1991, p.189) – and plainly many did not survive. If democracy were seen as 
delivering economic benefits, however, rational individuals would demand democracy 
(Huang et al. 2008, p.51, Waldron-Moore 1999, p.39). The performance model therefore 
predicts that if individuals positively evaluate the current regime’s economic performance, 
they have no rational reason to support a democratic system. 
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 Just as citizens learn about and evaluate their own regime, they can ‘learn from first-
hand experience how democracy works and what its norms are’ (Kirsch & Welzel 2019, 
p.62). The last measure of regime performance is therefore travel to democracies, which by 
exposing people to democratic governance may affect evaluations of their own regime. The 
diffusion of democratic values can occur via access to international media, travel or contact 
with relatives (Rohrschneider 1999); specifically, travel to a democracy can be considered a 
component of ‘political learning’ (Wang 2017, p.140). This example of lifetime learning can 
‘raise awareness that authoritarian rule is in contradiction to democracy’s liberal norms’ 
(Kirsch & Welzel 2019, p.62, Mattes & Bratton 2007). Having travelled to a democracy is 
therefore another aspect of lifetime learning to be evaluated in the performance model. By 
increasing individual’s democratic exposure, it should increase support for a democratic 
system. 
The lifetime learning model – three performance variables and one experiential 
variable – can be summarised in four hypotheses. First, if elections are perceived as 
performing fairly – that is, democratically – this should increase support for democracy. 
Second, perceiving more corruption should result in dissatisfaction with the current regime 
and increase support for an alternative democratic system. Russia and Belarus were both 
fully authoritarian at the time of the surveys in 2018 and 2006 respectively; Ukraine was 
considered a ‘transitional government or hybrid regime’ by Nations in Transit 2010 at the 
time survey data was collected.6 Perceiving these regimes as corrupt should therefore 
foster support for a less corrupt democratic system. Third, by the same logic, positive 
evaluations of economic performance should mean citizens are satisfied with the current 
system and not see the need for democratisation. Lastly, travelling to democracies should 
increase support for democracy as a result of political learning. The hypotheses derived for 
the performance model are thus: 
 
H8. Perceiving elections as fair will positively affect support for democracy. 
H9. Perceiving higher levels of corruption will have a positive effect on support for 
democracy. 
H10. Positive evaluations of national economic performance will have a negative effect on 
support for democracy. 
 
6 For a detailed assessment, refer to chapter 4.  
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H11. Travelling to democracies will positively affect support for democracy. 
 
Democratic knowledge 
 A crucial and urgent part of democratisation is a society learning ‘democratic 
norms, principles and values’ (Dahl 1992, p.45, Diamond 2006, p.110), which can itself 
generate support for democracy (Chu 2014). The ‘first step’ to a new democracy’s survival 
is citizens knowing what democracy is as well as being able to distinguish it from 
authoritarianism (Shin 2012, p.221). For countries with a long history of autocracy, however, 
citizens must undergo what Shin terms ‘education and internalisation’, which first involves 
understanding what democracy is and is not, and subsequently internalising the belief that 
democracy is ‘the only game in town’ (Shin 2012, p.222, Linz & Stepan 1996). 
A significant barrier, however, is that authoritarian and hybrid regimes frequently 
portray themselves as democratic (Marquez 2016), which is particularly the case in 
competitive authoritarian states where ‘free’ elections are held (Levitsky & Way 2010). The 
consequence is that the normative desirability and legitimacy of democracy is rarely 
contested: instead, authoritarian rulers may spread ‘alternate discourses on democracy’ 
that serve to legitimate and strengthen their rule (Lu & Shi 2014, p.5). Often, these portray 
democracy as merely ‘having wise leaders who rule the country with a strong hand in the 
people’s best interest’ (Kruse et al. 2019, p.318). Little attention, however, has been paid to 
how democracy is understood in societies with limited experience of democracy (Pietsch et 
al. 2015). 
 Given this contestation over the meaning of ‘democracy’, socialisation under non-
democratic regimes is often argued to produce citizens who may support aspects of 
democracy and authoritarianism concurrently (Shin 2015b, p.13). The most basic element 
of democracy is free and fair elections (Schumpeter 1942); however, most research builds 
on Dahl (1971) to argue that informed citizens should also be able to identify civil rights and 
full suffrage as essential to democracy. Including this more comprehensive measure of 
democratic knowledge ensures that support for democracy does not ‘lack substance’ 
(Dalton et al. 2007a, p.1). 
 How might ordinary citizens understand democracy? Often, citizens identify the 
social or economic benefits democracy can bring as elements of democracy itself (Dalton 
et al. 2007a). While the latter can be regarded as consequences rather than characteristics 
of democratic governance (Collier & Levitsky 1997), understanding democracy in social as 
well as procedural terms simply translates to a social-liberal understanding of democracy 
rather than a market-liberal one (Held 2006). As a result of this normative debate, this thesis 
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follows Shin (2015a) and Kirsch and Welzel (2019) in treating social understandings as 
being exclusive to neither democracy nor authoritarianism. Following McClosky and Zaller 
(1984), Shin (2015a) argues that understanding a political concept such as democracy relies 
on the ability to distinguish between its key attributes and those that contradict it. This 
means evaluating whether citizens can identify essential tenets of democracy as well as 
distinguish between the properties of democratic and autocratic rule (Shin 2015a). Such an 
approach builds a two-dimensional measure of democratic knowledge, which is a relatively 
‘new conceptual tool’ (Shin 2015a, p.8, see also Shin 2012, Norris 2011).  
 Many studies (Cho 2014a, Norris 2011, Kirsch & Welzel 2019) utilise survey items 
asking about civil rights, free elections, ‘the separation of church and state’ and ‘civilian 
control of the military’ as the litmus test of democratic knowledge (Shin 2012, p.227). As 
Shin (2012) points out, Dahl (1998) and Sartori (1995) have argued that these are ‘the four 
most definitive characteristics of a democratic regime and its alternatives’ and therefore 
function as a useful test of a respondent’s level of understanding about democracy. 
Moreover, any democratic system can come under threat if religious authorities, soldiers 
and army officers or public servants are able to block the actions of the people’s elected 
representatives (Schmitter & Karl 1991, p.81).  
 By becoming aware of what democracy has to offer, democratic knowledge ought 
to generate support for a democratic system. Following Gibson and Caldeiras’ (2009) work 
on support for American courts, Cho (2014, p.3) advances a ‘confirmation bias theory’ 
whereby democratic knowledge operates as ‘a positive bias for democracy and a negative 
bias for authoritarianism’. Where citizens are able to compare authoritarianism and 
democracy, they are more likely to endorse democracy over the former (Cho 2014a, 
Geddes & Zaller 1989). Moreover, knowing more about democracy enables them to ‘resist 
authoritarian socialisation forces including governmental propaganda’ (Cho 2014, p.9). This 
point is echoed by Lu and Shi (2015, p.18), who argue that democratic knowledge allows 
individuals to recognise ‘the true authoritarian nature’ of autocratic regimes and thus prefer 
a democratic one. 
Given that socialisation into authoritarian regimes limits what citizens can learn 
about democracy, citizens in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus can be expected to identify 
aspects of democracy but not necessarily accurately distinguish between democratic and 
authoritarian systems. Cohorts socialised during transitional periods may be somewhat 
more capable of distinguishing between the two, given that those with even less experience 
of democracy are likely to have ‘limited sophistication about democratic politics’ (Shin 
2015b, p.13). We should also expect democratic knowledge to foster support for 
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democracy, in line with the theory reviewed above. The hypotheses regarding democratic 
knowledge are thus: 
 
H12. Informed understandings of democracy will be higher among generations socialised 
during transitional or revolutionary periods. 
H13. An informed understanding of democracy will have a positive effect on democratic 
support. 
 
Conclusion   
 Theories of political socialisation argue that the experiences of childhood and young 
adulthood have a lasting impact on political attitudes. However, research has long noted 
that despite being socialised into an authoritarian system, citizens often develop support for 
democracy during or soon after a regime change (see, for example, Evans & Whitefield 
1995). The puzzle this thesis tackles is how democratic support has emerged in Russia, 
Ukraine and Belarus - three such countries that have seen generations socialised into 
authoritarianism and regime change. 
Studying democratic support in countries that are not democratic raises a number 
of issues. Firstly, high support for democracy in such societies suggests that mass 
attitudes are incongruent with the existing regime type. Secondly, support for a regime that 
does not exist in a given society raises questions for theories of political learning and 
socialisation. Where are these attitudes being acquired? Do possible influences exert the 
same effect across age groups socialised under different circumstances? This thesis 
therefore tests three competing models of democratic support while controlling for 
generational and lifecycle effects, and whether these models operate differently for each 
cohort. 
The first of these theories, social modernisation, argues that people will put more 
value on obtaining political rights and freedoms as their material resources increase 
(Inglehart & Welzel 2005). Those who are middle class, wealthy, or simply want to protect 
their personal property will value democracy’s rule of law (Goldman 2006). Put simply, 
when people come to worry less about material needs through wealth or stable 
employment, they move ‘on Maslow’s motivational hierarchy to higher levels of [political] 
aspiration’ (Kruse et al. 2019, p.333). Operationalised by level of education, income, middle 
class status, non-manual employment and urban residence, each measure of social 
modernisation should generate support for democracy. 
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 Second, theories of regime performance argue that positive performance 
evaluations will generate support for the regime. As part of a lifetime of learning, 
performance evaluations will grow in importance as memories of prior regimes fade (Mishler 
& Rose 2001a). The model employed in this thesis utilises perceived electoral integrity, 
corruption and economic evaluations as performance indicators and travel to democracies 
as another lifetime learning variable affecting regime evaluations. In non-democracies, 
perceiving high levels of corruption or being dissatisfied with national economic 
performance should foster support for a different regime such as democracy. Viewing 
elections as fair and travel to democracies should also increase support for democracy, by 
exposing citizens to democratic practices. However, those who voted for the winning 
candidate may be less concerned with whether the election was won fairly, and view 
political institutions more favourably overall (Anderson & Tverdova 2003, Rose & Mishler 
2009). 
 Lastly, the need for citizens in democratising societies to understand democratic 
principles (Diamond 2006) is complicated by many authoritarian and hybrid regimes 
promoting themselves as ‘democratic’ (Marquez 2016). Citizens develop more 
sophisticated understandings of democracy as they learn to distinguish between 
characteristics of democratic and authoritarian systems (Shin 2015a), which in turn 
promotes ‘a positive bias for democracy’ through becoming aware of the rights and 
freedoms democracy has to offer (Cho 2014, p.3). This also prompts people to recognise 
and reject the ‘authoritarian nature’ of autocratic regimes (Lu Shi 2015, p.18). 
 Many of these theories, however, have thus far been discussed only generally or 
with reference to a specific region or time period. Little research has been conducted on 
the post-Soviet region or on Russia, Ukraine and Belarus specifically, and even less with 
reference to how these popular theories of democratic support are moderated by 
generational or lifecycle effects. The next chapter will review what empirical literature does 
exist, before putting these theories to the test in Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7.  
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Support for democracy in the post-Soviet era 
 
Centuries of autocratic rule in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus – from the tsars to the 
vast apparatus of the CPSU – have led many commentators to claim that the political 
culture of these countries is naturally inclined to authoritarian rule.7 Although this is not 
antithetical to the expectation that growing up under a given system involves being 
socialised into support that regime and its values (Almond & Verba 1963, Eckstein 1966), 
the increasing availability of survey data after the fall of the Soviet Union has allowed a 
different picture to emerge.8 Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians tend to report relatively 
widespread support for democracy since the demise of the USSR, regardless of whether 
this was during times of transition or once authoritarian regimes had been established.9 
However, this is often accompanied by simultaneous support for authoritarian regimes. This 
thesis will therefore provide a detailed account of how regime preferences vary among 
cohorts of Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians socialised under different political 
conditions. 
The study of support for democracy among young people in Russia, Ukraine and 
Belarus is pertinent and timely for two reasons. First, if support for democracy is 
widespread and the ‘only game in town’ (Linz & Stepan 1996), this becomes a crucial factor 
if these regimes come under stress, given that supporters of democracy will be less 
inclined to defend the regime (Bermeo 2003). Second, as it is nearly three decades since 
the fall of the Soviet Union, generations of young people socialised in these countries after 
communism have come of age and their political attitudes remain comparatively 
underexplored. 
This thesis therefore aims to extend and update the existing scholarship in three key 
ways. Firstly, many of the key studies of political learning and socialisation in the post-
communist context were conducted in the 1990s (Gibson et al. 1992, Rose & Carnaghan 
 
7 See Hale (2011) for a critical overview of these arguments. 
8 Survey data from the Soviet period was present but limited in scope and availability – see Reisinger et al. 
(1994) for an overview. 
9 Chapter 4 will provide a detailed overview of regime classifications across Russia, Ukraine and Belarus over 
time. They have typically erred between being classified as ‘hybrid’ or ‘consolidated authoritarian’ regimes by 
Freedom House. 
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1995), when, of course, there were no young people socialised after the fall of the Soviet 
Union to include in the research. This thesis thus updates and extends existing studies by 
analysing five waves of survey data spanning twenty-one years. Secondly, it expands on 
more recent studies that only cover Russia (Hale 2011, Mishler & Rose 2007) by providing 
an in-depth focus on three post-Soviet states. Belarus in particular is ‘one of the least-
studied European states to emerge from the breakup of the Soviet Union’ (Ioffe 2007, 
p.348). Lastly, and more broadly, it has been recently noted that a clear understanding of 
how attitudes towards democracy operate in non-democratic regimes is still ‘missing’ 
(Pietsch et al. 2015, p.2). We also still ‘know relatively little about when and why 
socialization experiences lead to generational differences in how citizens perceive and 
evaluate politics’ (Neundorf & Niemi 2014, p.1). This study therefore contributes to the 
wider literature on democratic support, learning, and socialisation.  
This chapter will review the relevant empirical literature. Firstly, it will report the 
evidence and trends on levels of support for democracy in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. It 
then examines the more limited research on the extent to which age cohorts differ on their 
evaluations of democracy. While ‘age’ is often found to matter, it is less clear as to how 
socialisation affects attitudes towards democracy in the post-Soviet context. The third 
section reviews the empirical evidence specifically regarding the three competing models of 
democratic support outlined in Chapter 1 which, as already discussed, have been selected 
because they are commonly cited as key influences on support for democracy. The 
literature on social modernisation, performance theories and democratic knowledge is 
explored so as to outline what we might expect to find in the three results chapters and 
highlight in particular the gaps that this study will address. 
 
2.1 Support for democracy in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus 
 The central puzzle of this thesis – that support for democracy can be high even in 
countries where citizens are expected to be socialised into supporting non-democratic 
values – is one shared by a broad swathe of literature. As outlined in chapter 1, support for 
democracy has been a prominent concern across both the theoretical and empirical 
literatures. The emergence of cross-national survey data, however, has permitted the 
systematic empirical study of attitudes towards democracy across many cultures and 
regime types. This is worthy of study given that mere institutions are not sufficient for a 
democracy to survive: it must be accompanied by widespread citizen support to be stable 
and legitimate (Diamond 1999, Linz & Stepan 1996, Rose et al. 1998). In hybrid or 
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authoritarian regimes, democratic support is crucial to a successful transition to democracy 
(Linz & Stepan 1996, Diamond 1999). 
 In the case of post-Soviet countries and Russia in particular, citizens are often 
described as historically ‘heavily inclined to authoritarianism’ (Hale 2011, p.1357). The 
‘cultural-continuity thesis’ is rife to the extent that Hahn (1991, p.397), Colton and McFaul 
(2002) and Hale (2011) – studies of Russian public opinion across two decades – set out to 
test these claims. Such arguments generally appear in historical pieces (Duncan 2000, 
Pipes 1990, Pipes 2004), but are occasionally also expressed by political scientists and 
analysts (Mendelson & Gerber 2003, Motyl 2010). As noted by Reisinger et al. (1994), 
however, it was difficult to evaluate these claims given the limited opportunities to survey 
Soviet citizens.  
 Despite these arguments, early studies of post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine reported 
widespread support for democracy and political reform (Finifter & Mickiewicz 1992, Gibson 
et al. 1992, Hahn 1991, Miller et al. 1994). In summarising the broad findings of several 
studies, Reisinger et al. (1994, p.220) argued that Russians and Ukrainians were ‘ready’ for 
democracy – or at the very least, that ‘the distribution of political values is unlikely to be the 
primary roadblock’ for consolidation. Democratic support appeared to be widespread 
across all sectors of the population, including members of the CPSU (Gibson et al. 1992, 
White & McAllister 1996). Reisinger et al. (1994, p.185), arguing that the democratic values 
present in Russia and Ukraine helped ‘account for the role that mass political action played 
in the fall of the Soviet regime’, nonetheless note that support was concentrated among 
highly-educated and urban citizens. Haerpfer and Kizilova (2014, p.170), however, find that 
‘less than half’ of Russians supported democracy across the 1990s.  
 One key question was whether such support ‘survived the turbulence of 1992-
1995’, a period characterised in Russia by ‘high levels of turbulence’ in both political and 
economic terms (Whitefield & Evans 1996, pp.218–219). Indeed, the proportion of citizens 
supporting ‘the aim of building democracy… in which political parties compete for power’ 
fell to 40% in 1995, though the authors note that there was ‘virtually no change in the 
number of those opposing it’ (Whitefield & Evans 1996, p.224). When asked ‘how good 
would democracy be for governing Russia’, over half of citizens surveyed by Colton and 
McFaul (2002, p.101) responded ‘very good’ or ‘fairly good’. While only 45% supported 
democracy under Yeltsin, this rose to 62% in 2008 (Haerpfer & Kizilova 2014, p.170). In 
Russia, then, support has persisted in some form to the present. 
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 In Belarus and Ukraine, patterns similarly vary over time. Around half of Belarusians 
and Ukrainians agreed that it would be ‘best to get rid of parliament and elections and have 
a strong leader who can decide things quickly’ in 1993-94 (Rose et al. 1998, p.111). 
However, Belarusian support for democracy hovered at three-quarters of the surveyed 
population in 2008 despite the ongoing authoritarian rule of President Alexander 
Lukashenka (Haerpfer & Kizilova 2014). In Ukraine, support was at 66% in 2005, before the 
failure of the Orange Revolution resulted in a fall to 56% in 2008 (Haerpfer & Kizilova 2014, 
p.170). 
 Survey research in post-communist countries must also concern itself with the 
argument that public opinion may ‘combine elements of democracy and autocracy’ (Hale 
2011, p.1359). In contexts where citizens are socialised into an authoritarian regime or have 
limited experience with democracy, it is crucial to examine whether support for democracy 
is accompanied by a rejection of undemocratic alternatives (Rose et al. 1998). This is 
particularly pertinent given that many Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians were socialised 
under a Soviet regime that maintained a ‘rhetorical commitment to democracy’ (Dalton 
1994, p.473), and may end up supporting aspects of democratic and authoritarian systems 
concurrently (Shin 2015b). While the ability to differentiate between aspects of each system 
will be detailed by chapter 7, the four-item World Values Survey battery tapping ‘support for 
democracy’ accounts for concurrent support for authoritarian alternatives. 
 One such index comes from Haerpfer and others (Haerpfer 2002, Klingemann et al. 
2006), who developed a 1-10 scale of non-democrats to democrats on the basis of a nine-
item index. After being asked to rate ‘democracy’, authoritarian leadership, a military 
regime, and communism, less than a quarter of Belarusians, Ukrainians and Russians in 
1994 were found to be ‘democrats’ scoring nine or above on the scale (Haerpfer 2002, 
p.44). A similar index used by Bashkirova (2006, p.367) highlighted that in 1999 many 
Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians seemed ‘not to be aware of the fact that democracy 
and autocracy are two antagonistic concepts’.  While 82% of Ukrainian respondents 
appeared to support democracy, half of them also supported having ‘a strong leader who 
does not have to bother with parliament and elections’ and ‘having the army rule’ 
(Bashkirova 2006, p.367). Similar patterns were found in Russia and Belarus, where a third 
and half of respondents, respectively, supported democracy and autocracy (Bashkirova 
2006, p.367).  
 These results appear to provide only limited evidence for the ‘cultural-continuity’ 
theses outlined above, suggesting a ‘dual political culture’ (Mishler & Willerton 2003, p.113) 
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embracing both democratic and authoritarian tendencies may indeed be the norm. Hale 
(2011), however, relying on the 2008 Russian Election Study, argues that Russians prefer a 
strong leader who is nonetheless chosen in a free election. 89% of respondents agreed that 
Russia ought to have a leader ‘with a strong hand’, yet 87% said ‘citizens should choose 
from among several candidates with different views by means of free and fair elections’ 
(Hale 2011, p.1368). Rather than being authoritarians or totalitarians, Hale argues that 
Russians seem to prefer ‘delegative democracy’, in which an elected president rules with 
almost unfettered power during their term in office (O’Donnell 1994). In sum, while 
documented levels of democratic support are higher than may be expected for populations 
that were mostly socialised under the Soviet regime, these findings are generally tempered 
by simultaneous support for authoritarian regimes.  
 
2.2 Support for democracy and political generations 
 To what extent is support for democracy related to learning and socialisation? The 
answer is unclear: while many studies include ‘age’ in their analyses, few specifically 
explore how cohorts socialised under different regimes and conditions vary in their 
attitudes towards democracy. Evidence from Africa suggests that neither generational 
effects nor lifetime learning have any effect on support for democracy (Mattes & Bratton 
2007), while generational effects seem to be stronger in new East Asian democracies 
(Dalton & Shin 2014). In Russia, lifecycle effects seem to matter more than cohort 
experience (Mishler & Rose 2007); however, exposure to communism from age 6-17 in both 
the former USSR and post-communist countries has been found to diminish support for 
democracy (Pop-Eleches & Tucker 2014). As discussed in this section, it appears that 
generational experiences are likely to matter, but the dynamics at play are unclear and 
require further investigation. 
 In the early 1990s, studies exploring the determinants of support for democracy 
often found the clearest influence to be age. Young people growing up during or soon after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union tended to be the most supportive of democracy (Gibson et 
al. 1992, Gibson 1996a, Reisinger et al. 1994, Hahn 1991). Reisinger et al. (1994, p.203), 
surveying Ukraine, Russia, and Lithuania in 1990-92, noted that ‘no other explanatory factor 
has a noteworthy impact’ in predicting a negative view of Stalin, and ultimately concluded 
that younger citizens possessed stronger democratic values.  
 Surveys a decade on from the collapse of communism largely mirrored these 
findings. With New Russia Barometer data from 2004, Rose, Mishler and Munro find that 
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young people were more likely to spurn undemocratic options such as returning to 
communism, abolishing elections, military rule, or a ‘tough dictatorship’ (2004, p.203), to 
the extent that the authors argue that generational replacement would ‘imply a substantial 
impact on the rejection of undemocratic regimes’ (Rose et al. 2004, p.212). Similarly, Colton 
and McFaul (2002, p.112) conclude from their analysis of Russian data from 1999 - 2000 
that the strongest correlation was between ‘age and associated generational experience of 
the citizen’ and preferences for ‘Western democracy’. Still, only 15% of Russians aged 18-
29 favoured ‘Western democracy’ as compared to a ‘reformed Soviet system’ or the 
‘current political system’; however, those over 40 were more inclined for a return to the 
Soviet system, with less than 8% preferring a Western democracy (Colton & McFaul 2002, 
p.112). 
 Looking beyond Russia to Ukraine and Belarus, levels of support did not necessarily 
follow an upward trend. Haerpfer (2002, p.54) finds only 18% of Russians aged 16-29 to be 
‘democrats’ in 1994, while in Ukraine only a quarter of this age group were ‘democrats’ in 
1998. Despite the emergence of the authoritarian Lukashenka regime in Belarus over this 
period, around a third of young Belarusians were supporters of democracy (Haerpfer 2002, 
p.54). The relationship was also statistically significant: the younger a citizen was, the more 
democratic they tended to be (Haerpfer 2002, p.57).  
 Studies specifically focusing on socialisation and learning differ, however, as to how 
much socialisation matters. In Rose and Carnaghan’s (1995) study investigating 
generational effects in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and a wider group of post-communist 
countries, the ‘glasnost’ generation that turned fifteen between 1982 and 1990 reported the 
lowest levels of approval for the old regime. This generational effect, moreover, persisted 
even when controlling for lifecycle effects and education (Rose & Carnaghan 1995). They 
did, however, note that ‘divisions within generations are greater than between generations’ 
and that there were no significant generational differences in support for democracy (Rose 
& Carnaghan 1995, p.48). 
Mishler and Rose’s landmark study using New Russia Barometer data from 1992 - 
2005 found older cohorts to express ‘significantly more support on average than younger 
generations for the former communist regime’ (2007, p.826). Stronger evidence, however, 
was found for a lifetime learning model: while generational effects were present, 
‘contemporary political and economic experiences’ exerted more of an influence (Mishler & 
Rose 2007, p.832). Lifecycle and generational effects, in sum, ‘operate in tandem’, and the 
authors conclude that Russians would swiftly come to support and participate in a 
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democratic system should one emerge (Mishler & Rose 2007, pp.831–32). Based on 
Russian surveys from 1993, 1996 and 2004, Hahn and Logvinenko (2008) also find more 
support for democracy among the post-Soviet generation than those socialised under 
communism, yet note that whether this is generational or a lifecycle trend is unclear.  
Other survey studies, however, find far lower enthusiasm for democracy among 
young people in the post-Soviet context. Mendelson and Gerber (2005, p.88), having 
surveyed Russians aged 16-29 in June 2005, argued that ‘if anything, support for 
authoritarianism may be growing’. Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer (1998, p.129), moreover, find 
‘virtually no difference between generations in support for the current regime’ in nine post-
communist countries including Belarus and Ukraine, which at the time were ‘not free’ and 
‘partly free’ respectively. This extends to support for undemocratic alternatives, such as a 
return to communist rule, army rule or a strong leader who need not bother with elections 
(Rose et al. 1998). In a more recent analysis of Russia, however, Rose, Mishler and Munro 
found older generations to be ‘significantly less supportive’ of the regime, and younger 
generations significantly more supportive (2011, p.87). 
On related political attitudes that may correlate with support for democracy, the 
young appear to differ from their elders in all three countries. They are more likely to hold 
positive views towards the European Union and NATO and less likely to mourn the collapse 
of the Soviet Union (McAllister & White 2016a, White et al. 2010, White et al. 2016). A 
majority of young Russians are also ambivalent or positive towards Stalin (Mendelson & 
Gerber 2006), and ‘gravitate enthusiastically’ towards Putin (Mendelson & Gerber 2008), 
while young Belarusians are less likely to vote for President Lukashenka (McAllister & White 
2016b). Young Ukrainians were also more likely to participate in the Orange Revolution and 
Euromaidan (Reznik 2016). 
What seems clear is that young people are likely to differ, at least to some degree, 
to their elders in their evaluations of political regimes. Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2014), 
specifically investigating the impact of early socialisation, conclude that exposure to 
communism at age 6 - 17 had a stronger negative effect on support for democracy than 
adult exposure. Russians have also been found to differ by age on regime support: as put 
by Rose, Mishler and Munro (2006, p.116), ‘the longer ago Russians were born, the less 
likely they are to support the new regime and the more likely to prefer an alternative 
regime’. However, all generations showed evidence of being able to ‘re-learn’ over time, as 
all tended to trend up and down in support for the current regime and authoritarian 
alternatives (Rose et al. 2006, p.118). The post-perestroika generation was nonetheless the 
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most likely to reject authoritarian regimes at 42%, whereas only 16% of elder Russians 
socialised during the Stalinist terror did so (Rose et al. 2006, p.116). In summary, prior 
research makes clear that age affects support for democracy. Whether this is a product of 
generational or lifecycle effects, however, is unclear and requires further longitudinal 
enquiry. 
 
2.3 Competing explanations of democratic support 
Social modernisation 
  As discussed in the theoretical review, social modernisation theory has received the 
most scholarly attention and is generally expected to be the most likely to have a strong 
effect on support for democracy in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Specifically, of all the 
independent variables discussed in this chapter, education has the most evidence in favour 
of it being a predictor of democratic support. However, the effects of other indicators such 
as middle class identification or non-manual work are not clear, particularly when 
controlling for generational and lifecycle effects.  
Education has been found to exert the most consistent positive effect on support for 
democracy in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Despite concerns that Soviet education may 
have socialised students into ‘non-democratic values’, Gibson and Duch observed that the 
conventional wisdom that education ‘broadened perspectives [and] increased stores of 
information’ held in the post-Soviet context (Gibson & Duch 1993, p.85). The effect of 
education in post-communist states seemed to mirror that of advanced democracies: a 
higher level of education ‘makes people more independent-minded and more critical of 
authority’ (Rose & Carnaghan 1995, p.45). Highly educated Russians tend to be more likely 
to reject undemocratic regimes (Rose et al. 2006). In Ukraine and Belarus, the higher 
someone’s level of education, ‘net of all other influences…the more likely he or she is to 
reject undemocratic alternatives’ (Rose et al. 1998, p.139). Indeed, Haerpfer (2002, p.47) 
noted that those with a university education constitute a ‘core social group of “democrats”’ 
in post-communist countries.  
The observed effect of education, however, is not uniform and may differ depending 
how it is measured. Mishler and Rose (2002) find that education was not statistically 
significant in explaining regime support in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus; in a subsequent 
study, they find education to have a significant negative impact on support for the former 
Soviet regime (Mishler & Rose 2007). In Ukraine, one study notes that education did not 
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have a ‘strong independent impact’ on democratic support as it did in Russia (Reisinger et 
al. 1994, p.215). Despite expecting that higher levels of education would lead to citizens 
becoming more critical of the Russian regime, Rose, Mishler and Munro find that education 
did not exert a significant effect once age and occupational status had been controlled for 
(2011). 
On related measures of political attitudes, education has an inconsistent effect. 
Highly educated Belarusians, for example, are less likely to support President Lukashenka 
(McAllister & White 2016b). Although one study found higher education to increase support 
for the European Union in all three countries (White et al. 2002), in a later analysis it was 
only statistically significant in Russia, but not Ukraine and Belarus (White et al. 2008). 
Nonetheless, given that education appears to be the strongest predictor of support for 
democracy in Russia (McAllister & White 2017b), it is expected to remain so in this study. 
 The effect of income is less conclusive. Possibly, this is related to the history of 
barter and exchange in these countries, which were often used after the collapse of 
communism as ‘a substitute for cash transactions’ and existed outside of the formal 
economy (Rose 2009, p.50). As an important measure of social modernisation, however, 
income and its related measures do seem to effect democratic support and is thus included 
here. Although wealthier Russians and Ukrainians reported higher support for democracy in 
1990-92 (Reisinger et al. 1994), the class divides typical of the West were elsewhere found 
to be ‘not particularly salient’ in the former USSR (Gibson et al. 1992, p.359). In the case of 
Belarus and Ukraine, Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer found a lower household income to result 
in a person being more likely to support undemocratic options (1998). In the context of 
economic turbulence, Finifter and Mickiewicz (1992, pp.869–70) argued that to the extent 
that income mattered, it was likely because it enabled people to ‘better withstand the sharp 
rise in prices’. Moreover, citizens that were wealthier and better educated would have the 
most potential for advancement during times of political and economic uncertainty (Finifter 
& Mickiewicz 1992, pp.869–70). 
 Similarly, Haerpfer’s (2002, p.69) measure of household economic performance was 
more powerful than age or gender in explaining democratic support from 1991 - 1998 in 
Russia, Ukraine and Belarus as well as fourteen other post-communist countries. However, 
Rose, Mishler and Munro found household economic situation to have no statistically 
significant effect on support for the Russian regime, dismissing the argument that people 
are likely to ‘vote with their pocketbook’ (2011, p.101). Given the results specifically on 
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democratic support as a dependent variable, however, those with higher incomes should 
be expected to be more supportive. 
 Subjective middle-class status and non-manual work appear to have some effect on 
democratic support; however, these are comparatively understudied. Nonetheless, in a 
review of the extant literature Evans (2006) noted that class had emerged as a key influence 
on vote choice in Eastern Europe, as in more advanced democracies. Although it tends to 
have a statistically significant effect on attitudes towards regimes, some findings are 
contradictory. For instance, Russians who see themselves as having a higher class status 
tend to be more supportive of the current regime (Rose et al. 2011). However, they are also 
more likely to reject undemocratic regime alternatives (Rose et al. 2006). In other research, 
a middle-class identity combined with a non-manual occupation is the second strongest 
predictor of support for democracy after education in Russia (McAllister & White 2017b). In 
Ukraine, higher social status made citizens more likely to participate in the Orange 
Revolution, but had less of an effect for Euromaidan (Reznik 2016). Mishler and Rose (2002) 
found that a higher socio-economic status, self-ranked in terms of ‘social position’, was 
similarly significant for supporting the current Russian regime while education was not. 
Class and occupation, then, are the socio-economic variables that are most in need of 
further study. 
 The last measure of social modernisation, living in an urban area, tends to 
correspond to higher support for democracy. This is evidenced in early studies of Russia 
and Ukraine (Miller et al. 1994, Reisinger et al. 1994) and in interviews conducted in the 
Soviet Union in 1989 (Finifter & Mickiewicz 1992). Residents of national capitals in post-
communist countries – including Ukraine and Belarus – were the ‘readiest to reject 
undemocratic regimes’, while rural residents were 13% less likely than average to do so 
(Rose et al. 1998). In fifteen post-communist countries analysed by Haerpfer (2002, p.50), 
support for democracy always appeared to be highest in cities of over 100,000 people.  
 Studies using more recent waves of data reported similar findings. Russians living in 
larger cities tend to be less supportive of the Putin regime, though this effect was limited 
(Rose et al. 2011). More specifically, urban Russians are more likely to reject authoritarian 
forms of government (Rose et al. 2006). Those living in smaller towns and rural areas, 
however, tended to provide the most ‘stable support’ for the Kremlin (Treisman 2014, 
p.377). While very little research has focused on Belarus or Ukraine, Reznik (2016) reports 
that Ukrainians from more populous settlements were more likely to have participated in the 
Orange Revolution and Euromaidan. McAllister and White note that urban dwellers were 
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less likely to support the Belarusian President Lukashenka, but acknowledge that this may 
simply be due to the ‘social characteristics that happen to coincide’ with living in a larger 
town (2016b, p.11). While results have varied, then, residents of more populous areas 
appear to be more likely to support democracy. 
 Research on the effects of education in particular suggests that social 
modernisation ought to significantly influence support for democracy in Russia, Ukraine 
and Belarus. This is consistent with the arguments of Almond and Verba (1963), Inglehart 
and Welzel (2005), and Diamond (1999, 2008b), among others, who, as outlined in the 
previous chapter, expected social modernisation to increase demand for democracy. 
However, it is not clear as to whether it affects cohorts uniformly, and results are far from 
conclusive. 
 
Performance models  
 How does regime performance affect support for democracy? Stemming from 
rational choice arguments, which focus on citizen evaluations of what regimes are 
delivering, performance theories hold that effective regimes will command stronger citizen 
support (Dahl 1971, Linz 1978). When citizens in a democracy believe the system is 
performing well, they tend to report higher democratic support (Huang et al. 2008). Effective 
autocratic regimes, however, can decrease public support for democratisation (Magalhães 
2014). Performance theories can therefore be considered a part of lifetime learning, where 
attitudes develop over the lifecycle in response to political experience (Mishler & Rose 
2001, Rose et al. 1998). 
 Performance models generally encompass both political and economic dimensions. 
As Bratton et al. (2005, p.42) point out, performance evaluations during ‘dual transitions’ 
depend on both economic and political goods. Citizens therefore need to evaluate both 
separately: new political rights might ameliorate resentment about economic difficulties, 
while a strong economy may later ‘help to legitimate democracy’ (Bratton et al. 2005, p.42). 
Studies focusing on the first decade of the post-communist transition indeed find that 
political performance trumps economic performance on attitudes towards democracy and 
the new regime (Evans & Whitefield 1995, Mishler & Rose 2002, Rose et al. 1998). Later 
studies of Russia (Rose & Mishler 2009) and ten post-communist democracies (Mishler et 
al. 2016), however, find economic considerations to be more important. The nature of the 
relationship between regime performance and support for democracy in Russia, Ukraine 
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and Belarus, then, remains unresolved, particularly with reference to its interaction with 
generational and lifecycle effects. 
On the first performance indicator, perceptions of electoral integrity, the literature 
shows varied results. While young people are well-represented in post-election protests in 
all three countries (Korosteleva 2009, Reznik 2016, White & McAllister 2014), the extent to 
which citizens actually view elections as fair is debated. While Birch (2008), for example, 
shows that over half of Russians and Ukrainians see their electoral process neutrally or 
unfavourably, ‘cultural conflict’ about what constitutes a fair electoral contest is well-
documented in Russia (Rose & Mishler 2009, p.131). This tends to centre on the perception 
that electoral malpractice would ultimately not have affected the results (White & McAllister 
2014, Wilson 2012): regardless of any interference, ‘the most popular party’ won (Rose & 
Mishler 2009, p.131). Evidence from the 2016 parliamentary election also indicates that 
Putin supporters were more likely to perceive it as a fair contest (McAllister & White 2017a). 
More broadly, Russians who are pleased with their party’s performance are less likely to be 
concerned with the integrity of the election (Rose & Mishler 2009).  
There is little research that tackles the effect of perceived electoral integrity on 
support for democracy. However, when citizens in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus view 
elections as fair, they are more satisfied with democracy (McAllister & White 2015). When 
Russians view elections as unfair, they report less national pride, institutional trust, and 
support for the existing authoritarian regime (Rose & Mishler 2009). Birch’s (2008, 2010) 
research on democracies indicates that lower confidence in electoral integrity leads to 
weaker support for democracy. Moreover, Anderson et al. (2005) demonstrate that merely 
participating in an election fosters attachment to the regime. When controlling for 
interactions between perceived electoral integrity and support for the incumbent, then, 
higher perceived electoral integrity should correspond with higher support for democracy. 
 Corruption is another ‘important indicator of the performance of the political system’ 
(Anderson & Tverdova 2003, p.91). Although research is again lacking on its effect on 
democratic support, its influence on other political attitudes are well-documented. 
Corruption lowers support for incumbent governments (Anderson & Tverdova 2003, Bratton 
et al. 2005, Clausen et al. 2011) and decreases trust (Canache & Allison 2005) and 
democratic legitimacy (Chang & Chu 2006). It also lowers support for the current regime 
(Booth & Seligson 2009, Mishler & Rose 2001b). In Latin America, this effect persists even 
when the socialisation of younger cohorts into democracy is taken into account (Moreno & 
Lagos 2016). One study of African states showed that corruption decreases trust, which in 
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turn ‘inhibits the development of mass attitudes supportive of democracy’ (Armah-Attoh et 
al. 2007, p.1).  
Across post-communist countries, being aware of more corruption also tends to 
correspond with more sceptical views of the government and regime. In newly democratic 
post-communist states, perceptions of fair treatment by the government correlate with 
support for democracy (Linde 2012). In Belarus, the belief that corruption had decreased 
under the post-Soviet system led to increased trust in the current legal and political system 
(Wallace & Latcheva 2006). For post-communist countries more broadly, perceiving higher 
corruption decreased trust in institutions, suggesting a wider decline in the ‘legitimacy of 
the public realm’ (Wallace & Latcheva 2006, p.99). Similarly, in a study including Russia, 
Belarus and Ukraine, believing that the post-Soviet regime was less corrupt than its 
predecessor generates higher trust in political institutions (Mishler & Rose 2001a). 
 The literature suggests that perceiving corruption makes citizens in authoritarian 
states more likely to desire a democratic system instead of the current corrupt regime. 
Magalhães (2014, p.92), for example, has demonstrated that effective authoritarian regimes 
foster ‘greater popular rejection of democracy’. Collins and Gambrel (2017, p.1300) tackle a 
similar problem using the case of Kyrgyzstan, finding that being concerned about 
corruption makes ‘an individual more likely to express support for democratic values’. 
Holding concerns about corruption also resulted in higher approval of the ‘democratising’ 
provisional government, which was associated with clean democratic government, and 
stronger disapproval of the previous authoritarian regime (Collins & Gambrel 2017, p.1299). 
 Russia, Belarus and Ukraine are 138th, 70th and 120th respectively on Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. In line with the findings above, Rose et al. 
(2006) find that perceiving higher corruption negatively affects regime support among 
Russians. Rose and Mishler later demonstrate, however, that corruption has no effect on 
attitudes towards the Putin government but does erode trust in institutions (Rose & Mishler 
2009, 2010). Believing public officials to be corrupt also negatively affects satisfaction with 
democracy in Belarus and Ukraine (McAllister & White 2015). While the evidence is 
therefore inconclusive for these countries specifically, we should expect perceived 
corruption to result in higher support for democracy as an alternative to a corrupt 
authoritarian regime.  
 A complementary theory of regime support is economic performance. As put by 
Elster (1993, p.271), ‘democracy will be undermined if it cannot deliver goods in the 
economic sphere’. Given that post-communist states underwent a ‘dual transition’ both 
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politically and economically (Fish 1994, p.40), economic performance has received slightly 
more attention in the region. Russia, Ukraine and Belarus each experienced economic crisis 
in the years following the collapse of the USSR (McAllister & White 2011b, Person 2016). 
Kitschelt (1992) notably demonstrates the connection between perceived economic 
performance and democratic support in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and Hungary. 
Economic evaluations had the same effect across eight post-communist countries 
including Russia and Ukraine, though the effect was not as great as that of political 
performance (Evans & Whitefield 1995).  
 More recently, Mishler et al. (2016) find that strong economic performance fosters 
support for post-communist democracies and erodes support for communism and 
authoritarian regimes more broadly. In Kyrgyzstan, poor economic evaluations lead to 
higher support for a democratic system by fostering opposition to the current transitional 
regime and decreasing trust in its institutions (Collins & Gambrel 2017). ‘Market satisfaction’ 
has also been found to have the strongest effect on support for the current system in 
Russia and other post-communist countries (Kluegel & Mason 2004, p.825), while 
economic performance ‘far outweighs’ perceptions of electoral integrity in predicting 
support for the Russian regime (Rose & Mishler 2009, p.131). Similarly, positive views of the 
economy increase support for Putin (McAllister & White 2011b, White & McAllister 2008). 
Given the broad pattern is that positive economic evaluations foster support for the current 
regime, democratic or not, we should expect perceived economic performance to have a 
negative effect on support for democracy in authoritarian Russia and Belarus and hybrid 
Ukraine. 
 The last performance measure, travel to democracies, is an aspect of lifetime 
learning that may affect how individuals evaluate democratic and authoritarian regimes, as 
well as the relative performance of those systems. While there is very little literature on this 
indicator, it is important to consider given that democratic values can be diffused access to 
free or international media, travel or contact with relatives (Rohrschneider 1999). Wang 
(2017, p.140), for example, demonstrates that Chinese students studying in Taiwan 
changed their political attitudes as a ‘result of political learning’. While a short stay in 
democracy did not definitively promote democratic support, socialising with their 
Taiwanese classmates did result in more positive attitudes towards democracy (Wang 
2017). Visits to democracies also decrease nostalgia for the Soviet Union in Ukraine and 
support for President Lukashenka in Belarus (McAllister & White 2016a). Coupled with the 
increasing desire of young Russians to emigrate (The Moscow Times 2019), travel to 
democracies should positively affect democratic support. 
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Democratic knowledge 
 Democratic knowledge has received less scholarly attention than other sources of 
support for democracy such as social modernisation, social capital and performance 
theories (Cho 2014a). Although a number of recent studies have examined various aspects 
of democratic knowledge and its influence on support for democracy (notable examples 
include Cho 2014 and Norris 2011), few have explored this relationship in Russia, Ukraine 
or Belarus. As explained in Chapter One, existing research on this topic stems from the 
basic assumption that the ability to understand a political concept may affect individual 
attitudes towards that concept (McClosky & Zaller 1984). More specifically, scholars have 
argued that democratic knowledge affects individual support for or satisfaction with 
democracy (Crow 2010, Mattes & Bratton 2007). In terms of this study’s theoretical 
framework adapted from Shin (2015a) and Norris (2011), a procedural understanding of 
democracy that identifies elections, civil rights and equal rights for women as democratic 
should correspond to higher support for democracy, as opposed to authoritarian 
understandings that demonstrate a lack of understanding of what democracy is. 
The ability to distinguish between democracy and authoritarianism is particularly 
important for societies with limited historical experience of democracy. Socialisation under 
such regimes has been argued to produce ‘democratic novices’, who may support aspects 
of democratic and authoritarian systems concurrently (Shin 2015b, p.13). This may be 
especially true for post-communist countries, where citizens were socialised under an 
authoritarian regime that nonetheless had a ‘rhetorical commitment to democracy’ (Dalton 
1994, p.473). Lu and Shi’s recent study of China, for instance, finds that those with an 
understanding of liberal democracy were much more likely to see the ‘true authoritarian 
nature’ of the regime (2014, p.18). Those who accepted the Chinese Communist Party’s 
definition of ‘democracy’ were more likely to perceive the regime ‘as more or less a 
democracy’ (Lu & Shi 2014, p.18) despite it consistently being classified as ‘not free’ 
(Freedom House 2019). 
It is therefore crucial to evaluate people’s ability not only to define democracy, but 
also whether they are able to discern between democracy and authoritarianism. Previous 
research has typically asked open- or closed-ended questions to gauge competence in 
understanding and distinguishing between regime types. While the open-ended approach is 
guided by the question ‘how do citizens define democracy?’ (Dalton et al. 2007a), closed-
ended questions offer structured choices designed to gauge a respondent’s ability to 
discern between characteristics of democratic and authoritarian systems (Cho 2014a). 
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Moreover, Canache (2012, p.1140) notes that asking open-ended questions and taking the 
number of meanings a respondent can offer for democracy as an indicator of their 
democratic knowledge may actually just be measuring ‘sheer verbosity’ or personality. 
Although the closed-ended approach is more appropriate for this study, studies utilising 
open-ended questions have provided important data as to how post-Soviet citizens 
understand ‘democracy’ and are thus included here. 
Large-scale survey studies of people’s knowledge of democracy indeed show that it 
can mean many different things to different people (Bratton et al. 2005, Cho 2015, Dalton et 
al. 2007b, Miller et al. 1997). What has been clearly established is that the ability of citizens 
to define democracy ‘varies considerably across countries and different time periods’ 
(Dalton et al. 2007a). Bratton et al (2005, p.66) find, for instance, that South Africans were 
much more likely than others to be able to define democracy; however, 92% of people in 
Malawi, a comparatively rural and less literate society, were also ‘well aware of democracy’. 
Less than half of Russians surveyed in 2008 were able to offer a definition that included key 
points such as ‘rights, freedoms, the rule of law, elections [and] political competition’ (Hale 
2011, p.1360). A quarter were unable to provide any definition at all (Hale 2011). 
A positive relationship between knowledge of democracy and support for a 
democratic system has been found in existing research. In one of their influential studies of 
African public opinion, Bratton and Mattes (2001, p.117) note that ‘individuals who cannot 
define democracy are much less attached to it as a preferred form of regime’. This finding 
has been replicated in Latin America (Baviskar & Malone 2004, Carrion 2008), a 1997 study 
of Russia and Ukraine (Miller et al. 1997) and a recent study of forty-four countries 
worldwide (Cho 2014a). The general conclusion, then, is that we expect knowing more 
about democracy in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus to have a positive effect on support for 
democracy. 
However, research also tends to find that social understandings of democracy 
emphasising state welfare and economic issues are common. Social understandings of 
democracy themselves do not constitute knowledge of democracy: firstly, because 
economic benefits are a possible consequence of democratic governance rather than one 
of its core features (Collier & Levitsky 1997), and secondly because a focus on economic or 
redistributive outcomes does not suggest a strong or lasting commitment to democracy 
itself (Norris 2011, p.154). As Dalton, Shin and Jou (2007b, p.144) note, support for 
democracy ‘may mean a desire to achieve this same economic – but not necessarily the 
same political – standard’ as advanced industrial democracies. It follows that this may lead 
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respondents to identify economic benefits as key characteristics of democracy (Dalton et 
al. 2007b, p.144). 
Understanding democracy in social-democratic terms has, however, been found to 
be commonplace in both democratic and autocratic societies. In a study of both 
democratic and hybrid regimes in East Asia, Chang and Chu (2007, pp.5–6) note that even 
despite highly educated populations, a procedural understanding of democracy ‘has yet to 
become the prevailing popular view’. This is in contrast to Dalton, Shin and Jou (2007a), 
who compare survey data from Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America and conclude that 
‘most people think of democracy in terms of the freedoms, liberties and rights that it 
conveys’.  
The procedural versus social typology takes on special relevance in formerly 
communist regimes: while citizens hailing from both democracies and autocracies often 
express social views (Norris 2011, p.157), the socialising effect of communism is often 
argued to result in more emphasis being placed on economic benefits and wealth 
redistribution. Bashkirova (2006, p.368), for instance, argued that ‘most Russians expected 
primarily prosperity and individual welfare from democracy, not civil liberties’, and that this 
constituted a ‘strong incentive to prefer democracy’. This is further to a debate that was 
‘raging’ (Gibson 1996a, p.952) after the fall of the Soviet Union as to the relationship 
between attitudes towards political systems and economic policy. Findings ranged from 
Finifter and Mickiewicz’s (1992, p.860) caveat that support for democracy did ‘not 
necessarily mean that one is eager to abandon the socialist system’, to Miller et al.’s (1994, 
p.410) argument that support ‘does imply an abandonment of the socialist system in favour 
of increased individual responsibility’. 
This link is made explicitly by Fuchs (1999, p.143), who concludes in his analysis of 
former East and West Germans that ‘the socialisation and experience of East Germans in 
the German Democratic Republic had a systematic impact on their normative notions of 
democracy’. Successive New Russia Barometer Surveys have found majorities to identify 
economic benefits such as a basic income and prosperity as ‘essential’ to democracy 
(Rose et al. 2006, pp.127–128). By contrast, Wegmann and Knutsen (2014) find that having 
lived under a communist regime made individuals less likely to see redistribution as 
essential to democracy. Because young people socialised after the fall of the Soviet Union 
had, of course, little to no experience with communism, the implications for this study are 
unclear. 
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The theoretical expectations outlined in Chapter One – that citizens living in 
autocracies will have less democratic knowledge than those in democracies – are largely 
confirmed by empirical research. Norris’ (2011, p.157) cross-national analysis finds that 
social-democratic understandings are most commonly expressed by citizens living in 
autocracies such as Russia, as well as China, Iraq and Jordan. After controlling for key 
factors such as education, media use and income, however, she found that ‘the historical 
experience of democracy in each society did not help to predict a correct procedural 
understanding’ (Norris 2011, p.159). Historical experience of democracy nonetheless 
‘strongly undermines instrumental and authoritarian understandings’ (Norris 2011, p.159). 
Cho (2015, p.255), too, notes that citizens able to effectively distinguish between 
democracy and authoritarianism ‘constitute a majority only in the West’. Cho does find, 
however, that knowledge of ‘democracy and its core elements... has advanced further than 
understanding the difference between democracy and its alternatives as a system of 
government’ (2015, p.249).  
What is clear is that knowledge of democracy matters for democratic support. The 
theoretical expectation that a procedural rather than social understanding of democracy 
should result in stronger or more durable support appears to hold up across many studies, 
regardless of region or regime type. In the case of Africa, Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Bodi 
(2005, p.274) note that ‘a procedural understanding of democracy is a top-ranked element 
explaining why some Africans demand democracy and others do not’. This holds even 
when controlling for education (Bratton et al. 2005). In Latin America and East Asia, 
procedural understandings of democracy likewise correspond to stronger support for 
democracy (Baviskar & Malone 2004, Chang & Chu 2007). Utilising the Shin (2015a) 
framework that requires respondents to differentiate between characteristics of democratic 
and authoritarian regimes should thus shed light on the extent to which Russians, 
Ukrainians and Belarusians are informed about democracy. While this in itself will address a 
gap in the literature, examining the relationship between democratic knowledge and 
support for democracy in these countries will extend analysis further. 
 
Conclusion 
 Based on the available empirical literature, three main trends can be outlined as 
follows. Firstly, despite the ‘cultural-continuity thesis’ that suggests citizens of post-Soviet 
countries and Russia in particular are historically inclined to authoritarianism (Hahn 1991, 
p.397), support for democracy is reported to have been relatively widespread since the 
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collapse of the USSR. However, such support is often tempered by simultaneous support 
for authoritarian rule (Bashkirova 2006, Haerpfer 2002, Hale 2011). The four-item World 
Values Survey battery designed to capture support for democracy as well as account for 
support for authoritarianism will therefore provide a more robust account of the attitudes of 
young people socialised since the end of communism. Moreover, this study will be able to 
compare attitudes towards democracy across cohorts socialised under a wider variety of 
regimes and conditions. 
 Secondly, although ‘age’ has often been found to matter for democratic support and 
political attitudes more broadly, comparatively few studies explore this in terms of learning 
and socialisation. While early socialisation has been found to have an effect on political 
attitudes in post-communist society (Mishler & Rose 2007, Pop-Eleches & Tucker 2014, 
Rose & Carnaghan 1995), it is not clear as to how enduring this might be. Moreover, 
research that focuses explicitly on socialisation in the region tends to focus on the effect of 
communism. This thesis aims to shed light on the effects of growing up under the hybrid 
and authoritarian regimes that emerged in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus after the demise of 
the USSR. 
 Thirdly, while Chapter One established the theoretical relevance of each set of 
independent variables included in this study, the empirical literature reviewed here indicates 
that the effects of many of them remain uncertain. Some, such as a higher level of 
education and urban residence, have consistently been found to increase support for 
democracy, and as such are expected to do so in this study as well. Others, such as 
perceived electoral integrity and travel to democracies in particular, are comparatively 
understudied, with the existing literature providing a less clear indication as to how they 
might affect support. Democratic knowledge is receiving increasing attention and knowing 
more about democracy is expected to correspond to higher support, but again, this is 
largely based on research conducted in other regions. 
Many of the studies reviewed above, moreover, describe findings specific to one 
country or a particular period in time. The theoretical and empirical literature reviewed in 
this and the previous chapter have given a decent indication as to what is expected to 
influence support for democracy among cohorts of young people in Russia, Belarus and 
Ukraine. However, it is too often the case that evidence is scarce, particularly in terms of 
how these factors might play out in Ukraine and Belarus as compared to Russia, which has 
received the bulk of scholarly attention. There is, of course, also a significant gap in terms 
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of how young people socialised after the fall of the Soviet Union view democracy, as well as 
what might predict their attitudes.  
 To address these oversights, the next chapter will present the methodology of this 
thesis and explain the operationalisation of each variable. Chapter Four will chart levels of 
support for democracy across generational cohorts from 1996 - 2011, and explore the 
extent to which this might be attributed to generational or lifecycle or period effects. 
Following this, the effects of social modernisation (chapter 5), regime performance (chapter 
6), and democratic knowledge (chapter 7) on support for democracy will be explored. 
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Data, measurement and methods 
 
 The previous chapters have reviewed the theory and literature on the relationship 
between political socialisation and support for democracy. This chapter provides an 
overview of the data, variables and method used to perform the analyses and test the 
hypotheses in the following chapters. Where appropriate, more specific details are provided 
in each substantive chapter. The central aim of this study is to test for generational and 
lifecycle effects on support for democracy, while controlling for three competing models of 
regime support. It is therefore crucial that democratic support and generational cohort can 
be measured over time for our three case studies. The World Values Survey and McAllister 
and White’s Research Surveys provide measures for each theoretical model taken at 
several time points across the post-Soviet period, as will be shown below. This chapter will 
first justify Russia, Ukraine and Belarus as case studies for testing theories of political 
learning and socialisation. It will then describe the data sources and methodology 
employed in this thesis and detail the operationalisation of the dependent and independent 
variables.  
 
3.1 Case selection 
 This thesis investigates the role of political learning and socialisation in developing 
support for democracy. In established democracies, such research is difficult because each 
generation is socialised into the same system and should thus express similar levels of 
support for democracy (Mishler & Rose 2002, p.6). Russia, Ukraine and Belarus are ideal 
case studies to test these theories precisely because their history of regime change has 
produced cohorts socialised under different political systems (Mishler & Rose 2002, p.6). 
This study is therefore able to investigate what happens when generations experience a 
transition from communism to democracy, and when subsequent cohorts experience 
different regime variations. Russia has long been a coveted case study for political 
socialisation and democratic support (Rose & Carnaghan 1995, Mishler & Rose 2007) due 
to its ‘fitful political trajectory’ from Yeltsin’s ‘sweeping democratic reforms’ to Putin’s 
authoritarian consolidation (Gerber & Chapman 2018, p.485). Ukraine and Belarus, 
however, have received far less attention and are thus ideal cases for comparison to 
include in this study.
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 The methodology therefore follows a most similar systems design in selecting its 
cases, which provides ‘an element of control by selecting cases on the basis of 
comparability and similarity’ (Goggin 1986, p.331). Lijphart notes that one such strategy is 
to choose countries ‘found within a geographical-cultural area’ (1975, p.159). This allows 
researchers to control for ‘durable cultural traditions’, which are among the most important 
influences on ‘political values and behaviours’ (Fuchs & Klingemann 2002, p.27). While a 
most similar systems design therefore aids in isolating the possible effects of political 
socialisation, it does limit generalisability beyond the cases studied in this thesis (King et al. 
1994, pp.139–42). Including three cases, however, does allow us to test ‘the generalisability 
of the Soviet legacy’ (Rose 2009, p.3) and the extent to which it may apply to other post-
Soviet states. 
 Specifically, this study controls for cultural factors that may affect support for a 
democratic system. Russia, Ukraine and Belarus are all dominantly Slavic and together 
represent half the population and three-quarters of the territory of the former Soviet bloc 
(White 2007, p.39). They are also majority Orthodox, possess a similar ‘level of socio-
economic modernity’ as measured by GDP per capita, and originated from the same 
historical empires (Fuchs & Klingemann 2002, pp.28-29). Each country experienced 
seventy-four years of communism, while culturally similar countries such as Moldova 
endured only fifty years of Leninist rule (Fuchs & Klingemann 2002). Given this study’s focus 
on political socialisation, the length and nature of exposure to communism is one element 
that needs to be controlled for since there were ‘differences between and within countries’ 
on how communists governed (Mishler & Rose 2002, p.10). Russia, Ukraine and Belarus 
were the ‘most “Russified” parts of the Soviet Union’, and communism was ‘the national 
form of government’ (Mishler & Rose 2002, p.10). The fall of the USSR was therefore a 
‘mixed blessing, simultaneously celebrated and mourned in different quarters’, whereas for 
most Eastern European countries it was ‘greeted widely as national liberation’ (Mishler et al. 
2016, p.127).  
 Russia, Ukraine and Belarus therefore each provide a cohort of citizens socialised 
under similar Soviet circumstances, but also subsequent generations socialised under very 
different circumstances. The Soviet cohort was socialised into communism, and there is 
then a cohort in each country socialised after the fall of the USSR as each country 
underwent some degree of democratisation. Lastly, the youngest generation in each 
country was socialised into very different circumstances as Belarus and Russia 
consolidated into authoritarian regimes and Ukraine followed a path of fitful liberalisation 
and revolution. The cohorts are described fully in section 3.3. For now, it is sufficient to 
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note that these countries display a ‘wide variation in regime type’ that provide a rich case 
for observing how democratic support emerges in a varied range of political regimes 
(Person 2019). Moreover, these different post-Soviet trajectories mean that we can 
delineate ‘multiple types of generations’ and test the effect of socialisation into different 
regime types (Mattes et al. 2016, p.22). Taking Russia, Ukraine and Belarus as the cases 
analysed in this study therefore allows for generalising beyond a single case and testing the 
theory of interest while controlling for extraneous variation. 
 
3.2 Data sources and method 
 As already described, this study focuses on the political attitudes of ordinary 
citizens and is cross-national in nature. In testing the effects of political socialisation and 
the competing models of social modernisation, regime performance and democratic 
knowledge, this thesis requires data which offers measures consistent across time and 
place. This thesis is able to empirically test its hypotheses by employing the World Values 
Survey for the bulk of analysis and McAllister and White’s Research Surveys for the 
performance model. More broadly, cross-national surveys allow us to test the ‘empirical 
generalisability of claims’ about political attitudes, provides the opportunity for comparative 
study of contextual influences on such attitudes, and offers ‘points of comparison’ between 
countries (Curtice 2007, p.898). 
 The World Values Survey was first fielded in the early 1980s and gradually expanded 
worldwide. Survey questions are developed by the board, translated into local languages 
by the national team, and fieldwork carried out by ‘leading survey research firms’ (Dalton & 
Shin 2006, p.275). The WVS therefore allows the use of standardised items consistent 
across time and place, while comparable datasets offer fewer benefits. The Comparative 
Study of Electoral Systems does not include any data past the year 2004 in Russia, 2000 in 
Ukraine and 2008 in Belarus, and the International Social Survey Programme only covers 
data on Russia. The European Social Survey similarly only offers data from 2004 onwards 
and has not conducted surveys in Belarus. The World Values Survey, supplemented by the 
Research Surveys where appropriate, offers the temporal and geographical scope of 
observations required by this research. Russia and Belarus were first included in the WVS 
survey in 1990; however, the 1990-1994 survey wave did not include questions designed to 
tap support for democracy and thus does not offer observations on the dependent variable. 
Belarus was not included in Wave 5 (2005-2007), which is thus excluded from the analysis.  
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 While the WVS offers valuable measures of the social modernisation and democratic 
knowledge models, it does lack certain variables from the performance model. Specifically, 
it does not ask about electoral integrity or corruption. For chapter 6, this study therefore 
uses McAllister and White’s Research Surveys, which include all necessary survey items for 
the performance model. It takes the most recent survey wave available for each country, 
namely Russia 2018, Belarus 2006 and Ukraine 2010.10 
 Table 3.1 shows the fieldwork dates, interview mode and sample size of each 
national survey wave utilised in this thesis. At least 1,000 respondents were interviewed in 
each country, through to over 2,000 in some of the World Values Surveys. All interviews 
were conducted face-to-face, and the sample drawn with the random route method. Each 
WVS survey was organised centrally, as described above. The Research Surveys were 
conducted by R-Research Ltd, the Centre for Sociological and Political Research at the 
Belarusian State University, and the Ukrainian regional partners of Russian Research. 
  
Table 3.1: Survey data overview 
Survey Fieldwork dates Mode Response 
rates 
N 
Russia 
WVS 21 November 1995 - 25 January 
1996 
Face-to-face 75% 2,040 
WVS 21 September to 16 October 
2011 
Face-to-face 24% 2,500 
WVS 7 November - 29 December 
2017 
Face-to-face Not reported 1,810 
Research Survey 4 - 26 April 2018 Face-to-face 51% 2,004 
Belarus 
WVS 5 - 30 December 1996 Face-to-face 49% 2,092 
Research Survey 5 - 19 June 2006 Face-to-face Not reported 1,000 
WVS 18 November - 5 December 
2011 
Face-to-face Not reported 1,500 
WVS 1 February - 5 March 2018 Face-to-face Not reported 1,548 
Ukraine 
WVS 12 September - 1 October 1996 Face-to-face 85% 2,811 
Research Survey 15 - 24 February 2010 Face-to-face 62% 1,200 
WVS 1 - 12 December 2011 Face-to-face 58% 1,500 
 
 
10 Ukraine 2012 and Belarus 2011 did not provide all necessary survey questions. 
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 This study explores its research questions quantitatively using descriptive and 
inferential statistics. Each chapter follows a standard structure of reporting descriptive 
statistics on each variable before proceeding to multivariate analysis. OLS regression 
models test the effects of each model on support for democracy, while Chapter Seven 
employs factor analysis to explore the structure of post-Soviet citizens’ understanding of 
democracy. The use of cross-national surveys means that respondents ‘are not 
independent of each other, but rather are clustered by nation’ (Curtice 2007, p.905). Each 
regression is therefore run separately by country so that any national differences do not 
affect the results. Each model is then run separately by generational cohort, so as not only 
to test each model nationally but to determine whether theories of democratic support 
function the same way regardless of what conditions a cohort is socialised into. Without 
panel data being available, this study cannot definitively disentangle age, cohort and period 
effects, but its methods ‘will go a long way toward testing whether respondents’ views vary 
meaningfully by generation’ even while taking other models into account (Mattes et al. 
2016, p.17). 
 The lack of panel data available also necessitates that this study cautiously report 
‘the correlates of support rather than predictors’ given that it uses cross-sectional data 
(Dalton 2004, p.62). When testing relationships between attitudinal variables, moreover, we 
cannot rule out reciprocal causation (Bartels 2006, p.147). However, this study provides an 
exploratory analysis in an understudied combination of cases using survey data unavailable 
for prior waves of regime transitions. As such, it contributes to the literature in giving ‘an 
initial sense of the correlates of support’ and in which social groups support for democracy 
may be emerging (Dalton 2004, p.62). Furthermore, it can aid further enquiry by ruling out 
theories where regression results are inconsistent with a proposed causal mechanism 
(Dalton 2004).  
 To maintain as much of each sample as possible and maximise validity, this study 
excludes missing data using the listwise procedure. As shown in Table 3.1, the samples are 
large enough to allow for this, and ‘the vast bulk of missing data may be regarded as 
ignorable’ regardless (Mattes & Bratton 2007, p.208). The WVS presents an additional 
problem with ‘don’t know’ responses, which were allowed in Russia and Belarus but not 
Ukraine. As put by Mattes and Bratton (2007, p.208), this reflects ‘relatively arbitrary factors 
of the national questionnaire design process, not to anything intrinsic to citizenship in that 
country’. To maintain consistency between cases, ‘don’t know’ responses were excluded 
on the grounds that in autocracies or new democracies, unfamiliarity with the concept of 
democracy may produce ‘genuine don’t know responses’ (McAllister & White 2017b, p.80), 
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which should be distributed randomly among the population and have little impact on 
analysis (Francis & Busch 1975). While another explanation may be that respondents in 
authoritarian countries may avoid expressing support for democracy due to fear, prior 
research has found that this is unlikely to be the case (Carnaghan 1996, McAllister & White 
2017b). 
  Lastly, contextual data where is used where appropriate. Primarily, this is in Chapter 
Four, where Freedom House and the Varieties of Democracy project are used to identify 
generational cohorts. This is supplemented with general political and historical scholarship 
on the region to determine the degree to which cohorts were exposed to democracy, and 
the general conditions into which they were socialised. Freedom House has reported on 
political trends since the 1950s and is produced annually with the input of in-house 
analysts, academics and think-tank researchers.11 Its Freedom in the World and Nations in 
Transit reports provide contextual information that is used to delineate generational 
cohorts. This study also utilises the V-Dem Liberal Democracy Index, which was produced 
with the involvement of over 2,600 country experts answering over four hundred questions 
to build V-Dem’s regime indicators. The Liberal Democracy Index is used for mapping the 
broad contextual conditions of each country of time as it includes measures of electoral 
democracy as well as liberal democracy and as such provides a comprehensive overview 
of regime trajectories.12 
 
3.3 Operationalisation of dependent and independent variables 
 The main dependent and independent variables, democratic support and 
generational cohort respectively, appear in every chapter of this thesis. This section 
introduces these variables, as well as the independent variables in the alternative models. It 
briefly explains why each is included and, where appropriate, gives a justification as to how 
it is measured. Full details on every variable, such as question wording and coding, are 
included in the Appendix. 
 
 
11 See https://freedomhouse.org/report/methodology-freedom-world-2018 for a general overview. 
12 Specifically, ‘electoral democracy’ measures freedom of association, clean elections, freedom of expression, 
elected officials and suffrage; ‘liberal democracy’ measures rule of law, an independent judiciary, civil liberties, 
and ‘effective checks and balances that… limit the exercise of executive power’ (Coppedge et al. 2017, p.49). 
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Dependent variable: Support for democracy 
 The dependent variable throughout the thesis is support for democracy. As 
discussed in Chapter One, democratic support is both normatively and empirically 
important: broadly speaking, countries with high levels of citizen support for democracy 
and low support of autocratic rule ‘tend to be stable democracies’ (Inglehart 2003, p.34). 
There are, however, many public attitudes that may ‘contribute to the emergence and 
flourishing of democracy’, such as interpersonal trust, outgroup tolerance and post-
materialist values (Inglehart 2003, p.51). Related concepts such as trust in institutions and 
satisfaction with democracy are also well-studied, but ‘neither is a valid measure of 
principled support for democracy’ (Claassen 2019a, p.5). The latter is a particularly 
common measure, but refers to how a democracy works in practice rather than being ‘an 
indicator of support for the principles of democracy’ (Linde & Ekman 2003, p.391).  
 In a recent review of common survey measures, Mattes (2018) identifies four 
conceptions of the kind of ‘democratic citizen’ needed for a democracy to emerge and 
survive. While three ‘emphasise different types of values’ such as social capital, tolerance 
and emancipation values, the fourth focuses on explicit preferences for a democratic 
regime (2018, p.3). Rose (1997) pointed out that democratic values and social capital were 
unlikely to be widespread in new democracies. The choice of many scholars, then, is to 
give respondents a ‘choice between competing regime types’ (Mattes 2018, p.6) to 
determine the extent to which democracy is ‘the only game in town’ (Linz & Stepan 1996, 
p.6). Survey questions that tap ‘explicit support for democracy versus autocracy’ is the 
standard measure of democratic support (Claassen 2019, p.2) and allows us to study 
diffuse support for a regime (Easton 1975). 
 Because representative surveys were not easily conducted in the communist world, 
early survey research focused primarily on established democracies (Dalton & Welzel 2014). 
Now, however, we have access to ‘reliable empirical measures’ that are standardised 
across time and place (Norris 2011, p.42), and even citizens in authoritarian countries 
‘express as much support for democracy as those in democracies’ (Kirsch & Welzel 2019, 
p.86). Inglehart notes that while ‘almost everyone gives lip service to democracy’, this is not 
as genuine as it may seem (Inglehart 2003, p.52). As Schedler and Sarsfield (2007, p.642) 
argue, while scholars of democratisation grapple with the concept of ‘hybrid regimes’, 
scholars of public opinion must make sense of ‘hybrid citizens’. Those claiming to support 
democracy, for example, ‘may see no conflict with practices such as one-party rule’ 
(Mattes et al. 2016, p.16). 
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 This study therefore follows the bulk of the literature (Bratton et al. 2005, Dalton 
2004, Klingemann et al. 2006, Magalhães 2014, Mattes et al. 2016, Norris 2011) in 
constructing a more robust measure of democratic support that controls for any 
simultaneous support of authoritarian regimes. By controlling for such contradictions, we 
can account for ‘purely rhetorical’ support for democracy (Dalton & Shin 2006, p.81) and 
ensure that respondents genuinely believe democracy is preferable to other options (Sartori 
1987, p.274). Empirically, this is important because prior research has established that even 
for those claiming to support democracy, many do not endorse it when offered a choice 
between democracy and autocracy (Shin & Wells 2005, p.92). Moreover, many post-Soviet 
citizens have experienced multiple regimes, but only one that approached being 
democratic (Rose & Mishler 1996, p.31).  
 Requiring citizens to choose between democratic and authoritarian systems creates 
a ‘relativist’ measure of support reminiscent of Winston Churchill’s argument that 
‘democracy is the worst form of government, except all those other forms that have been 
tried from time to time’ (Rose & Mishler 1996, pp.29, 31). Such an index is variously referred 
to as a ‘Democracy/Autocracy Index’ (Inglehart 2003, p.54), ‘democratic regime index’ 
(Dalton & Shin 2006, p.81) or ‘democracy - autocracy scale’ (Klingemann et al. 2006, p.5). 
The index items provided by the World Values Survey are as follows: 
 
I’m going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of 
governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad, or very bad way of 
governing this country?  
- Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections  
- Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country  
- Having the army rule  
- Having a democratic political system. 
 
 As Dalton and Shin (2006, p.81) point out, this question design means that 
respondents can ‘express support for nondemocratic alternatives in the first three items 
before the democratic alternative is presented’. Furthermore, the response options of ‘very 
good’ through to ‘very bad’ facilitates ‘potential nondemocratic responses on the first three 
items’, meaning that ‘disapproval of autocratic regime forms’ is inherent in the measuring of 
democratic support (Dalton & Shin 2006, p.81). To create the composite democratic 
support index, the questions tapping support for a strong leader, army rule and expert rule 
were therefore reverse-coded so that higher values on these items corresponded to 
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rejection of authoritarian forms of rule. All four items were then summed to create an index 
of democratic support ranging from 0 to 12, with higher values corresponding to higher 
support for democracy.13 This scale is used in the bulk of the democratic support literature 
(Bratton et al. 2005, Dalton & Shin 2006, Inglehart 2003, Klingemann et al. 2006, Mattes et 
al. 2016, Norris 2011, Pop-Eleches & Tucker 2017) and is employed here for both 
comparison and to ensure that support for democracy is not diluted by simultaneous 
support for autocratic regimes (Shin & Wells 2005). 
 
Independent variables 
 The theory of democratic support tested throughout this thesis is political 
socialisation. The main set of independent variables is, therefore, generational cohorts 
classified according to the regime type members were socialised into. Identifying 
generational cohorts is ‘partly a function of historical interpretation and partly a matter of 
empirical analysis’ (Mishler & Rose 2007, p.825). Chapter One has already provided an 
overview of the debates in the political learning and socialisation literature. Chapter Four 
undertakes the historical interpretation necessary to delineate generational cohorts; 
however, to operationalise generational cohort it is necessary not only to identify the points 
at which one political period ends and another began, but the age at which citizens are 
considered to have been ‘socialised’. This thesis tests the ‘impressionable years’ 
hypothesis: that fundamental attitudes develop in adolescence and early adulthood and are 
broadly resistant to change (Campbell et al. 1960, Mattes et al. 2016, p.5). Previous work 
suggests that longer exposure to a regime over type is likely to have a stronger effect on 
political attitudes; for example, longer exposure to communism has been found to decrease 
support for democracy (Pop-Eleches & Tucker 2014). One contribution of this study is its 
focus on populations that have experienced multiple regime changes. It is therefore able to 
explore the length or degree of socialisation required to affect democratic support among 
individuals. 
 A general principle in classifying cohorts is that ‘youth experiencing the same 
concrete historical problems may be said to be part of the same actual generation’ 
(Mannheim 1952, p.304). The broad consensus is that ‘the impact of historical events is 
greatest when they occur in adolescence and young adulthood’ (Sapiro 2004, p.11). Often 
 
13 Principal-component factor analysis confirms that these items measure an underlying latent factor of 
democratic support. 
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termed ‘the impressionable years model’, this conception of political socialisation holds 
that political orientations and values are formed early, ‘followed by a period of modest to 
strong crystallisation’ (Jennings 2007, p.33). At minimum, these become a lens for 
‘understanding, interpreting and evaluating situations, issues, and problems that individuals 
experience throughout the lifecycle’ (Mattes et al. 2016, p.5). Empirically, earlier waves of 
democratisation in Germany (Baker et al. 1981) and Japan (Richardson 1974) saw 
democratic support emerge most strongly among the young. Mattes et al. (2016, p.5) point 
out that while some explanations for this gave credit to civic education in schools, there 
was also notable influence from ‘generalised exposure to democracy’. It is this exposure 
that forms the basis for this study’s classification of generational cohorts. 
 How, then, do we identify which citizens belong to which cohort? The literature 
generally agrees on the focus on ‘adolescence and young adulthood’ (Sapiro 2004, p.11). 
Mannheim identified 18 to 25 as the formative years (1952, pp.299-300); others have used 
15 to 25 (Grasso 2014) or the year in which a citizen reaches voting age (Dalton & Shin 
2014) . Following their review of the socialisation literature, Mattes et al. (2016) identify ages 
14 to 22 as the broad impressionable years. By identifying the year a respondent turned 18, 
we are able to locate individuals ‘who spent a majority of their formative years’ under a 
regime - that is, ages 14 to 18 versus 19 to 22 (Mattes et al. 2016, p.13).14 As well as solving 
the identification problem, 18 is of course the start of legal adulthood, and accounts for the 
research indicating that ‘for most youths meaningful political socialisation is well under way 
by the mid-teens’ (Mattes et al. 2016, p.13).  
 As chapter 4 discusses in great historical detail the classification of generational 
cohorts, Table 3.2 simply presents how respondents are coded. The year in which a 
respondent turns 18 is taken as the means of identifying cohort. Each country has a Soviet 
generation socialised before the collapse of communism in 1991, which forms the reference 
category for each country. Each country then has two additional cohorts classified by the 
political context and level of ‘generalised exposure to democracy’ (Mattes et al. 2016, p.5) 
to test the central hypothesis that more exposure means higher democratic support. There 
are three ‘transition’ generations characterised by their socialisation into a democratising 
period experienced in the 1990s. In Russia and Belarus, the consolidation of an 
authoritarian regime under Putin and Lukashenka respectively has resulted in ‘authoritarian’ 
 
14 The authors also note that ‘given the inherent ambiguities, it seems pointless to push any further the question 
of exactly when an event occurred - ie, what day and month’ (Mattes et al. 2016, p.21). 
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generations. In Ukraine, however, the youngest cohort was socialised during and after the 
Orange Revolution, which again saw some level of democratisation. Each country therefore 
has a total of three political generations socialised under different regime types, which 
allows for ‘the possibility that governing structures other than democracy lead citizens to 
adopt particular attitudes towards governance’ (Mattes et al. 2016, p.22). 
 
Table 3.2: Defining generations 
 
Generation Birth year Turned 18 Experience 
USSR Soviet  - 1972 - 1990 Socialism, authoritarianism 
Russia Transition 1973 - 1982 1991 - 2000 Limited political and civil rights  
Authoritarian 1983 -  2001- Consolidating authoritarianism 
Belarus Transition 1973 - 1977 1991 - 1995 Limited political and civil rights  
Authoritarian 1978 - 1996 -  Consolidating authoritarianism 
Ukraine Transition 1973 - 1985 1991 - 2003 Limited political and civil rights  
Revolution 1986 - 2004 -  Some democratisation 
 
 The second model of democratic support tested in this study is social 
modernisation. The key tenet of modernisation theory was developed by Lipset (1959a), 
who argued that increasing education, wealth and urbanisation creates fertile ground for 
democratisation. At the individual level, rising income, higher education, membership of the 
middle class, occupation and urban residence are argued to provide the ability and desire 
to seek greater political and civil rights (Inglehart & Welzel 2005). A wealthy and educated 
middle class, for example, should wish to protect property rights and have a stake in 
‘stability, the rule of law and democratic procedures’ more generally (Goldman 2006, 
p.322). Factors such as education, occupation and income are likely to expand people’s 
social and cognitive capabilities, which Welzel and Inglehart (2006, p.32) contend may lead 
them to form movements demanding ‘greater and more effective liberties’. In short, the 
individual-level indicators of social modernisation tested in this study are widely viewed as 
fostering demand for democracy, which in an authoritarian regime may threaten the system 
itself (Welzel & Inglehart 2006, p.32). 
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 Chapter 5 uses Waves 3, 6 and 7 of the World Values Survey to test social 
modernisation theory. Following the existing theory and literature, which is described in full 
in chapter 5, five social modernisation variables are included in the regression model. Table 
3.3 provides details of variable construction. University education is coded as a binary 
indicator tapping at least some university-level education. Income is a ten-point scale 
where the respondent estimates their household income group. A dummy variable for those  
 
Table 3.3: Social modernisation variables 
Variable Question Coding 
University educated ‘What is the highest educational level 
that you have attained?’ 
1 No formal education 
2 Incomplete primary school 
3 Complete primary school 
4 Incomplete secondary school: 
technical/vocational type 
5 Complete secondary school: 
technical/vocational type 
6 Incomplete secondary: university-
preparatory type 
7 Complete secondary: university-
preparatory type 
8 Some university-level education, 
without degree 
9 University-level education, with 
degree 
1 = At least some university 
education 
0 = No university 
Income ‘We would like to know in what group 
your household is. Please, specify the 
appropriate number, counting all 
wages, salaries, pensions and other 
incomes that come in’ 
1 Lower step - 10 Highest step 
Middle class ‘Would you describe yourself as 
belonging to…’ 
1 Upper class 
2 Upper middle class 
3 Lower middle class 
4 Working class 
5 Lower class 
1 = Upper or lower middle class 
0 = Other 
Manual vs intellectual 
work 
‘Are the tasks you do at work mostly 
manual or mostly intellectual?’  
 
1 = Non-manual (>7 on ten-step 
scale) 
0 = Manual 
Urban resident (Coded by interviewer) 1 = Over 10,000 residents 
0 = <10,000 residents 
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identifying as upper or lower middle class taps middle-class identification. The WVS also 
asks respondents whether their tasks at work are ‘mostly manual or mostly intellectual’. 
Following McAllister and White (2017b), a binary variable is constructed where non-manual 
workers are considered those answering 7 or above on the ten-step scale. Lastly, the 
interviewer coded ‘size of town’. To measure urban residence, a binary measure was 
created to tap those living in a settlement of ten thousand people or more. These measures 
are consistent across time; however, income was the only item included in the Belarus 
2018 survey, and the 2017 Russia survey did not ask a comparable question about non-
manual work.  
 Performance theories of governance argue that effective regimes command citizen 
approval (Dahl 1971; Linz 1978) and are thus related to rational choice theory in that 
political systems are judged by what they are able to deliver (Rose et al. 1998). Most 
studies testing this theory, however, focus on democratic countries. Far less attention has 
been paid to whether positive performance evaluations in autocracies lead to lower support 
for democracy (Magalhães 2014). Moreover, performance evaluations are considered a part 
of lifetime learning because the performance of a new regime becomes more important 
than memories of a prior regime over time (Mishler & Rose 2001b, Rose et al. 1998). While 
testing for generational effects accounts for the influence of political socialisation, lifetime 
learning models incorporate later experiences such as regime change and the performance 
of a new system (Mishler & Rose 2007).  
 Chapter Six therefore tests the effect of perceived electoral integrity, corruption and 
economic performance as well as whether an individual has been exposed to democratic 
rule by visiting a democratic country. While the first three items are common measures of 
regime performance, all four constitute experiences in adulthood that may affect support 
for a democratic system (Mishler & Rose 2001b, Rose & Mishler 2009). Moreover, although 
a great deal of past research has used corruption indicators such as Transparency 
International data to investigate individual-level effects, such sources do not necessarily 
reflect the experiences or perceptions of the general public (Knack 2007). Additionally, 
public perceptions of issues such as electoral integrity and corruption and their effect on 
democratic support are in and of themselves important for democratic consolidation (Rose 
et al. 1998, Diamond 1999). The focus in this chapter therefore remains on individual-level 
survey data. 
 The World Values Survey does not ask about these topics in Russia, Ukraine and 
Belarus. Chapter 6 therefore uses McAllister and White’s Research Surveys fielded in 
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Russia, Ukraine and Belarus in 2018, 2010 and 2006 respectively – the most recent 
available surveys with all necessary survey items. Table 3.4 provides details of how each 
variable was constructed. Perceived electoral integrity is a standardised 0 to 10 scale 
constructed from three survey items. The three original variables ask the extent to which 
counting ballots, campaign coverage and the campaign itself were fair. Descriptive 
statistics on each item are in the Appendix. 
 
Table 3.4: Performance model variables 
 
 
15 Not included in the Belarus survey. 
Variable Question Coding 
Electoral integrity ‘In your opinion, to what extent are 
elections in Russia fair in relation to… 
1 Composition of the ballot paper 
and counting votes 
2 Television coverage of the electoral 
campaign 
3 The conduct of the electoral 
campaign in your district’ 
 
1 Not fair at all - 
4 Fair to significant extent 
 
Combined in single standardised 
measure on 0-10 scale (see 
Appendix). 
 
 
Voted for incumbent  
(interaction term) 
‘Which of the candidates did you vote 
for in the presidential election?’ 
1 Voted for winner 
0 Did not vote for winner 
Perceived corruption ‘How widespread, in your opinion, are 
bribery and corruption in central and 
local government?’ 
1 Hardly any officials involved - 
4 All officials are corrupt 
Economic performance ‘What do you think about the present 
economic situation in (Russia)?’ 
1 Very bad - 
5 Very good 
Travel to democracies ‘Have you ever visited any of the 
following countries…’ 
- Baltics 
- Poland 
- USA15  
0  No 
1 Yes 
Variable created using count of 
countries (0-3) 
 
Social media use ‘How often do you use social 
networks (eg. Facebook, Twitter, 
Odnoklassniki, Vkontakte)?’ 
1 Never -  
5 Regularly 
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 To control for the argument that having voted for the winner of an election functions 
as a heuristic when evaluating electoral integrity (Zaller 1992, see also Anderson & 
Tverdova 2003), the model includes an interaction term between perceived integrity and 
whether the respondent voted for the winning presidential candidate. This takes the form of 
a dummy variable indicating that the respondent voted for Putin, Lukashenka or 
Yanukovich in the 2018, 2006 and 2010 elections respectively. Perceived corruption is a 
four-step scale asking how widespread bribery and corruption are in central and local 
government in the respondent’s country. Similarly, economic performance asks 
respondents about the present economic situation in their country on a five-step scale. 
Travel to democracies is a variable counting how many democratic countries a respondent 
has visited. Social media use is also included in chapter 6 as a variable that may affect 
performance evaluations. The item is only available in the Russia survey, and asks how 
regularly respondents use social networks such as Facebook, Twitter and the Russian 
platforms Odnoklassniki (Classmates) and Vkontakte (InContact). 
 An important part of democratisation is a society learning ‘democratic norms, 
principles and values’ (Dahl 1992, p.45, Diamond 2006, p.110), which can generate support 
for democracy (Chu 2014). In societies with a long history of authoritarian rule, citizens 
must first understand what democracy is and is not, and then internalise the belief that 
democracy is ‘the only game in town’ (Shin 2012, p.222, Linz & Stepan 1996). The 
confounding factor, however, is that hybrid and autocratic regimes often claim to be 
democratic (Marquez 2016) or hold free elections (Levitsky & Way 2010). Socialisation into 
such regimes is often argued to result in citizens who support elements of democracy and 
autocracy concurrently (Shin 2015b, p.13). The growing literature on democratic 
knowledge, or the ‘cognitive origin’ of support for democracy (Cho 2014, p.1), has found 
that knowing more about democracy tends to correlate with democratic support regardless 
of regime type (Bratton & Mattes 2001, Cho 2014a, Miller et al. 1997, Norris 2011). This may 
be because knowing about democracy means being aware of the rights and freedoms it 
provides (Mattes & Bratton 2007, p.202), and that authoritarian systems do not offer such 
benefits (Cho 2014). 
 Chapter 7 uses Wave 6 and 7 of the World Values Survey to test the effect of 
democratic knowledge on support for democracy. Table 3.5 provides an overview of the 
relevant variables. The WVS has a battery of nine items to tap understandings of 
democracy. Respondents are asked how essential each item is to democracy and are able 
to respond on a ten-step scale. Following an exploration into understandings of democracy 
in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, a democratic knowledge index is constructed from the 
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items referring to free elections, civil rights, gender equality, army rule and religious law. A 
standardised 0 - 10 scale was created by subtracting the non-democratic items (army rule 
and religious law) from the democratic items (free elections, civil rights and gender 
equality). Further justification and explanation of this measure is discussed in chapter 7.   
 
Table 3.5: Democratic knowledge variables 
Measure Question Coding 
Understandings of 
democracy 
 
Many things are desirable, but not all 
of them are essential characteristics 
of democracy. Please tell me for 
each of the following things how 
essential you think it is as a 
characteristic of democracy.  
- Governments tax the rich and 
subsidise the poor 
- Religious authorities interpret the 
laws 
- People choose their leaders in free 
elections 
- People receive state aid for 
unemployment 
- The army takes over when 
government is incompetent 
- Civil rights protect people’s liberty 
- The state makes people’s incomes 
equal 
- People obey their rulers 
-  Women have the same rights as 
men 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 = Not an essential 
characteristic of democracy 
to 
10 = Essential characteristic 
of democracy 
Democratic knowledge (elections + rights + women) - (army 
+ religion) 
Standardised 0 - 10 scale 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
 This chapter has introduced the cases, data, methods and measures that are used 
throughout this thesis. In the following chapters, this thesis conducts regression analyses 
using individual-level survey data from Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Primarily, the World 
Values Survey is the source of this data; however, the Research Surveys provide the 
measures necessary to test the performance model in Chapter Six. The dependent variable 
throughout this study is support for democracy, which is constructed from four survey 
items to ensure that respondents reject authoritarianism as well as express support for a 
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democratic system. A most similar systems design controls for a number of possible 
influences on democratic support and provides a reference category of Soviet socialisation. 
The key independent variables are generational cohort and age so as to test for 
generational and lifecycle effects. The competing models of democratic support 
investigated are social modernisation, regime performance and lifetime learning, and 
democratic knowledge. The next chapter goes into further detail on the socialisation 
experience of each generational cohort and investigates the role of political socialisation on 
support for democracy.  
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Political generations in the post-Soviet space 
 
 Young people have long been of interest to analysts of the post-Soviet sphere. 
Immediately following the Soviet Union’s collapse, young people were widely found to be 
the most enthusiastic about the prospect of democracy (Gibson et al. 1992, Gibson 1996b, 
Reisinger et al. 1994); similar findings were reported over the following decade (Haerpfer 
2002, Hahn & Logvinenko 2008). In 2018, attention focused on ‘Puteens’, a generation that 
has ‘no memory of life before Mr Putin’ (The Economist 2018); ‘Generation Putin’ are indeed 
among his most ardent supporters and admirers (Krastev 2018, Volkov & Kolesnikov 2018). 
Whether this interest in young post-Soviet citizens is reflected in actual generational 
differences, however, warrants further investigation. 
 This chapter uses the World Values Survey to begin exploring the effects of political 
socialisation on support for democracy. Following the theories of political socialisation 
discussed in Chapter One, we should expect to see the political conditions under which 
different generations grow up affect their political attitudes. As we are here concerned with 
support for democracy, the level of democracy present at a given time is the relevant 
socialising influence. If age has a negative effect on democratic support, as found in some 
literature on the region (see for example Colton & McFaul 2002; Rose, Mishler & Munro 
2006), then it may be that lifecycle effects simply result in people becoming less democratic 
as they grow older.  
 The following section discusses the recent history of each country with a view to 
identifying post-Soviet political generations. As Mishler and Rose note in their influential 
study of Russian socialisation under communism, delineating generations ‘is partly a 
function of historical interpretation and partly a matter of empirical analysis’ (2007, p.825). 
After identifying historical cohorts in section 4.1, section 4.2 uses the World Values Surveys 
to test for generational effects, and whether any such effects remain when age is taken into 
account. 
 
4.1 Identifying generational cohorts in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus 
 The review of the empirical literature presented in Chapter Two noted that 
generational experience is likely to matter for democratic support, but that the exact 
dynamics involved require further investigation. Exposure to Soviet communism, for 
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example, has been shown to depress support for democracy (Pop-Eleches & Tucker 2014). 
While age has been found to affect democratic support (Haerpfer 2002, Rose et al. 2006), 
generational effects have received far less attention, particularly as they may apply to the 
post-Soviet period. 
 As the focus of this thesis is socialisation under post-Soviet regimes, and the Soviet 
experience has been extensively explored elsewhere (Mishler & Rose 2007, Pop-Eleches & 
Tucker 2014, Rose & Carnaghan 1995), it treats those socialised under communism as a 
reference category in relation to the post-Soviet cohorts defined in the next section. 
According to political socialisation theories, we should expect people socialised under 
communism to be less supportive of democracy than young people growing up in the post-
Soviet period, where the supply of democracy has at times been greater. 
 The Soviet Union left behind a struggling economy and acute uncertainty. What 
would replace it ‘was anything but a given’ (Plokhy 2015, p.323). Even before the Soviet 
Union dissolved, however, analysts were interpreting its level of modernisation as a sign it 
could develop at least some level of pluralism (McFaul 2018, p.305). Its high levels of 
literacy, urbanisation and economic development were all noted as encouraging signs, and 
Yeltsin’s nominal ‘commitment to democracy’ encouraged the idea that the third wave of 
democratisation could include the Soviet republics (McFaul 2018, p.305). Almost three 
decades later, however, the Baltics are the only former Soviet states to have fully 
democratised.16  
 For a broad overview of the democratic trajectories of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, 
Figure 4.1 presents the Varieties of Democracy’s (V-Dem) Liberal Democracy Index ratings 
over the post-Soviet period to 2011, when the most recent World Values Survey was 
conducted.17 Over 2,600 country experts are involved in answering over four hundred 
questions to build V-Dem regime indicators, which in this case ranges from 0 to 1, with 
higher ratings indicative of more liberal democracy (Coppedge et al. 2015). The Liberal  
 
16 Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are classes as ‘consolidated democracies’ by Freedom House’s Nations in 
Transit 2018. See https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/nations-transit-2018 
17 The use of V-Dem is by no means exclusive. Other democracy-evaluation projects such as Freedom House 
are referenced throughout the thesis, including for the sake of classifying generational cohorts below. 
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Source: https://www.v-dem.net/en/analysis/VariableGraph/, accessed May 3, 2018. 
 
Democracy Index is presented here as it includes measures of electoral democracy as well 
as liberal democracy, for the sake of a comprehensive overview.18 While there has been 
some fluctuation in levels of liberal democracy, none of our three case studies have fully 
democratised at any point. Instead, all three experienced some liberalisation and 
democratisation, albeit not a great deal, in the early 1990s, with Belarus becoming more 
authoritarian around 1995 and Russia around 2000. Ukraine, however, experienced 
something of a democratic peak around 2004 before declining again around 2011, when 
the most recent World Values Survey was conducted.  
 Following the collapse of the USSR, however, there was not only a regime change 
but a ‘dual transition’ from communism to capitalism (Fish 1994, p.40). To give a full picture 
of the post-Soviet context, Figure 4.2 presents annual GDP growth (year-on-year) from 
1990 to 2018 for each country. All three countries were marked by economic crisis in the 
immediate post-Soviet period. Ukrainians suffered the largest contraction in the early post-
 
18 Specifically, ‘electoral democracy’ measures freedom of association, clean elections, freedom of expression, 
elected officials and suffrage; ‘liberal democracy’ measures rule of law, an independent judiciary, civil liberties, 
and ‘effective checks and balances that… limit the exercise of executive power’ (Coppedge et al. 2017, p.49). 
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Figure 4.1: Varieties of Democracy Liberal Democracy Index, 1991 - 2018 
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Soviet period, before returning to growth in 1999. While Belarus and Russia followed similar 
trends, Belarus began to rapidly recover in the mid-1990s, coinciding with the election of 
Aleksander Lukashenka as president. Similarly, Russia experienced the most economic 
growth under Vladimir Putin in the early 2000s. All countries again experienced a fall as a 
result of the Global Financial Crisis. The political and economic experience is discussed in 
more detail below in order to determine what socialising experiences may be at play. A 
summary of generational cohorts is presented at the end of each section. 
 
Figure 4.2: Annual GDP growth (percent), 1990 - 2018 
 
 Annual GDP growth (year-on-year, percent). Source: World Bank (2018a). 
 
Russia 
Russia’s transitional generation 
 The USSR ended ‘not with a bang but with a whimper’ (Service 2003, p.509). Its 
formal dissolution in December 1991, however, was preceded by a defeated August coup 
attempt that suggested democratic change could be underway (see McFaul 2018). A self-
appointed ‘Emergency Committee’ comprised of leading Party members placed Soviet 
president Mikhail Gorbachev under house arrest during his holiday in Crimea on August 
18th, and issued decrees banning most newspapers, public demonstrations, and most 
political parties (White 2011). Claiming that perestroika (restructuring) had failed and that 
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they were best placed to nurse the Soviet Union back to health, the Committee sent tanks 
into central Moscow (Service 2003, p.499). Boris Yeltsin, president of the Russian Soviet 
Republic, declared the coup illegal from atop a tank outside the parliament, and on August 
20th seventy thousand people gathered to defend the building from Committee forces 
(White 2011). The next day, Parliament ‘gave Yeltsin their unqualified support’ and the 
resolve – and military backing – of the Committee dissipated (White 2011, p.24, Service 
2003, p.501). Time magazine announced that ‘a thousand years of autocracy are reversed’ 
and the victors claimed that ‘democracy had prevailed over dictatorship’ (McFaul 2018, 
p.305). Indeed, only a sixth of Russians surveyed in January 1992 felt positively towards 
communism, while 78 percent felt positively towards ‘freedom’ (Rose 2009, p.15). 
 What had prevailed, however, was economic and political turmoil. Prices rose by 
245 percent by January 1992, and many employers were unable to pay wages (Service 
2003, p.510, p.516). Meanwhile, in March 1993, the Supreme Soviet began preparing to 
impeach Yeltsin, who promptly held a referendum to allow an eventual 59 percent of voters 
to endorse him and 53 percent to support his economic policies (Service 2003, pp.522-3). 
For analysts this was ‘astonishing’, given many had argued that Russians would use the 
referendum to object to ‘the pain of economic transformation’ (McFaul 2001, p.190). 
 This idea emboldened hundreds of deputies, led by senior figures Rutskoi and 
Khasbulatov, to occupy the parliament building when Yeltsin dissolved the parliament in 
September 1993 and announced new elections alongside a vote on his new constitution 
(McFaul 2001, p.195). Parliament promptly impeached Yeltsin (McFaul 2001, p.196) and 
armed units allied to the parliament attacked a television station and the mayor’s office; 
following a prolonged standoff and the deaths of 143 protestors attempting to protect the 
parliament, Yeltsin breached the barricade with loyal tanks (Rosefielde & Hedlund 2009, 
p.171). With the arrest of 47 parliamentarians and the ban of opposition publications, the 
‘fledgling democracy… thus was nipped in the bud’, marking a turning point from the 
reforms started under Gorbachev  (Rosefielde & Hedlund 2009, p.171, McFaul 2001, p.199).  
 This political juncture was also characterised by constitutional change in the form of 
a new bicameral Federal Assembly, with elections to occur on December 12, 1993. Given 
the origins of these changes were mired in violent conflict and ‘unconstitutional’ 
presidential decrees, the election and the referendum to approve the new constitution 
suffered from a lack of legitimacy  (Sakwa 1995, p.196). Despite Yeltsin having ‘no authority 
to call a referendum’, the government claimed 54.8 percent of voters participated, and 58 
percent supported the changes; however, evidence suggests turnout figures were inflated 
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to meet the 50 percent threshold (McFaul 2001, p.208, White 2011, p.29). Yeltsin’s 
preferred party, Russia’s Choice, won only 70 of 450 seats in the simultaneous 
parliamentary election, which was conducted ‘with a sufficient degree of fairness for a snub 
to be delivered to Boris Yeltsin’ (Service 2003, p.528).  
 A contemporaneous debate emerged as to whether these developments constituted 
a ‘“return” to authoritarian rule’ (McFaul 2001, p.208).19 As argued by McFaul (2001, p. 208), 
however, this could be considered an ‘overstatement’. First, while the 1993 constitution 
favoured the presidency, the parliament did allow for ‘the expression of dissent’ and in 
some cases ‘derailed Yeltsin’s policies’ (Fish 2018, p.333, Way 2015). Second, a ‘vibrant 
independent media’ remained, as did ‘competitive elections’ (Way 2015, pp. 146-47). While 
elections were ‘marred by irregularities’, they were sufficiently competitive for Freedom 
House to state in 1999 that ‘Russians can change their government democratically’. 
Nonetheless, corruption was ‘pervasive’, the judiciary ‘not fully independent’ and the media 
sometimes subject to government pressure (Freedom House 1999). 
 Young people socialised in this decade experienced continued economic turmoil, or 
‘catastrophic hyperdepression’ (Rosefielde & Hedlund 2009, p.272). By 1995 65 percent of 
industry was privatised, but around half of the International Monetary Fund loans to Russia 
were ‘illegally expropriated’ by oligarchs (Service 2003, p.534). Privatisation meant the end 
of benefits formerly provided by Soviet employers, such as healthcare, dining, recreation 
and housing (Rosefielde & Hedlund 2009, p.107). By 1998, GDP was down almost 50 
percent from 1989 (Rosefielde & Hedlund 2009, p.199); by 2000, around 40 percent of the 
population were below the UN poverty line (Service 2003, p.539). It was ‘very difficult’ for 
young Russians, who faced high unemployment and the end of free university education 
(Arbatov 2001, p.174). Unemployment among 15 - 24 year olds rose from 13 percent in 
1992 to a peak of 27 percent in 1998 (World Bank 2019c). After a decade of upheavals, 
voters were keen for the ‘restoration of order and tough leadership’ (Freedom House 1999).  
  ‘The obscure Vladimir Putin’ became prime minister in August 1999 and advanced 
‘a more authoritarian political style’ (Service 2003, pp.530, 541). Within weeks, bombings of 
Moscow apartment blocks blamed on Chechnya led to a second Russian invasion of the 
nation. Putin’s profile and popularity rose swiftly as ‘total military victory’ appeared in sight 
 
19 See McFaul 2001 (p. 208) for a discussion of these arguments, from, for instance, Roeder (1994) and Murray 
(1995). 
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(Service 2003, p.541). This military accomplishment, combined with burgeoning economic 
recovery, resulted in rising support for the government (Colton 2008).  
 Yeltsin resigned abruptly on December 31, leaving Putin the presidency and his 
endorsement that Putin would have the ability to ‘consolidate society’ (White 2011, p.35). 
Portraying himself as the ‘defender of the homeland’, Putin won the 2000 presidential  
election with support ‘more than sufficient for a first-round victory’ (Colton & McFaul 2003, 
p.185). Nonetheless, the vote was ‘marred by widespread fraud’ (Freedom House 2001); 
the year 2000 is thus arguably when Russia ‘fell below the minimum conditions of electoral 
democracy’ (Diamond 2015, p.145). 
 
Russia’s authoritarian generation 
 The new millennium and its president thus marked a shift from the limited pluralism 
and economic hardship of the 1990s to ‘authoritarianism’ and economic recovery (Fish 
2018, p.328, Way 2015, p.146). Putin acted swiftly to curtail the powers of parliament, 
amending upper house election rules to make ‘senators presidential appointees’ and 
building the United Russia party to assert control in the Duma (Fish 2018, pp.333–4). He 
also brought the Central Electoral Commission under his control, allowing him to tamper 
with election results and vote counts (Fish 2018, p.334). Further, economic growth in 2000 
was at a ‘record-breaking 10 percent’ (White 2011, pp.142–3), and youth unemployment 
went from 21 percent in 2000 and hovered between 15 and 18 percent over the next 
nineteen years (World Bank 2019c). Under Putin’s first two presidential terms, the economy 
grew at an average of around 7 percent per annum (White 2011, p.143). While this 
generation is being socialised into an authoritarian regime, it is one that provides economic 
stability compared to the disastrous preceding decade. 
 Putin’s efforts to consolidate power were swift and effective. By 2004, Freedom 
House was warning that his tactics left ‘little room for a vibrant civil society, independent 
media, or political opposition’, and demoted Russia to ‘not free’. Although freedom of 
expression, for one, had been in decline since the late 1990s (Fish 2005, p.73), the murder 
of journalists, bankers and politicians demonstrated that ‘the tsar cannot be provoked 
without devastating reprisals’ (Rosefielde & Hedlund 2009, p.177). Raids on NGOs were 
justified on the grounds that they were ‘havens for foreign spies’; a Kremlin-backed youth 
group, Nashi, was quickly formed ‘to defend Russia’s youth from the political manipulation 
of the West’ (Rosefielde & Hedlund 2009, p.178). In short, under President Putin, ‘the 
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legislature ceased to challenge executive power [and] elections became much more 
fraudulent and media more closed’ (Way 2015, p.147). 
 The constitutional limit of two consecutive presidential terms formed no obstacle for 
Putin, who backed his ally Dmitri Medvedev in the March 2008 contest in exchange for the 
prime ministership. ‘Unprecedented’ mass protests erupted after the December 2011 
parliamentary elections (Gel’man 2015, p.106). Despite the official United Russia vote share 
being 49.3 percent, it had actually ‘lost heavily’ and publicly, given that this was 
broadcasted widely on the Internet (Gel’man 2015, p.119). General public views of the 
fairness of elections had also declined; in 2001, 69 percent of Russians saw ‘the filling in of 
ballots and the counting of the votes as fair’, but a decade later this was only true for 53 
percent (White & McAllister 2014, p.75).  
 Putin’s popularity, however, had remained stable thanks to economic growth and 
improvements in living standards (White & McAllister 2008), and this allowed the regime to 
produce a more credible victory in the presidential election of March 2012 (Gel’man 2015, 
p.124). Pre-emptive measures were taken to curb further disruptions: criminal investigations 
were opened against opposition figures such as Alexei Navalny, fines were raised for 
protest participation, and a ‘culture war’ began against anti-Putin group Pussy Riot and 
‘homosexual propaganda’ (Gel’man 2015, p.124). 
 How should one characterise post-Soviet Russia? For most of the Putin years, 
Freedom House has classified it as a ‘consolidated authoritarian regime’; across the post-
Soviet period as a whole, it was deemed ‘partly free’ until 2004 and has remained ‘not free’ 
since (Freedom House 2018a). While Putin coined the term ‘managed democracy’ at the 
start of his second presidential term (Rosefielde & Hedlund 2009, p.179), scholars have 
described Russia in terms ranging from ‘hybrid regime’ (Treisman 2011) to ‘dictatorship’ 
(Hassner 2008) to ‘totalitarian’ (Gessen 2017). 
 In any case, that the comparative stability of the 2000s has corresponded to some 
increase in authoritarianism appears to be no coincidence. Fish (2018, p.339) notes that 
Putin’s ‘dogged commitment to stability’ allows for a ‘remarkably robust form of 
authoritarianism’; similarly, Matovski (2018, p.347) used Levada surveys from 1993 – 2011 
to demonstrate that Russians wanted ‘to restore and maintain order and stability after the 
country’s disastrous post-Communist decline’. At any rate, the year 2000 was a turning 
point in Russian politics, and it therefore defines post-Soviet generational cohorts as 
summarised in Table 4.2 below.  
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Table 4.1: Summary of Russian elections 
Russia Turnout Freedom House 
electoral democracy 
Notes 
1991 presidential 79% No  
1993 parliamentary  Yes  
1995 parliamentary 71% Yes ‘Can change their 
government democratically’ 
(Freedom House 1995) 
1996 presidential 70% Yes  
1999 parliamentary 60% Yes  
2000 presidential 69% Yes ‘Marred by irregularities’ 
(Freedom House 2004) 
2003 parliamentary 56% Yes  
2004 presidential 64% No  
2007 parliamentary 64% No  
2008 presidential 96% No  
2011 parliamentary 60% No  
2012 presidential 65% No ‘Tightly controlled’ (Freedom 
House 2013) 
2016 parliamentary 49% No  
Source: International Foundation for Electoral Systems 2019b, Freedom House. 
 First, however, Table 4.1 provides an overview of the elections conducted in Russia 
over the post-Soviet period. As seen below, Russians could participate in democratic 
elections from 1993 - 2003. By the 2004 presidential election, however, Russia had been 
downgraded to ‘not free’ by Freedom House as it consolidated into an authoritarian regime. 
Since then, the Kremlin has been ‘able to manipulate elections’ and silence dissent 
(Freedom House 2019).  
 Russians growing up between 1991 and 2000 were therefore exposed to some 
degree of democratic politics, and according to socialisation theory should thus be more 
inclined to support democracy. Despite experiencing economic hardship, they grew up in a 
‘partly free’ country, could democratically elect the government and freely assemble and 
protest (Freedom House 1999). The youngest cohort, however, were socialised into a 
consolidated authoritarian system with manipulated elections, a controlled media and 
minimal political and civil rights (Freedom House 2018a). Being a member of the 
authoritarian Putin generation should therefore have a negative effect on democratic 
support. Similarly, the Soviet cohort grew up in a consolidated authoritarian regime and 
should also be less supportive of democracy. These assumptions are tested in section 4.2 
below. 
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Table 4.2: Russian cohort summary 
 
Belarus 
 Besides a short moment of independence in 1918, Belarus had no history of 
independent statehood before it was ‘thrust upon them’ by the collapse of the USSR 
(Bennett 2011, p.4). Belarus in the early 1990s was ‘divided over whether it should even 
exist’, and its citizens more likely to consider themselves ‘citizens of the USSR’ than any 
other post-Soviet region (Andrew Wilson 2012, pp.141–42). Although the late introduction 
of the presidency allowed for a few years of some degree of pluralism, its rule since 1994 
by President Aliaksandr Lukashenka has resulted in the country being termed ‘Europe’s last 
dictatorship’ by former American Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice – a moniker that has 
made its way into the title of several studies of the country (see Bennett 2011, Wilson 2012). 
Indeed, scholars such as the Belarusian political scientist Vitali Silitski (2005, p.85) argue 
that President Lukashenka is able to capitalise on nostalgia for Soviet communism in 
promoting and legitimising his autocratic rule.  
 
Belarus’ transitional generation 
 This apparent affection for the Soviet period was clear from the outset. Belarus was 
‘one of the most resistant to reform’ and reformist Communists were indeed lacking (Clem 
Generation Born Experience Hypothesis 
Soviet (reference 
category) 
-1972 - Socialised during the Soviet 
period 
Socialised into 
authoritarianism: 
Negative effect on 
democratic support 
Transition 
generation (1991 
– 2000) 
1973 - 1982 - Economic hardship 
- Limited political and civil rights  
- Competitive elections 
- Independent media  
- ‘Partly free’ (Freedom House) 
Socialised in 
democratising period: 
Positive effect on 
democratic support 
Putin generation 
(2001–) 
1983 - - Consolidation of an authoritarian 
regime: fraudulent elections, 
media and NGO restrictions 
- Improvement in economy and 
living standards 
-‘Not free’ from 2004 – present 
(Freedom House) 
Socialised into 
authoritarianism: 
Negative effect on 
democratic support 
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1996, p.219). The Belarusian People’s Front (BNF),20 formed in 1988 and framed ‘as both a 
“general democratic” and a “national revival” movement’, had only 50,000 members by the 
end of 1990 and was largely a project of the intelligentsia (Wilson 2012, p.145). 
Gorbachev’s all-Soviet elections of March 1989 were an overwhelming success for the 
Communist Party, and only ‘a handful of BNF sympathisers’ were elected in ‘the fairest, 
most “genuine”’ elections to have been held in the USSR (Bennett 2011, p.7, White 1990, 
p.63). A majority of Communists was again elected to the Belarusian Supreme Soviet in 
March 1990, and the Declaration of Sovereignty in July made Belarus sovereign within the 
USSR. 
 However, 83 percent of Belarusians, voted in March 1991 to stay in the Soviet 
Union. Despite voting to preserve the status quo, 1991 was marked by rapid change. Rapid 
price increases for basic goods saw around 200,000 people go on strike in April, a preview 
of the sharp inflation and 37 percent decline in GDP that was to come over the immediate 
post-independence period (Andrew Wilson 2012, pp.149, 239). During the abortive August 
coup in Moscow, the Belarusian First Party Secretary attempted to install himself as 
president of Belarus in a state of emergency (Bennett 2011, p.11). With only two days to 
attempt this, however, he and his hard-line Party backers failed, and the concept of a 
Belarusian presidency was thus ‘discredited as a Communist plot’ until 1994 (Wilson 2012, 
p.150). Most of the government elite – including ministers, parliamentarians and local 
officials – resigned their Party membership and the Communist Party began to fade, 
despite many of its former members continuing their appointments (Bennett 2011, p.11). On 
August 25th, the Supreme Soviet brought the 1990 Declaration of Sovereignty into 
constitutional law, and on September 19th the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic became 
the Republic of Belarus. 
 Despite these developments, most of the elite supported Gorbachev’s proposal of a 
new Union Treaty – until an overwhelming majority of Ukrainians voted for independence in 
December 1991 (Wilson 2012, p.152). Shushkevich, Yeltsin and the Ukrainian president 
Kravchuk met urgently in a Belarusian dacha on December 7 and established the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, a ‘successor body’ intended to deal with 
succession issues, the military and the Soviet nuclear stockpile (Olcott 1993, p.314). The 
agreement was approved by the Belarusian parliament days later, with a sole dissenting 
 
20 Also abbreviated to BPF in some English-language literature. 
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vote; Lukashenka was to later claim it was his to aid his campaign strategy of Soviet 
nostalgia (Wilson 2012, p.153). The USSR was thus dissolved. 
 The post-Soviet leaders of Belarus inherited ‘a vast coercive and economic state 
apparatus’ that allowed them to effectively control much of the media and economy (Way 
2015, p.120). Nonetheless, electoral manipulation was ‘limited’, the media was able to air a 
‘range of opposition views’, and the legislature was occasionally able to pose ‘serious 
challenges’ to the executive (Way 2015, p.116). It was also ‘taken for granted that the 
country would be a parliamentary democracy’, but a presidency had been in lawmakers’ 
minds since 1991, when the Communist Party had attempted to create one (Bennett 2011, 
p.17). A constitution, and associated state-building issues such as an official language, the 
economic relationship with Russia, and the transition to market economy, dominated the 
years preceding the first presidential election in June 1994 (Bennett 2011, p.15). 
 The ‘first and only truly competitive presidential election’ in Belarus saw Lukashenka 
trump Kebich in the second round with eighty percent to 20 percent of votes (Wilson 2012, 
p.166). This resounding win left a popular impression of his ‘invincibility at the polls’; 
however, it also made his waning approval ratings in the following months all the more 
evident to him (Silitski 2005, p.86). The basic tools of authoritarian rule, such as state 
influence over the media and economy, as well as a ‘vast security apparatus’, were already 
at Lukashenka’s disposal (Way 2012, p.643). This, however, was insufficient, and he 
proceeded to establish presidential control over regional heads of administration, bring 
state assets under direct presidential authority, and use the security apparatus to harass 
private organisations that aided the opposition (Silitski 2005, p.86). In January 1995, a 
Minsk subway drivers’ strike was broken by force, neutralising any potential for opposition 
from the unions (Bennett 2011, p.33). In response to a BNF report naming the president as 
corrupt and whispers of impeachment in the Supreme Soviet, Lukashenka fired state 
newspaper editors and instructed the state publisher not to print independent newspapers 
(Bennett 2011, p.32). 
 Presidential tactics also included promoting himself at the expense of parliament 
and other government bodies. His self-promotion as a strong leader who was the ‘people’s 
only true friend’ continued with his manoeuvres leading up to the May 1995 parliamentary 
election and referendum, which was ‘designed to undermine the credibility of parliament’ 
(Bennett 2011, pp.29-30; Wilson 2012, p.174). First, state media depicted his opponents as 
‘descendants of World War II Nazi collaborators’ (Silitski 2005, p.86). Second, the 
referendum led with a ‘no-brainer’ question on giving the Russian language equal status to 
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Belarusian,21 designed to attract support for the fourth question, which asked whether the 
president should be permitted to dismiss the Supreme Soviet ‘in the event of systematic or 
gross violations of the constitution’ (Wilson 2012, p.174). Alongside questions on adopting 
updated versions of Soviet Belarusian emblems and economic cooperation with Russia, the 
referendum was designed to mobilise citizens nostalgic for Soviet rule (Silitski 2005, p.87). 
Indeed, all four questions were endorsed with over 75 percent support, on 64.8 percent 
turnout, and deals struck with Russia after the referendum allowed Lukashenka to restore a 
Soviet-style welfare state and link this to the neo-Soviet symbols and his own presidency 
(Wilson 2012, p.174).  
 This had the added benefit of neutralising the BNF and its ‘anti-Soviet identity’, 
which in any case was of so little appeal to Belarusians that no BNF candidates were 
elected to parliament in an election ‘considered to be free of serious fraud’ (Way 2015, 
pp.129–30). According to Lukashenka, parliament would only ‘obstruct his policies and 
cheat the electorate’; voters responded by electing only 119 parliamentarians, short of the 
minimum 174 (Bennett 2011, p.36). Repeat elections were held in November and December 
despite presidential attempts to prevent them, and while sixty-two empty seats remained, 
parliament reached quorum (Wilson 2012, p.175). 
 Despite a competitive election and broadening of political rights, the period was also 
characterised by the economic turmoil shared by other post-communist states. 
Unemployment among young people between 15 and 14 years of age went from less than 
one percent to a peak of 44 percent in 1998 (World Bank 2019c). While Belarus had 
experienced an overall ‘milder collapse’ than Russia (Person 2016, p.339) the result was still 
that young Belarusians, while coming of age during a period of comparative liberalisation, 
still experienced simultaneous economic turmoil. Subsequent chapters control for socio-
economic and regime performance influences on democratic support to explore the impact 
such socialisation may have had. 
 
Belarus’ authoritarian generation 
 In early 1996, Lukashenka proposed constitutional changes to parliament, including 
granting further legislative power to the president (Bennett 2011, p.45). The chamber 
rejected them and the press began discussing ‘constitutional crisis’, while some 
 
21 A no-brainer because ‘nearly everyone spoke it’ (Wilson 2012, p. 174). 
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parliamentarians began to raise the option of impeachment (Bennet 2011, p.46). A 
referendum was set for November, this time with four questions set by Lukashenka and 
three by parliament. Again, the president included a ‘Soviet nostalgia’ question on moving 
Independence Day to the anniversary of liberation from Nazi Germany, but the key item was 
his proposed constitutional amendments (Wilson 2012, p.183). The questions posed by 
parliament, however, would have abolished the presidency in favour of a parliamentary 
republic. While the opposition argued that ‘up to half the vote was falsified’, official support 
for Lukashenka’s amendments was 70.5 percent on 84 percent turnout (Wilson 2012, 
p.182). Independent observers suggested that electoral malpractice may have only affected 
the outcome by ‘a few percentage points’ (Silitski 2005, p.87). 
 The result was a system that ‘eliminated all meaningful political competition’ (Silitski 
2005, p.88). When the head of the Election Commission was removed for questioning the 
legitimacy of the referendum, seventy parliamentarians began preparation for impeaching 
the president (Way 2015, p.131). More than half of the parliament, however, supported 
Lukashenka, and the leaders of the case for impeachment were ‘formal high-level 
nomenklatura’ uncertain of their popular support (Way 2015, p.131). By late November, they 
had bent to pressure from a visiting Russian delegation and ceased impeachment 
proceedings; the figurehead, Sharetskii, told the ‘thousands of demonstrators’ outside they 
should go home (Way 2015, p.132). The parliament was closed on November 29, and a 
new bicameral system came into effect, whereby 110 members of the Palace of 
Representatives and half of the Council of the Republic were chosen directly by the 
president (Wilson 2012, p.184). Presidential decrees now officially overrode legislation 
adopted by parliament, and only parties supportive of the president – the Agrarians, 
Communists and Party of Popular Accord – were permitted representation (Wilson 2012, 
p.184). This did not go unnoticed abroad; the United States, Germany, and United Kingdom 
among others restricted visas for government officials, reduced financial aid, and their 
leaders stopped meeting Lukashenka (Way 2015, p.132). Regardless, he had consolidated 
his ‘authoritarian rule’ (Way 2015, p.132). 
 October 2000 saw the first elections for the ‘puppet parliament’, boycotted by most 
opposition groups (Wilson 2012, p.192). The opposition also fell victim to infighting over 
whether to boycott in the first place, weakening it even further (Silitski 2005, p.89). This 
formed the backdrop to the 2001 presidential election, where polls suggested ‘Lukashenka 
was popular enough to win’ but dissatisfied with his ratings nonetheless (Wilson 2012, 
p.196). Officially, he emerged victorious with 75.7 percent of the vote; independent polls 
indicated an actual vote of around 57 percent (Wilson 2012, p.198). Post-election protests 
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were stymied by blocking access to Minsk and phone and internet connections, resulting in 
around two to three thousand people gathering in the city on September 9 and 13 (Wilson 
2012, p.198). The case from the opposition and protestors were not assisted by figures 
showing Lukashenka would have won even a fair election, and that only 21 percent of 
voters ‘thought the election had been rigged to an extent that affected its outcome’ (Silitski 
2005, p.90).  
 Further ‘pre-emptive authoritarianism’ tactics were now possible: the government 
closed 157 non-government organisations between 2003 and 2005, and in many cases 
were replaced with government-controlled clones (Silitski 2005, Andrew Wilson 2012, 
p.202). In April 2003, Lukashenka made state radio and television ‘responsible to him’ 
(Bennett 2011, p.324). In June, he announced that all large organisations were to have a 
figure ‘responsible for ideological work’ (Bennett 2011, p.325). A year later, he used his 
annual parliamentary address to announce that parliamentary elections ‘must be held in an 
organized, open and democratic manner’, that there would be no harassment of opposition 
candidates, and that everyone would have ‘equal access to the mass media’ (Bennett 2011, 
p.130). He also added that he ‘may run for president again if the people support him’ 
(Bennett 2011, p.326). The 2004 parliamentary election coincided with another referendum, 
this time on allowing presidents to serve more than two terms. Official support was 88 
percent, allowing him to run again on March 19, 2006 (Wilson 2012, p.207). 
 By this election, it became ‘an open question to what extent the vote was actually 
“counted” at all’: the pro-Lukashenka vote seemed to be determined ‘in the privacy of the 
election commissions’ (Wilson 2012, p.217). That night, between five and ten thousand 
people gathered in Minsk to protest; by 25 March, around 15,000 people were dispersed 
with tear gas and rubber bullets (Wilson 2012, p.221). Despite this and the evidence of 
widespread electoral fraud, most Belarusians ‘remained uninformed about these electoral 
abuses’ and convinced instead that the president could win any vote (Silitski 2005, p.93). It 
did not assist matters that in both 2001 and 2006, the opposition’s electoral base was too 
small to be a foundation for mass protests (Wilson 2012, p.221). 
 Lukashenka held an early presidential election in December 2010, reporting a victory 
of 79.7 percent (Wilson 2012, p.234). Independent polls suggested that he would only have 
won between 35 and 45 percent this time around – and indeed, around 30,000 people 
protested that night in Minsk (Wilson 2012, p.234). The police arrested hundreds, closed 
the OSCE office, jailed the leaders and raided NGOs (Wilson 2012, p.234). Observers 
theorised that Lukashenka was spooked by his low ‘real vote’ as well as the sheer volume 
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of protestors (Wilson 2012, p. 234; Way 2015, p.139). The level of repression appeared so 
intense it would make ‘a Ukrainian-style electoral revolution in Belarus almost impossible’ 
(Silitski 2005, p.96). 
 Since the reasonably free and fair 1994 election, approval of Lukashenka has 
hovered between 30 and 50 percent and centres among the less educated, rural and 
elderly populations (Wilson 2012, pp.256–57). Corruption is mostly hidden, and about 12 
percent of GDP is directed towards health, welfare and education; Belarus also lacks the 
‘street crime and Mafia disorder that plague Ukraine and Russia’ (Wilson 2012, p.257). 
Youth unemployment has also dropped steadily under Lukashenka, dropping from its post-
Soviet peak of 44 percent in 1998 to 11 percent in 2011 when the most recent World Values 
Survey was fielded (World Bank 2019c). Lukashenka’s strategy of pre-emption has 
prevented the emergence of any democratic challengers, and his control of the media has 
ensured that most of the country convinced that he would win any fair electoral contest, 
and unaware of the ‘massive abuses’ of power and human rights (Silitski 2005, p.95). 
 Having been socialised into an ‘authoritarian state in which elections are carefully 
managed and civil liberties are minimal’ (Freedom House 2018b), membership of the 
youngest Belarusian cohort should have a negative effect on democratic support. In 
contrast, the transition generation experienced ‘free and fair’ elections (Freedom House 
1995, p.132). Similar to their Russian counterpart, this limited exposure to democracy 
should, according to socialisation theory, positively effect democratic support. Lastly, the 
Soviet cohort should be less supportive, having grown up under the authoritarian 
communist regime. 
 Table 4.3 summarises post-Soviet elections in Belarus over the period covered by 
this thesis. Belarus has seen the least electoral integrity of all three countries, never earning 
the title of ‘electoral democracy’ from Freedom House. Nonetheless, the 1994 presidential 
election was considered ‘free and fair’ (Freedom House 1995, p.131). After being 
‘democratically elected’, however, President Lukashenka has presided over a state where 
elections are ‘carefully managed’ and ‘marred by systemic violations’ (Freedom House 
2017). While Belarusians growing up in the early post-Soviet period experienced some 
degree of democratic politics, then, younger citizens have never experienced a free 
election. 
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Table 4.3: Summary of Belarusian elections 
Election  Freedom House 
electoral democracy 
Notes 
1994 presidential 70% No ‘Elections were judged free and 
fair’ (Freedom House 1995, 
p.131) 
1995 parliamentary 71% No Elections democratic (Freedom 
House 1997) 
1999 presidential 70% No ‘Cannot change their 
government democratically 
(Freedom House 1999a) 
2000 parliamentary 61% No  
2004 presidential 90% No  
2004 parliamentary 90% No  
2006 presidential 93% No  
2008 parliamentary 77% No  
2010 presidential 91% No  
2012 parliamentary 75% No  
2015 presidential 87% No  
2016 parliamentary 75% No Elections ‘carefully managed’ 
(Freedom House 2018b) 
Source: International Foundation for Electoral Systems 2019a, Freedom House. 
 
 Having been socialised into an ‘authoritarian state in which elections are carefully 
managed and civil liberties are minimal’ (Freedom House 2018b), membership of the 
youngest Belarusian cohort should have a negative effect on democratic support. In 
contrast, the transition generation experienced ‘free and fair’ elections (Freedom House 
1995, p.132). Similar to their Russian counterpart, this limited exposure to democracy 
should, according to socialisation theory, positively effect democratic support. Lastly, the 
Soviet cohort should be less supportive, having grown up under the authoritarian 
communist regime. 
 Table 4.4 summarises three political generations in Belarus. While Belarus has had 
the least exposure to democracy of the three case countries, its brief experience of limited 
pluralism from 1991 to 1995 may be expected to socialise young people into being more 
supportive of democracy. Those socialised into Lukashenka’s consolidated authoritarian 
regime, however, should show less support for democracy.  
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Table 4.4: Belarusian cohort summary 
 
Ukraine 
 In contrast to its neighbours, Ukraine emerged from the Soviet Union to become 
‘the most competitive and democratic country in the Commonwealth of Independent 
States’ (Way 2015, p.43). However, while the ‘transition’ period for many of its post-
communist neighbours to the west may have ended when they joined the EU in the mid-
2000s, Ukraine remained in a ‘transitional phase’ at the time of the latest World Values 
Survey (Magocsi 2010, p.725). As such, the post-Soviet period in Ukraine differs from 
Russia and Belarus in that it does not have a post-Soviet ‘authoritarian’ generation. Instead, 
it had a similar transitional phase followed by the Orange Revolution and the highest levels 
of democracy of any of the three case countries. 
 
Ukraine’s transition generation 
 Following the attempted coup in Moscow, President Leonid Kravchuk spearheaded 
the declaration of independence and set the date for a referendum and presidential 
election. On December 1, 1991, 80 percent of Ukrainians turned out to cast their ballot in 
the referendum. 92 percent of them endorsed an independent Ukraine, including over 80 
percent in ‘each of the supposedly Russified’ eastern oblasts, and Kravchuk emerged 
victorious with 62 percent of the vote (Magocsi 2010, p.674).  
Generation Born Experience Prediction 
Soviet 
(reference 
category) 
Before 1972 Socialised during the Soviet 
period 
Socialised into 
authoritarianism: 
Negative effect on 
democratic support 
Transition 
generation  
(1991 – 1995) 
1973 – 1977 - Competitive election 
-  Limited political and civil rights  
- Economic crisis 
-‘Partly free’ until 1995 (Freedom 
House) 
Socialised in 
democratising period: 
Positive effect on 
democratic support 
Authoritarian 
generation  
(1996– ) 
1978 - - Consolidating authoritarian 
regime 
- Economic recovery 
- Controlled media and human 
rights abuses  
-‘Not free’ 1996 - present 
(Freedom House) 
Socialised into 
authoritarianism: 
Negative effect on 
democratic support 
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 Even by 1991, however, the ‘euphoria, optimism and activism’ of 1989 had dropped 
substantially in the face of economic concerns (Subtelny 2000, p.579). By 1993, inflation 
had jumped by 2500 percent and the economy had contracted by 20 percent (Subtelny 
2000). There was also no end in sight: between 1991 and 1997, Ukrainian GDP fell by 60 
percent (Plokhy 2015, p.328). Youth unemployment rose from four percent in 1994 to a 
peak of twenty-one percent in 21 percent in 1999 (World Bank 2019c); while less than the 
rates seen in Belarus and Russia, young Ukrainians were still socialised in times of 
economic crises accompanying liberalisation. 
 Coal miners in the east attributed the crisis in large part to Kravchuk’s distancing of 
the country from Russia, and their strike in 1993 affected around 80% of mines, prompting 
the government to schedule a referendum on confidence in the president and parliament 
(Way 2015, p.54). Kiev was immediately filled with thousands protesting the decision, 
worried that such a referendum would compromise pro-Ukrainian language and national 
symbol policy (Way 2015, pp.54–5). Thus, the referendum was cancelled and elections 
were called for 1994.  
 The 1994 presidential election was competitive arguably because ‘no single group 
was strong enough to monopolize political control’ (Way 2015, p.56). Indeed, Freedom 
House (1995, p.579) noted that Ukrainians were ‘able to change their government 
democratically’ in both the presidential and parliamentary elections of that year. With the 
support of Russophiles in the east, Kravchuk was defeated 52 percent to 45 percent by 
Leonid Kuchma (Way 2015, p.56). Despite this advent of electoral democracy, historians 
noted that a ‘revulsion’ towards politics and a ‘major political crisis’ continued, given that 
many citizens had expected that independence would improve living standards (Subtelny 
2000, p.589, Plokhy 2015, p.327). Indeed, turnout for the first multi-party elections in 1994 
was so low that 112 seats in the 450-seat parliament were left unfilled (Subtelny 2000, 
p.615).  
 These elements of democratisation were not enduring. Kuchma, drawing on his 
Soviet-era regional and economic contacts, was able to exercise greater influence over 
parliament and elections, and more effectively silence dissent (Way 2015, p.57). In May 
1995, he spearheaded the Law on Power, which was aimed at increasing presidential clout 
(Subtelny 2000, p.611). The long-awaited constitution passed in June 1996, while nominally 
describing the political system as a hybrid between parliamentary and presidential, further 
strengthened presidential power (Subtelny 2000 p.605; Way 2015, p.58).  
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 The 1999 presidential election was marred by ‘widespread, systematic and 
coordinated’ electoral fraud (ODIHR 2000, p.21). The Kuchma campaign used its state 
power, biased media coverage and obstruction of other candidates to emerge victorious 
(Birch 2000, p.342). However, new political leaders were emerging and commanding 
popular support – and heralding new political conflict. Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko 
and his deputy Yulia Tymoshenko were enacting economic reforms, such as lowering taxes 
for the middle class, that had raised 13 percent of GDP in 2000 (Åslund 2001). Along with 
closing loopholes that oligarchs had used to evade taxation (Plokhy 2015, p.332), these 
policies saw Yushchenko become the country’s ‘most popular politician’ (Way 2015, p.64).  
 Ukrainians were further tested by the ‘Kuchmagate’ scandal of late 2000, which 
exposed corruption within the presidential office (Plokhy 2015, p.332). Secretly-recorded 
tapes were released that implicated Kuchma in the murder of journalist Georgi Gongadze, 
who had published information on ‘government abuses and oligarch’s scams’ (Yekelchyk 
2007, p.209). The scandal demonstrated executive involvement in misdemeanours ranging 
from the perversion of justice, ‘money laundering’, and ‘electoral fraud’ (Yekelchyk 2007, 
p.210). Thousands of protestors under the ‘Ukraine without Kuchma’ moniker assembled in 
a tent city in Kiev’s centre, and were joined by leaders including, after her dismissal and 
brief imprisonment on embezzlement charges, Tymoshenko (Way 2015, p.63).  
 While ‘Ukraine without Kuchma’ petered out after demonstrations became violent,22 
Kuchma’s approval ratings were frequently under 5 percent and made it clear that another 
presidential term was possible only with another round of electoral manipulation (Yekelchyk 
2007, p.212). Yushchenko had been forced from the prime ministership by ‘front parties for 
oligarchs’ and the communists (Yekelchyk 2007, p.210), and had formed the ‘Our Ukraine’ 
coalition that came second to Kuchma’s ‘For a United Ukraine’ in the 2002 parliamentary 
election.  
 
Ukraine’s Revolution generation 
 The Orange Revolution saw the start of the period in which young Ukrainians would 
be socialised into the highest degree of democracy yet. The Kuchma administration had  
needed a viable candidate, and its last prime minister, Viktor Yanukovich, came with the 
 
22 Way (2015, p. 63) argues that the movement may have failed in part because ‘national identity played a far 
less prominent role’ than, for example, the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan.  
 99 
‘strongest and best-funded organization’ (Way 2015, p.66). In the face of stiff competition, 
Yanukovich plotted a strategy of fraud that would see him ‘win by a plausible 3 percent’ 
(Way 2015, p.66). When neither candidate reached the fifty percent vote share required for 
an outright win, the November runoff produced a Yanukovich victory of 49 to 47 percent, 
but one that was stolen ‘in an utterly transparent and ham-fisted manner’ (Way 2015, p.68). 
In Lviv, for example, attempts at manipulation were met by authorities simply refusing to 
partake in electoral fraud (Way 2015, p.67). Nonetheless, turnout in Yanukovich strongholds 
was suspiciously high, opposition observers were forced out of election commissions, 
many were able to vote multiple times and absentee ballots were misused (Tucker 2010, 
p.23). 
 Having anticipated electoral fraud, Yushchenko’s team prepared for a 
demonstration in Kiev’s centre (Yekelchyk 2007, p.217). The resulting Orange Revolution, 
named for the colour of Yushchenko’s parliamentary ‘Our Ukraine’ group, consisted of 
about 20 percent of the population – around seven million people – participating throughout 
the country (Magocsi 2010, p.733). The main predictors of participation, however, were 
identity-based. Way (2015, pp.69–70) notes that most protestors were from the west of the 
country, given that the election had roused ‘anti-Russian nationalist sentiments’, and that 
being a Ukrainian-speaker made one 382 percent more likely to participate. Beissinger 
(2013, p.582) similarly argues that Ukrainian identity was a strong predictor, while only 34 
percent of demonstrators supported a ‘multiparty system’ two months after the event. 
‘Ukrainians’ were also more likely than Russians to see the Orange Revolution as a 
‘deliberate struggle of citizens united in the struggle to defend their rights’ (White & 
McAllister 2009, p.23). 
 In the end, the Supreme Court ruled the election invalid, and Yushchenko won the 
run-off with 52 percent of the vote (Magocsi 2010, p.735). After ‘one of the most monitored 
elections in history’, he took office in January 2005 (Yekelchyk 2007, p.218). The resulting 
compromise was a constitutional reform providing for a parliamentary – presidential system 
in which Parliament nominated a prime minister, who would then form a cabinet (Magocsi 
2010, p.729). Tymoshenko, who had agreed to support Yushchenko in the election in 
exchange for the prime ministership, was thus the inaugural holder of the ‘primary policy-
making role’ (Magocsi 2010, p.729). With the protagonists of the Orange Revolution in 
power, 48 percent of Ukrainians enthusiastically backed the Revolution and ‘expected 
positive changes’ (White & McAllister 2009, p.244) and 70 percent approved of Yushchenko 
(Way 2015, p.72). 
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 By the end of 2005, however, 24 percent of those who had ‘expected positive 
changes’ were expressing disappointment (White & McAllister 2009, p.244). Yushchenko 
had begun his term with early visits to Washington and the European Parliament. This, 
alongside the creation of a ‘European integration’ ministerial portfolio and his declaration to 
President George W. Bush that he hoped to help democratise Belarus, ‘set the tone for his 
presidency’ (Yekelchyk 2007, p.219). Eighteen thousand public servants had been fired by 
mid-2005, accomplishing ‘what the 1991 revolution failed to do: create a new political elite’ 
(Yekelchyk 2007, p.220). Youth unemployment hovered between 15 and 17 percent 
between 2005 and 2011, which was on par with Russia at the time, while Belarus kept 
youth unemployment at around 11 percent over this period (World Bank 2019c). Combined 
with the perception that the president’s frequent international travel left him ‘distant from 
citizens’ everyday concerns’, public fears flared that corruption had reached the upper 
echelons of government (Yekelchyk 2007, p.221). As rivalry between the Yushchenko and 
Tymoshenko camps intensified in mid-2005, Tymoshenko and Petro Poroshenko, head of 
the National Security and Defense Council, accused each other of corruption (Yekelchyk 
2007, p.222). In return for a pardon for the electoral fraud in 2004, Yushchenko secured 
Yanukovich’s support in removing Tymoshenko from the prime ministership (Way 2015, 
p.75). Tymoshenko accused Yushchenko of betraying the ‘ideals of the Orange Revolution’ 
(Yekelchyk 2007, p.222). However, the crises were not over. 
 Both Yanukovich’s Party of Regions and Tymoshenko’s BYuT beat Yushchenko’s 
Our Ukraine in the 2006 parliamentary elections. The eventual coalition between the Party 
of Regions, Communists and Socialists resulted in Yanukovich coming to the prime 
ministership. In sum, the infighting among the key players of the Orange Revolution had 
‘returned Ukrainian politics to the age of unstable coalitions and powerful business clans’, 
which was matched with corresponding disappointment among much of the public 
(Yekelchyk 2007, p.224). Two key implications were ‘the cause of reform and European 
integration’ being widely discredited, and ‘broad disappointment’ in Yushchenko 
specifically (Plokhy 2015, p.335).  
 The 2010 presidential election was ‘highly competitive’, featuring a free media, and 
negligible ‘evidence of serious fraud’ (Hale 2010, p.84). The Yushchenko campaign was 
‘wracked by defections, severe underfunding, and disorganization’, and garnered only 5 
percent support (Way 2015, p.77). Yanukovich, bolstered by a 2009 economic decline of 15 
percent and Yushchenko campaigning against Tymoshenko, thus returned to the 
presidency with 49 percent of the vote (Way 2015, p.77). Aided by the Party of Regions’ 
dominance in parliament, he proceeded to rescind the 2004 constitutional amendments 
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and concentrate more power in the president, jail Tymoshenko, and transfer up to 70 billion 
USD into his family’s offshore accounts (Plokhy 2015, p.338). Thus, while Ukraine became 
‘the only post-Soviet country aside from the Baltic states ever to have earned an 
unqualified “free” rating from Freedom House’, it remained ‘so unruly and corrupt that most 
Ukrainians question whether it is really a democracy at all’ (Hale 2010, p.84). Young people 
socialised since the Orange Revolution therefore experienced the most democracy of 
cohort in these countries, albeit one marred by public discontent about corruption and 
electoral competition. 
 While the survey data available for this thesis runs only to 2011 in Ukraine, more 
recent developments are well worth noting for their implications. By 2013, with 
Tymoshenko still in jail and the Party of Regions holding sway over most of parliament, 
Yanukovich was in a ‘strong position’ (Way 2015, p.81). The public was caught by surprise 
when he announced Ukraine would not be signing a European Union association 
agreement that had been years in the making, and 100,000 people made this known on 
November 24 by assembling in central Kyiv (Way 2015, pp.81–82). When police violently 
attempted to clear the square on November 30, over half a million people flooded the 
Maidan (Plokhy 2015, p.339). Surveys noted that 70 percent of protesters listed the harsh 
crackdown as motivation for joining, and 54 percent the ‘failure to join Europe’ (Way 2015, 
p.82). In mid-February, over seventy-seven people were killed in clashes, prompting 
Parliament to hastily ban the government’s use of force (Plokhy 2015, p.339). Yanukovich 
fled to Russia, which took advantage of events to invade the Crimea (Plokhy 2015, p.340). 
In May 2014, former Prime Minister Petro Poroshenko, who had himself participated in the 
Maidan protests, won the presidency in the first round (Plokhy 2015, p.343).  
 In consideration of the events discussed above, the revolution generation, having 
been exposed to the highest level of democratic governance, should according to 
socialisation theory be the most supportive of democracy. This cohort experienced 
competitive elections and free media and grew up in a period classified ‘Free’ by Freedom 
House (2010b). The transition cohort should be the next most supportive, having grown up 
in a period marked by limited electoral competition, civil and political rights. Similar to the 
transition generations in Russia and Belarus, this cohort experienced the restricted 
democratisation of the immediate post-Soviet period and could ‘change their government 
democratically’ (Freedom House 2003). Lastly, the Soviet cohort was socialised into the 
same authoritarian system as their Russian and Belarusian counterparts, which should 
negatively affect support for democracy. 
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Table 4.5: Summary of Ukrainian elections 
 Turnout Freedom House electoral 
democracy 
Notes 
1994 parliamentary 76% Yes ‘Generally free and fair’ 
(Freedom House 1997, p.471) 
1994 presidential 70% Yes  
1998 parliamentary 71% Yes  
1999 presidential 70% Yes  
2002 parliamentary 70% Yes  
2004 presidential 77% Yes Pressure on opposition 
(Freedom House 2004b) 
2006 parliamentary 67% Yes ‘Most open and democratic… 
since independence’ (Freedom 
House 2007) 
2007 parliamentary 60% Yes  
2010 presidential 69% Yes  
Source: International Foundation for Electoral Systems 2019c, Freedom House. 
 Table 4.5 summarises the elections held in Ukraine since independence, limited to 
the period covered by this study’s survey data. In contrast to Russia and Belarus, Ukraine 
has been deemed an electoral democracy by Freedom House since 1994. All Ukrainians 
socialised in this period, then, have experienced a number of free elections. In the period 
following the Orange Revolution, however, electoral processes have become even more 
robust, with elections called ‘free and fair, with only minor polling-place violations’ 
(Freedom House 2010a). 
 Table 4.6 summarises three political generations in Ukraine. While very similar to the 
cohort classifications of Russia and Belarus, Ukraine differs in that the membership of 
either of the two post-Soviet generations is hypothesised to have a positive effect on 
support for democracy. According to socialisation theory, the exposure to some degree of 
democracy both prior to and following the Orange Revolution ought to have a positive 
effect on democratic support. It is this that we test in the following section. 
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Table 4.6: Ukrainian cohort summary 
 
 
 
4.2 Testing generational effects in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus 
 This thesis employs the World Values Survey to explore generational effects on 
support for democracy in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus in the post-Soviet period. As 
discussed in the Introduction, the World Values Survey uses a common dictionary and 
question wording, lending itself to comparative analysis across countries and over time. 
Further, there are three waves of data spanning the period from 1996 to 2017, with the 
exception of 2006, when Belarus did not take part in the World Values Survey. The 
McAllister and White datasets provide survey items on regime performance that the World 
Values Survey does not, allowing us to test the performance model of regime support. 
 
 
 
 
   
Generation Born Experience Prediction 
Soviet  
(reference 
category) 
Before 1972 - Socialised during the Soviet 
period 
Socialised into 
authoritarianism: Negative 
effect on democratic 
support 
Transition 
generation  
(1991 – 2003) 
1973 - 1985 - Transitional period marked by 
flawed electoral competition 
and scattered protest 
movements 
- Limited political and civil rights 
- Economic crisis 
-‘Partly free’ (Freedom House) 
Socialised in democratising 
period: Positive effect on 
democratic support 
Revolution 
generation  
(2004–) 
1986 - -Socialised during the Orange 
Revolution and after 
- Competitive elections and free 
media 
- Economic recovery 
- Limited democratization, ‘free’ 
from 2006 to 2010 (Freedom 
House)  
Socialised in democratising 
period: Positive effect on 
democratic support 
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Table 4.7: Support for democracy (percentages) 1996 - 2018 
 1996 1999 2006 2008 2011 2017/18 Change 
since 1996 
Russia 
Strong democrats 3 3 3 4 2 6 +3 
Weak democrats 50 55 55 54 48 56 +6 
Undecided 20 18 21 16 22 16 -4 
Autocrats 27 24 21 26 29 21 -6 
N 1,251 1,328 1,303 1,003 1,778 1,318  
Belarus 
Strong democrats 3 2 na 1 4 4 +1 
Weak democrats 65 62 na 55 69 46 -19 
Undecided 16 17 na 20 14 21 +5 
Autocrats 16 19 na 24 13 30 +14 
N 1,367 660  1,043 1,509 1,228  
Ukraine 
Strong democrats 3 4 4 5 5 na +2 
Weak democrats 59 61 46 53 51 na -8 
Undecided 18 18 23 16 20 na +2 
Autocrats 20 16 28 25 25 na +5 
N 1,315 657 661 888 1,500   
Democratic support - ‘gold standard’ four-variable scale (percentages). 0-12 scale adapted from Klingemann et 
al (2006). Scores 0-5 ‘autocrats’, 6 ‘undecided’, 7-10 ‘weak democrats’, 11-12 ‘strong democrats’. Columns 
may not total 100 due to rounding error. Source: World Values Survey, available at www.worldvaluessurvey.org.  
 
 
 First, however, Table 4.7 presents aggregate levels of support for democracy over 
the years covered by the Values Surveys. The ‘support for democracy’ variable is 
comprised of the four-item battery – support for a democratic system, a strong leader who 
does not have to bother with elections, expert rule, or army rule. Klingemann et al.’s (2006) 
classification scale is used below for ease of interpretation, where higher values show 
stronger support for democracy and rejection of the authoritarian items. A score from 0-5 
on the ‘support for democracy’ scale indicates an ‘autocrat’, 6 ‘undecided’, 7-10 a ‘weak 
democrat’ and 11-12 a ‘strong democrat’; Table 4.7 presents the percentage of 
respondents in each category (Klingemann et al. 2006).  
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 The first clear pattern is the similarity between countries, where the bulk of 
respondents are ‘weak democrats’ who feel positively towards democracy but do not fully 
reject the three authoritarian items. Though only descriptive figures, this is consistent with 
the notion that limited exposure to democracy corresponds to limited public support for a 
democratic system. ‘Strong democrats’ are a clear minority both across countries and over 
time. ‘Autocrats’ are particularly numerous in Russia; however, the category is sizable in all 
three countries. To the extent that there is any trend over time, the proportion of democrats 
had slightly grown in Russia by 2017 and autocrats actually become slightly more 
numerous in Ukraine. 
 Does belonging to a certain generational cohort affect support for democracy? As a 
preliminary step, Table 4.8 shows the results of a bivariate regression using a post-Soviet 
generation dummy variable, with the Soviet generation as the excluded category. Contrary 
to socialisation theory, growing up under the post-Soviet period only has a significant effect 
on democratic support for Belarus in 2011. The post-Soviet dummy also explains 
essentially none of the variance in support for democracy. While it is still important to test 
for lifecycle effects, these first results suggest that a lifetime learning model accounting for 
various experiences throughout the life course will be more salient. 
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Table 4.8: Post-Soviet socialisation and democratic support 
 
 
 Russia  Belarus  Ukraine 
 1996 2011 2017  1996 2011 2018  1996 2011 
Post-Soviet 
socialisation 
.34 (.22) -.09 (.09) -.1 (.11)  .23 (.15) .21* (.09) -.07 (.12)  .26 (.19) -.18 (.1) 
Constant 6.57 6.53 7.16  7.24 7.36 6.63  7.07 6.91 
Adj R2 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 
N 1,250 1,778 1,318  1,367 1,509 1,228  1,315 1,487 
 
 
Ordinary least squares regression showing partial (b) coefficients predicting support for democracy. Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05. Source: 
World Values Survey, available at www.worldvaluessurvey.org
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 Table 4.9 disaggregates the post-Soviet period into the generational cohorts 
described above. Again, the generational cohorts are treated as dummy variables and the 
Soviet generation as the excluded category. Consistent with Table 4.8, there are no 
statistically significant effects of belonging to a certain political generation in Russia.23 
Parsing respondents into more precisely defined cohorts is, however, statistically significant 
in Belarus. As predicted in Table 4.4, socialisation into the Belarusian transition period 
(1991 – 1995) has a statistically significant positive effect in the most recent survey waves. 
Contrary to expectations, however, growing up under Lukashenka’s authoritarian regime 
also has a significant positive influence on democratic support in the two years immediately 
following his elevation to the presidency. Again, though, less than 1 percent of the variance 
is explained.  In Ukraine, the predictions of Table 4.6 are again unfounded. This contradicts 
the expectations of socialisation theory, and as such warrants investigation in subsequent 
chapters as to what else may be driving attitudes towards democracy, as well as what 
degree of within-generation variation is at play. It may be that the violence and political 
turmoil described in section 4.1 of this chapter led Ukrainians to view ‘democracy’ as 
unstable, unpredictable or a letdown, particularly after the Orange Revolution. Public 
evaluations of regime performance are therefore an important alternative model of support 
that will be tested in Chapter Six. 
  
 
23 A generation coding of 1991 – 2004 and 2005 – 2011 was also tested to mark when Freedom House 
downgraded Russia from ‘partly free’ to ‘not free’; however, this also yielded no statistically significant results. 
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Table 4.9 Post-Soviet generations and democratic support 
 
 Russia  Belarus  Ukraine 
 1996 2011 2017  1996 2011 2018  1996 2011 
Transition 
generation 
.34 (.22) -.04 (0.09) -.09 (.15)  .07 (.17) 0.34* (.16) -.25 (.20)  .26 (.19) -.19 (.12) 
Authoritarian/ 
revolution 
generation 
na -.13 (.11) -.11 (.13)  .82*** (.31) .17 (.10) -.03 (.12)  na -.16 (.15) 
Constant 6.57 6.53 7.16  7.24 7.36 6.63  7.07 6.91 
Adj R2 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 
N 1,250 1,778 1,318  1,367 1,509 1,228  1,315 1,487 
 
Ordinary least squares regression showing partial (b) coefficients predicting support for democracy. Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05. Source: 
World Values Survey Wave 6, available at www.worldvaluessurvey.org
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 Table 4.10 runs the same regression model while controlling for age, in order to 
establish whether lifecycle effects are a more useful explanation for democratic support. If 
any generational effects disappear, it may be simply that ‘people tend to support or not 
support democracy as they become older’ (Huang et al. 2016, p.243). In Belarus, age has a 
negative effect on democratic support across all three survey waves and washes out the 
positive effect of belonging to the authoritarian generation in 1996 and the transition 
generation in 2011. In the 2018 data, however, membership of the transitional generation 
has a negative effect on democratic support; however, with less than one percent of the 
variance explained, the influence of generational and lifecycle effects is negligible. It may be 
that the consolidation of authoritarian rule over the preceding sixteen years in Belarus has 
led to generation and lifecycle effects becoming less salient. Russia, of course, remains a 
puzzle in that neither generational nor lifecycle effects have been statistically significant in 
any of the analyses so far. It could be that ‘people will learn to accept whatever regime is 
supplied by elites’ regardless of the nature of the previous regime or socialisation 
experiences (Mishler & Rose 2007, p.832).  
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Table 4.10: Generational versus lifecycle effects and democratic support 
  Russia  
 1996 2011 2017 
 b beta b beta b beta 
Transition  .17 (.24) .02 .10 (.16) .02 -.22 (.21) -.04 
Authoritarian  na .04 .08 (.18) .02 -.31 (.27) -.07 
Age (years) -.01 (0) -.05 .01 (0) .06 -.01 (.01) -.05 
Constant 6.88 6.18 7.52 
Adj R2 0 0 0 
N 1,250 1,778 1,318 
 
Belarus 
 1996 2011 2018 
 b beta b beta b beta 
Transition  -.33 (.19) -.05 .12 (.19) .02 -.52* (.24) -.08* 
Authoritarian  .38 (.33) .03 -.17 (.19) -.04 -.51 (.26) -.12 
Age (years) -.02*** (0) -.15*** -.01* (.01) -.10* -.02* (.01) -.13* 
Constant 7.98 7.97 7.22 
Adj R2 0.02 0.01 0 
N 1,367 1,509 1,228 
 
Ukraine 
 1996 2011 
 b beta b beta 
Transition  .11 (.21) .02 -.45* (.18) -.1* 
Revolution na  -.52* (.24) -.09* 
Age (years) -.01 (0) -.05 -.01 (.01) -.09 
Constant 7.35 7.48 
Adj R2 0 0 
N 1,315 1,487 
Ordinary least squares regression showing partial (b) and standardised (beta) coefficients predicting support for 
democracy. Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05. Source: World Values Survey, 
available at www.worldvaluessurvey.org. 
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has shown that support for democracy is only minimally driven by 
generational effects, counter to the expectations of theories of political socialisation. This is 
 111 
particularly true of Russia, where no generational effects were found even for the overall 
post-Soviet generation. Moreover, when generational effects were statistically significant, 
they often had the opposite influence of what we should expect from being socialised into a 
certain political system. In Belarus, socialisation under an increasingly authoritarian regime 
had a positive effect on democratic support; in Ukraine after the Orange Revolution, 
membership of both the transitional and revolutionary generations had a negative effect 
despite being socialised into the highest level of democracy present in any of the three 
countries. Generational effects were also rendered insignificant in Belarus, where the 
negative effect of age washed out the generational effects found previously. The key 
outcome of this chapter, therefore, is that theories of political socialisation and lifecycle 
effects are of limited utility in these countries. 
 One possible explanation lies in the fact that the literature does not sufficiently 
distinguish between socialisation and merely being exposed to democracy. None of the 
cases studied here have fully democratised; therefore, citizens are likely not being 
socialised into democracy as ‘normal politics’ (Mattes et al. 2016, p.3). Moreover, the 
limited level of democratisation in these countries coincided with economic crisis. This ‘dual 
transition’ (Fish 1994, p.40) of the political and the economic system may explain why 
exposure to democracy has not developed democratic support. While democratisation in 
the 1990s was accompanied by economic collapse (Person 2016), the consolidation of 
authoritarian regimes in Russia and Belarus coincided with economic recovery. The 
following chapters evaluate the extent to which economic performance effects democratic 
support and what mechanisms may produce democratic support in each cohort. 
 The models in this chapter consistently explained close to zero of the overall 
variance in support for democracy, indicating that other influences are likely to be more 
important. In particular, things such as education (Rose et al. 2006, McAllister & White 
2017b), general socio-economic experience (Diamond 2008b, Inglehart & Welzel 2005) and 
knowledge of democracy (Cho 2014a) have been found to be strong predictors of 
democratic support. The next chapters therefore evaluate the effect of social 
modernisation, regime performance and democratic knowledge on support for democracy. 
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 Social modernisation 
 
 How might economic development and rising living standards affect attitudes 
towards democracy? This chapter tests the effects of one of the key and most enduring 
theories of democratic support – social modernisation. The past half-century has seen great 
attention paid to the relationship between economic development and democracy, with the 
basic theory being that higher levels of wealth, education and urbanisation create fertile 
ground for democratisation (Lipset 1959a). At the individual level, indicators of 
modernisation include income, educational level, occupation, membership of the middle 
class and urban residence. As a country modernises, it is these factors that should affect 
support for democracy among citizens (Inglehart & Welzel 2005). 
 Previous research has found that individual-level outcomes of modernisation 
provide the ability and incentive to seek expanded civil and political rights. People in ‘the 
modern parts of society’ able to move to urban areas, gain an education or employment in 
non-agricultural work, or increase their earning capacity should be more likely to ‘become 
supporters of reform’ and participate in politics (Bratton et al. 2005, p.36). If resources such 
as education and income increase people’s cognitive and social capabilities, it follows that 
they should be more likely to form movements seeking ‘greater and more effective liberties’ 
(Welzel & Inglehart 2006, p.32). A wealthier, educated middle class also has an interest in 
property rights and ‘stability, the rule of law and democratic procedures’ more generally 
(Goldman 2006, p.322). If this occurs in an authoritarian system such as that of Russia, 
Belarus or (to a lesser extent) Ukraine, the regime itself comes under threat (Welzel & 
Inglehart 2006, p.32). 
 This chapter extends the literature concerning modernisation and democratic 
support to the countries of interest to this thesis, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Although this 
broad line of enquiry is not new (notable existing works include Rose et al. 1998, McAllister 
& White 2017b), studies that examine the post-Soviet region do not often extend their 
analysis beyond Russia, and fewer still do so with reference to generational or lifecycle 
effects. This chapter therefore gives an overview of individual-level indicators of 
modernisation and tests their effect on democratic support in both the overall survey 
samples and the within-cohort samples.  
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 The chapter begins by reviewing theories of modernisation as they pertain to public 
support for democracy. To elaborate on the theorised mechanisms linking the independent 
variables to democratic support, section 5.1 specifies why, according to modernisation 
theory, each independent variable should have an effect. It also presents the five 
hypotheses to be tested later in this chapter. Section 5.2 reviews prior empirical findings as 
to how measures of modernisation affect democratic support in Russia, Ukraine and 
Belarus. Section 5.3 gives an overview of the changes over time in the independent 
variables, and section 5.4 tests the hypotheses with a multivariate model. Lastly, the 
conclusion draws the results together and summarises the utility of the social 
modernisation model in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. 
 
5.1 Theories of modernisation  
 While modernisation theory largely centres on Lipset’s (1959a, p.79) argument that 
‘the more well-to-do a nation, the greater it will sustain democracy’, more recent 
scholarship has moved to focus on implications at the individual level. Thus, while 
scholarship at the aggregate level typically looks at ‘wealth, industrialisation, urbanisation 
and education’ (Lipset 1959a, p.75), studies at the individual level use equivalent measures 
such as personal or household income, occupation, urban residence and educational level. 
As Inglehart (1988, p.1220) puts it, the relationship between economic development and 
democracy is seen as featuring mass attitudes as a crucial ‘intervening variable’. 
 Why should modernisation make people more supportive of democracy? The 
increase in ‘economic, intellectual and social resources’ prompted by modernisation gives 
people more time and money to spend as they see fit (Welzel & Inglehart 2006, p.23). As 
these resources increase, this security leads people to value things they previously had little 
time for – such as the opportunity to participate in politics, and ‘the pursuit of freedom’ 
(Inglehart & Welzel 2005, p.2). Individuals also develop an increased capability to engage in 
these pursuits as a result of growing levels of education and access to information. This, in 
turn, leads people to ‘perceive freedoms as valuable enough to struggle for their 
legalisation whenever they see themselves capable to handle these freedoms’ (Welzel 
2011, p.6). As a result of higher education and income levels, shifts from manual to 
cognitive work and other products of modernisation, individuals become more intellectually 
capable of exploring new activities (Welzel & Inglehart 2006, p.25), and autonomy and 
individualism come to replace community discipline and conformity (Welzel et al. 2003, 
p.342). Moreover, the increase in priva
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wealthier middle classes ‘would have an interest in defending their property rights’ and be 
more likely to back democratisation as a result (Frye 2003, p.26). In short, the individual 
benefits of social modernisation - the assets brought by education, income, rising class 
status or white-collar work - promote an interest in the democratic procedures that protect 
property (Goldman 2006, p.322). 
 In theory, then, modernisation should encourage the development of democracy 
because it shapes ‘mass values in ways that make them less compatible with autocracy 
and more functional for democracy’ (Inglehart & Welzel 2005, p.164). For instance, broader 
outlooks, tolerance and higher understandings of politics and society should all be 
encouraged by socio-economic development (Dalton & Shin 2006, p.88). Inglehart and 
Welzel (2005) argue that modernisation develops what they call ‘self-expression values’, 
which prioritise political and civil rights and ‘the institutions best suited to maximise human 
choice’. In sum, modernisation theory suggests that people benefiting from the outcomes 
of economic development – higher education and income, middle class status, non-manual 
professions and urban residence - should be those demanding democracy as a result of 
both ‘their personal conditions of life and an increased exposure to norms that might 
encourage democratic values’ (Dalton & Shin 2006, p.89). 
 The first factor, education, is often argued to be the most influential individual-level 
predictor. Lipset (1959a, p.80) argues that high levels of education are ‘close to being a 
necessary condition for democracy’. In another early work linking civic values and 
democracy, Almond and Verba (1963, p.379) note that no other demographic variable 
seemed to compare with education ‘to the extent in which it seems to determine political 
attitudes’. There is, therefore, general support for the argument that higher education is a 
key component of social modernisation. 
 Higher education creates critical and well-informed citizens who should show higher 
levels of democratic support (Schofer & Meyer 2005). It allows people to become more 
‘intellectually independent’ and form their own view of the world (Inglehart & Welzel 2005, 
p.28). In contemporary times, it aids the ability to ‘make sense of the flood of information 
available’ (Norris 2011, p.130). This ‘cognitive mobilisation’ afforded by university education 
in particular consists of political engagement and the intellectual skills to do so (Dalton 
1984). An alternative view is that higher education develops the civic and associational 
skills necessary for understanding and participating in politics (Hillygus 2005). It exerts a 
democratic influence by facilitating discussion and social interaction, which raises political 
participation and demand for a ‘broad-based’ democratic regime relative to an autocratic 
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one (Glaeser et al. 2007, p.77). In turn, this ‘increases the likelihood of successful 
democratic revolutions against dictatorships, and reduces that of successful anti-
democratic coups’ (Glaeser et al. 2007, p.77). 
 The influence of a non-manual occupation should operate similarly to education. As 
modernisation and post-industrialisation move people away from manual work offering 
‘very little autonomous judgement’, cognitive work fosters individual agency, autonomy and 
intellectual creativity (Welzel & Inglehart 2006, p.34). While the working class often 
supported suffrage and the welfare state, this was rarely accompanied by a broader 
demand for democratic procedures (Welzel & Inglehart 2006, p.34). Citing survey evidence 
from thirteen countries, Lipset (1959b, p.486) concludes that ‘the lower strata are less 
committed to democratic norms than the middle classes’ and that this amounted to 
‘working class authoritarianism’. More recently, however, the expansion of knowledge and 
service industries that employ and develop cognitive and social skills ought to increase 
demand for greater political rights and freedoms (Welzel & Inglehart 2006, p.34). 
 The causal mechanisms linking higher income and middle-class status to 
democratic support should both broadly tap economic prosperity. As Diamond (2008b, 
p.26) notes, a middle class that does not rely on the state may foster support for a 
democratic regime. Such a class therefore develops an interest in ‘stability, the rule of law 
and democratic procedures’ and placing checks and balances on the government to 
safeguard its assets (Goldman 2006, p.322). Eventually, the middle class starts ‘to desire 
more than mere personal freedom and prosperity’ and begins ‘to demand political liberty 
and a say in how their country is governed’ (Aron 2013, p.65). Noting that this path to 
democratisation occurred in 1970s Spain, Greece and Portugal, 1980s South Korea and 
Taiwan, and 1990s Mexico, Aron (2013, p.65) argues that once the middle class begins this 
process it ‘almost always succeeds in changing the regime’. Those with higher incomes 
should likewise value ‘political self-expression’ and a democratic state that should protect 
these rights (Inglehart & Welzel 2005, p.164).  
 Lastly, urban residence should also positively influence democratic support. As put 
by Laski (1937, p.78), ‘organised democracy is the product of urban life’, and urbanisation 
is a key component of modernisation theory as put forward by Lerner (1958) and Lipset 
(1959a). While Lipset (1959a, p.78) focuses on the aggregate level, arguing that ‘the degree 
of urbanisation is also related to the existence of democracy’ alongside education and 
wealth, more recent accounts highlight the individual-level effects of urbanisation. As 
people move from agriculture to ‘the cosmopolitan values of the city’, they are exposed to a 
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wider range of modern values (Dalton & Shin 2006, p.91). The effect is to expose people to 
‘a broader worldview, a more diverse environment, and the orientations and skills that 
encourage participatory demands’ (Dalton & Shin 2006, p.91). 
 If these arguments of modernisation theory hold, then all five independent variables 
should have a positive effect on democratic support. While the effect should not vary 
significantly across cohorts, some variables, such as income, are likely to increase with 
age. An overview of each independent variable by generation is thus provided in section 
5.3. The hypotheses this chapter will test in section 5.4 are: 
 
H1: Tertiary education will positively affect support for democracy. 
H2: Having a higher income will positively affect support for democracy. 
H3: Identifying as middle-class will positively affect support for democracy. 
H4: Being employed in non-manual work will positively affect support for democracy. 
H5: Urban residence will positively affect support for democracy. 
 
5.2 Prior empirical findings 
 While a wide range of scholarship has explored the effect of modernisation variables 
on attitudes towards democracy, relatively little focuses on the post-Soviet region. 
Although Russia has received some attention (see Rose et al. 1998, 2006 & 2011 for 
notable examples), literature on Ukraine and Belarus is scarcer. Few studies, moreover, 
have explored the effects of modernisation variables with reference to age or generation. 
 As noted earlier, social modernisation has been found to be among the most 
important predictors of democratic support. In a study of forty-one democracies and non-
democracies, Huang et al (2008), for example, find that the highly paid and educated are 
the strongest supporters of democracy. In a similarly broad study of thirty-nine countries, 
Norris (2011) finds that education predicted support for democracy. Education has been 
found to foster democratic support in China (Huang et al. 2016, McAllister & White 2017b), 
African countries (Bratton et al. 2005), Latin America (Canache 2012) and in both 
democratic and undemocratic states in Asia (Wang et al. 2006). Middle class identity has 
similar effects in multiple African countries (Bratton et al. 2005) and China (McAllister & 
White 2017b), as does income in large-scale cross-national studies (Norris 2011) and Latin 
America (Canache 2012). Urban dwellers are also more likely to support democracy than 
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their more rural counterparts, whether in China (Shi 2008) or a sample of forty-one countries 
worldwide (Huang et al. 2008). Lastly, while the effect of non-manual employment is 
relatively understudied, it has been demonstrated to foster democratic support in Africa 
(Evans & Rose 2007, Evans & Rose 2012) and Russia and China (McAllister & White 2017b). 
The effects of individual-level indicators of modernisation on democratic support have 
therefore been influential around the world. While the theoretical and empirical literature 
indicates this should also be the case in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, the following review 
of regional scholarship demonstrates that further enquiry is still needed. 
 Testing the effects of education while controlling for generational cohort accounts 
for shifts in each country’s university systems over time. The Soviet system involved heavy 
‘party censorship’ in universities, relenting only when glasnost allowed wider freedom of 
speech from 1985 onwards (Bain 2003, pp.4–6). In the early post-Soviet period, 
international philanthropy in Russia ‘promoted critical thinking and open discussions in 
academia’ to an extent not seen under communism (Romanov & Iarskaia-Smirnova 2015, 
p.360). Under Putin, however, academic freedom ends if research were to ‘confront or 
challenge the government’; however, the government does value higher education for 
purposes of prestige, social mobility and the economy (Matei et al. 2018, p.34). In Belarus, 
there has been little change since the Soviet era, where decision-making ‘remains highly 
concentrated in the hands of the president’ (Gille-Belova 2015, p.85) and courses on 
‘ideology of the Belarusian statehood’ are mandatory (Bekus 2008, p.273). While both 
Belarus and Russia are marked by significant state pressure on universities (Freedom 
House 2018a, Freedom House 2018b), academic freedom in Ukraine has been ‘generally 
respected’ (Freedom House 2007).  
 Gibson and Duch (1993, p.85) debunk concerns that a Soviet education produced 
‘non-democratic values’ and find that more educated Russians were indeed ‘more 
democratic’. Rose and Carnaghan (1995, p.45) similarly note that higher education 
produced more scepticism of authority and disapproval of the Soviet regime. Further 
research from Rose and colleagues again demonstrates that higher education made 
undemocratic governance less attractive to Ukrainians and Belarusians (Rose et al. 1998) 
and Russians more likely to reject regime options such as army rule, dictatorship or a return 
to communism (Rose et al. 2006, p.121). Haerpfer (2008) finds education to be the most 
important factor in rejecting such forms of authoritarian governance in Russia and Belarus. 
While household income was more important in Ukraine, education remained statistically 
significant (Haerpfer 2008). 
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 However, recent research suggests that higher education does generate support for 
democracy, as social modernisation theories argue. As noted by Rose et al. (2011, p.89), 
the relationship between education and democratic support in advanced democracies 
(Dalton 2013) suggests that educated Russians ought to reject their own undemocratic 
regime. Their analysis, however, indicates that education has no effect on attitudes towards 
the regime when age and occupation are controlled for (Rose et al. 2011, p.89). 
Contemporaneous survey data presented by Gerber and Chapman (2018) finds that 
Russian university graduates perceive the current regime as less democratic than their less 
educated counterparts. Further, a university education had a positive effect on support for 
democracy as well as demand for actual democratisation (Gerber & Chapman 2018). 
 Evidence on the relationship between income and democratic support is more 
contradictory: while the literature reviewed in the previous section suggests that a higher 
income should result in a more democratic citizen, the empirical results are inconclusive. In 
the early 1990s, Reisinger et al. (1994) finds that wealthier Russians and Ukrainians express 
higher support for democracy. Rose, Mishler and Munro (2006), however, find household 
economic situation to have no statistically significant effect on support for the Russian 
regime. Having a higher standard of living had a weak but significant positive effect on 
regime support (Rose et al. 2006).  
 Similarly, the perception of high living standards has been found to increase support 
for the current presidents of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus (McAllister & White 2016a). While 
this might suggest that a higher income may simply result in greater satisfaction with the 
current regime, Gerber & Chapman (2018) find that higher-earning Russians showed more 
support for democratisation. Further, those in the lowest income quintile perceived the 
current regime as more democratic than their counterparts in the top quintile (Gerber & 
Chapman 2018). While results are mixed, we might therefore cautiously expect income to 
have a positive effect on democratic support. 
 Theory suggests that belonging to the middle class and working a non-manual 
occupation should both foster democratic support. Despite this, the latter has received very 
little attention in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, and middle class identification has only 
provided mixed results. In line with the broad assumption the middle class should act as a 
‘sponsor of democratisation’ (Bratton et al. 2005, p.14), evidence from Russia suggests that 
non-manual work and middle class identification are the second strongest predictors of 
democratic support after education (McAllister & White 2017b). Studies of the protest 
following the 2011 Duma election also indicate that the middle class were well-represented 
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(Gill 2015), with some arguing that they constituted ‘a new social force’ against the Putin 
regime (Jensen 2013, p.1). 
 However, while Russians who view their ‘social status as above average’ are more 
likely reject a return to communism, suspending elections, army rule and dictatorship, they 
are also more likely to support the current system (Mishler & Rose 2002, Rose et al. 2006, 
p.111). Rose et al. report the same relationship, suggesting that satisfaction with one’s 
social position may mean satisfaction with the status quo (2011). An above-average social 
status, however, may tap something different to middle class identity (Rose et al. 2011). 
While Ross (2016, p.82) notes that the Russian middle class is ‘ambivalent’ towards 
democracy – with three-quarters of this class supportive of the current regime – almost half 
of this group agreed that ‘political freedom and democracy cannot be refused under any 
circumstances’. Moreover, younger members of the middle class showed slightly more 
support for democracy (Ross 2016, p.82). 
 In contrast, urban residence is frequently found to foster support for democracy. 
Early studies of post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine found urban residents most willing to 
support democracy (Miller et al. 1994, Reisinger et al. 1994). Urban Russians also show 
more willingness to reject authoritarian regimes (Rose et al. 2006) and tend to be less 
supportive of Putin (McAllister & White 2016a, Rose et al. 2011). Russians living in more 
rural areas and smaller towns, however, are a stable support base for the Putin regime 
(Treisman 2014). 
 While evidence from Belarus is limited, Belarusians living in urban areas are less 
likely to show support for President Lukashenka and are less nostalgic for the Soviet Union 
(McAllister & White 2016a, McAllister & White 2016b). Lastly, Gerber and Chapman (2018, 
pp.493–494) note that residents of Moscow and St Petersburg are ‘substantially more likely 
to support democratisation’ than other Russians, more likely to agree that democracy 
would ‘be the best form of government for Russia today’, and less likely to perceive the 
current regime as democratic.  
 We should therefore expect all five indicators – education, income, occupation (as 
measured by middle class status and non-manual employment) and urban residence – to 
positively effect democratic support. The next section provides an overview of the 
independent variables with reference to generational cohorts, before testing their effect on 
democratic support in section 5.4. 
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5.3 Social modernisation over time 
 To begin our analysis of the effects of social modernisation, this section gives an 
overview of trends at the individual level. It employs the two World Values Survey waves 
that cover all three case countries, for which fieldwork was completed in 1996 and 2011.24 
Where possible, it also includes the latest WVS wave, which provides more recent data for 
Russia (2017) and Belarus (2018), run in conjunction with the European Values Survey. 
Table 5.1 shows the percentage of Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians holding a tertiary 
education by cohort25 across the three World Values Survey waves used for multivariate 
analysis. The first point to note is that at least one-fifth of all cohorts hold a tertiary 
education, and that this increases across time as cohort members age and complete such 
milestones. In Russia, the Soviet generation shows only a modest increase from 1996 to 
2011, where the proportion of those with a university education sits at twenty-five percent. 
This is likely due to the simple fact that the mean age of the Soviet cohort is fifty-seven in 
2011 and members are less likely to complete any further education at this age. The 
transition generation, however, increases its level of education to nearly fifty percent of the 
cohort in 2017. The authoritarian cohort growing up under Putin also shows relatively high 
levels of education, at thirty eight percent. 
 The three Belarusian cohorts in 2011 are also relatively well-educated, with at least 
40 percent of each generation holding a tertiary qualification. The transition generation is 
the best educated of all cohorts with 57 percent of its members holding a university 
education, up from 25 percent in 1996 when cohort members were only in early adulthood. 
In Ukraine, the pattern is similar to its neighbours, where around one-fifth of the Soviet and 
transition generations held a tertiary education in 1996. While only around one-quarter of 
the Soviet generation was university-educated by 2011, the transition and revolution 
generations sat at forty and fifty percent respectively. 
 
 
 
24 While data is available for Russia and Ukraine from the fifth wave of the WVS, it is not presented here for four 
reasons: 1) Belarus, clearly, is excluded; 2) there is no measure for middle class status; 3) the measure for town 
size is inconsistent with other waves; 4) analyses with the remaining measures do not differ substantially from 
the analyses presented in-text. 
25 Refer to chapter 4 for an overview of cohorts. 
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 Table 5.1: Levels of tertiary education 
  (Percent) 
  1996 2011 2017 
     
 Soviet 21 25 25 
Russia Transition 23 40*** 49*** 
 Authoritarian na 44*** 38*** 
     
 Soviet 22 42 na 
Belarus Transition 25 57** na 
 Authoritarian  45 na 
     
 Soviet 22 26 na 
Ukraine Transition 17 43** 
 
na 
 Revolution na 55*** na 
     
Percentage of respondents holding a ‘university-level education with degree’ and ‘some university-level 
education without degree’. *Significantly different from Soviet generation at p<.05, **p<0.1, ***p<.001. Source: 
World Values Survey, available at www.worldvaluessurvey.org.  
 
 On the second modernisation variable, income, respondents do not differ greatly by 
country of cohort. Table 5.2 shows these mean values of self-reported income on a ten-
step scale. This item has the advantage of being consistent across countries and survey 
waves, in contrast to other measures of income in these surveys. In contrast to educational 
levels, mean reported income hovers roughly around the midpoint with little significant 
change. However, one weak trend common to all countries is the Soviet cohort reporting 
the least income. This may be related to younger people being better able to adapt to 
changing political and economic conditions, or reflect the Soviet cohorts evaluating their 
position relative to the communist period. The higher-earning generations are indeed the 
youngest cohorts in 2011, and the authoritarian generations in Russia and Belarus in 2017-
18. 
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Table 5.2: Self-reported income 
  (Mean 1-10) 
  1996 2011 2017-18 
     
 Soviet 4.8  3.9  4.3  
Russia Transition 5.6**  4.5***  5.2***  
 Authoritarian  4.9***  5.3***  
     
 Soviet 5.5  4.5  4.5  
Belarus Transition 6.7***  5.1***  5.2***  
 Authoritarian 6.2  5.1***  5.6***  
     
 Soviet 3.7  4   
Ukraine Transition 4.1*  4.7***   
 Revolution  5.1***   
     
1-10 household income scale where 1 indicates ‘lowest income group’ and 10 indicates ‘highest income group’.  
*Significantly different from Soviet generation at p<.05, **p<0.1, ***p<.001. Source: World Values Survey, 
available at www.worldvaluessurvey.org.  
  
 A similar generational trend is apparent in non-manual employment. WVS measures 
of occupation are inconsistent across survey waves: the 1996 wave offers a categorical 
measure with clear manual and non-manual options, while the 2011 round asks 
respondents to rate their occupation from 1, ‘mostly manual tasks’, to 10 ‘mostly 
intellectual tasks’. Both are coded as binary variables tapping non-manual occupation, 
displayed in Table 5.3.26 While the Soviet generations were more likely to be employed in 
non-manual work in 1996, this reverses by 2011. The gap is also narrower in Ukraine, 
where the transition generation had only four percent less non-manual workers; in Russia 
and Belarus, only around a quarter of transition cohort members worked in non-manual 
professions. By 2011, around forty percent of the younger cohorts were in non-manual 
work, with the highest proportion reported for the Belarusian authoritarian generation. 
 
 
 
 
26 Russia 2017 is excluded due to a very different categorical measure; there is no item for Belarus 2018. 
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Table 5.3: Non-manual employment 
  (Percent) 
  1996 2011 
    
 Soviet 40 36 
Russia Transition 26** 37 
 Authoritarian na 40 
    
 Soviet 37 35 
Belarus Transition 26* 41 
 Authoritarian na 52*** 
    
 Soviet 38 37 
Ukraine Transition 26 42 
 Revolution na 42 
    
The non-manual category includes those scoring 5 ‘non-manual office worker’ and above in 1996, and 7 or 
above in 2011.3 . *Significantly different from Soviet generation at p<.05, **p<0.1, ***p<.001. Source: World 
Values Survey, available at www.worldvaluessurvey.org.  
 
 
 Of each country, Belarusians are the most likely to identifying as middle class. 
Middle class identification starts at a higher base than the other variables so far at 38 
percent in the case of the Russian Soviet generation in 1996. There is some disparity 
between similar cohorts in 1996, however: Soviet generations in Belarus and Ukraine 
reported 62 and 45 percent respectively. In all three countries, however, the transition 
cohort in 1996 felt more middle class than their Soviet counterparts, with a difference of 
almost 20 percent in Russia. Indeed, across all countries and years, the younger 
generations identify as middle class more frequently than their predecessors.  
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Table 5.4: Middle class image 
  (Percent) 
  1996 2011 2017-18 
     
 Soviet 38 45 46 
Russia Transition 57*** 54*** 57*** 
 Authoritarian  56*** 66*** 
     
 Soviet 62 53  
Belarus Transition 69 65* n/a 
 Authoritarian  68***  
     
 Soviet 45 42  
Ukraine Transition 60*** 56***  
 Revolution  59***  
     
‘Middle class’ includes those who responded ‘lower’ or ‘upper middle class’. *Significantly different from Soviet 
generation at p<.05, **p<0.1, ***p<.001. Source: World Values Survey, available at www.worldvaluessurvey.org 
 
 Lastly, these populations are relatively urbanised. At least 60 percent of 
respondents report living in an urban area, with the Russian transition cohort in 1996 and 
the Belarusian authoritarian cohort in 2011 being the most urbanised at just over 80 
percent. There is little drastic change across time, which is in line with urban population 
estimates from the United Nations Population Division showing that Russia in particular has 
not had any significant increases in urbanisation over the post-Soviet period (World Bank 
2018b). Belarus, however, has seen an increase in its urban population from 66 percent in 
1990 to 74 percent in 2011, which is reflected in the individual-level estimates that are 
slightly higher than Russia and Ukraine. Ukraine’s population is the least urbanised, at 
around 69 percent in 2011, which is again reflected in Table 5.5. The main trend to note is 
that the youngest generations are the most urbanised, with a difference of at least 10 
percentage points between them and the Soviet generations in all three countries in 2011. 
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Table 5.5: Urban residence 
  (Percent) 
  1996 2011 2017 
     
 Soviet 71 66 71 
Russia Transition 82** 68 76* 
 Authoritarian  76*** 76* 
     
 Soviet 66 70  
Belarus Transition 71* 76 na 
 Authoritarian  81***  
     
 Soviet 63 57  
Ukraine Transition 60 61 na 
 Revolution  68**  
     
Percentage of residents living in a town with >10,000 residents. *Significantly different from Soviet generation at 
p<.05, **p<0.1, ***p<.001. Source: World Values Survey, available at www.worldvaluessurvey.org.  
  
5.4 Modernisation and support for democracy 
 The social modernisation literature argues that individual-level experiences of 
modernisation will foster pro-democratic attitudes. So far, this chapter has shown that 
younger generations broadly tend to be more educated, have a slightly higher reported 
income, and are more likely to be in non-manual employment, identify as middle-class and 
live in an urban area. Table 5.6 presents the results of the multivariate model across Russia, 
Ukraine and Belarus in Wave 3 of the World Values Survey, for which data was collected in 
1996. As with other analyses throughout this thesis, generational cohort and age are 
included to control for generational and lifecycle effects respectively. To maintain 
consistency with the within-generation analyses, where cohort members often belong to 
the same age group decile, age is coded in years rather than decades.  
 The first result to note is the disparity between countries in terms of how much of 
the variance in democratic support is explained by the modernisation model. For Russia 
and Belarus, 6 percent of the variance is explained, but in Ukraine it is only half of this 
figure. While there are two puzzling results that stand out to be explored further in the 
discussion, for now we will note that modernisation theory seems to operate similarly in 
Russia and Belarus, but Ukraine appears to respond differently. 
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Table 5.6: Social modernisation and democratic support, 1996 
Ordinary least squares regression showing partial (b) and standardised (beta) coefficients predicting support for 
democracy. The dependent variable is scored 0-12. Education, non-manual work, class and urban residence 
are dummy variables scored 0 and 1. Income is a 0-10 scale. See Chapter 4 for cohort coding. 
Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05. Source: World Values Survey, available at 
www.worldvaluessurvey.org.  
  
 Holding a tertiary education has a consistent and significant impact on democratic 
support across all three countries, confirming the first hypothesis. This aligns with the 
expectations of modernisation theory suggesting that higher education fosters critical and 
liberal thinking (see Inglehart & Welzel 2005; Glaeser et al. 2007). The effect is similar across 
countries and important relative to most other variables. The other variable to reach 
significance in all three countries is income; however, having a higher income has a positive 
effect in Russia and Belarus but a negative effect in Ukraine. There is no immediately 
obvious reason for income having the opposite effect in Ukraine; however, this could reflect 
previous findings on a related measure, higher living standards, which often increases 
support for the current regime (Rose et al. 2006) or president (McAllister & White 2016a). 
The second hypothesis therefore finds support only in Russia and Belarus. 
 Urban residence has a similarly contradictory influence. While insignificant in 
Belarus, in Russia it has the expected positive effect on democratic support. It is also 
influential in Ukraine albeit in the opposite direction, which again contradicts the arguments 
of modernisation theory and comes with no ready explanation. However, this is in line with 
 Russia Belarus Ukraine 
 b beta b beta b beta 
Tertiary education 
 
.66*** (.15) .14*** .58*** (.14) .14*** .43** (0.15) .1** 
Income 
 
.09** (.03) .1** .05* (.02) .07* -.08** (0.02) -.11** 
Non-manual work 
 
.03 (.14) .01 .26* (.13) .07*  .23 (0.13) .06 
Middle class 
 
.24 (.14) .06 -.11 (.12) -.03 .17 (0.12) .05 
Urban resident 
 
.39** (.13) .09** .13 (.13) .03 -.41** (0.12) -.11** 
Transition cohort 
 
.02 (.25) 0 -.14 (.24) -.02 -.06 (0.25) -.01 
Authoritarian / 
revolution cohort 
 
na  -.16 (.38) -.01    na  
Age (years) 0 (0) -.01 -.11** (.04) -.09** -.04 (0.04) -.04 
Constant 5.57 7  7.56 
Adj R2 0.06 0.06  0.03 
N 1,145       1,053  1,014 
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previous research finding inconsistent effects of urban residence in Ukraine (see for 
example De Haas et al. 2016, Shulman 2005). The hypothesis that urban residence should 
foster democratic support is therefore supported only in Russia. 
 The other modernisation variables show weaker and less consistent effects. Neither 
of the variables roughly tapping occupation are particularly influential: a middle class image 
is insignificant for all three countries, and employment in non-manual work is only 
significant in Belarus. It does, however, have the expected influence of fostering support for 
democracy. Generational and lifecycle effects are insignificant when taking the 
modernisation variables into account; however, age retains a negative effect in Belarus 
even when controlling for all else. This is particularly striking given that indicators in this 
model such as income could be expected to increase with age – and have a positive effect 
on democratic support, as is shown in the results. 
 To further explore some of these unexpected results, a semi-partial R2  analysis was 
run for all three countries. In all cases, the most influential variable was education, followed 
by income in the case of Russia. In Belarus, however, the negative effect of age is 
miniscule, explaining only very little (0.005) of the variance in democratic support – not 
much more than income (0.004) or non-manual work (0.004). In Ukraine, the unexpected 
negative effects of income and urban residence explained only one percent and 0.7 percent 
of democratic support respectively. Interactions between variables such as education, 
generation and age were explored but yielded no statistically significant results; in Ukraine, 
the same was true for interactions tested between income, urban residence and generation. 
Thus, while some results are certainly counterintuitive and theoretically unexpected, they 
exert very little impact on the dependent variable. 
 Table 5.7 presents the same model, this time from the sixth WVS wave conducted in 
2011, and with notable changes in the influence of several variables. The first thing to note 
is the decline in the modernisation model’s ability to explain democratic support. While the 
model again explains three percent of the variance in Ukraine, Russia and Belarus have 
dropped by half to three and two percent respectively. While numerous independent 
variables still exert their expected influence, it appears that individual socio-economic 
measures are becoming less important for evaluations of democracy in these countries. In 
the case of Belarus and Russia in particular, this may be part of having spent a decade or 
more under the same ruler and their manner of evaluating regime options shifting 
accordingly. Alternative explanations will be explored in later chapters. 
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Table 5.7: Social modernisation and democratic support, 2011 
Ordinary least squares regression showing partial (b) and standardised (beta) coefficients predicting support for 
democracy. The dependent variable is scored 0-12. Education, non-manual work, class and urban residence 
are dummy variables scored 0 and 1. Income is a 0-10 scale. See Chapter 4 for cohort coding. 
Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05. Source: World Values Survey, available at 
www.worldvaluessurvey.org.  
 Second, education retains its positive effect in Russia and Ukraine. In Belarus, 
however, it has no significant effect, which is at odds with some key works in 
modernisation theory (Lipset 1959a) but not unheard of in the post-Soviet region (Rose et 
al. 2011). Employment in non-manual work, however, retains its positive effect in Russia 
and Belarus. It could thus be the same mechanism at work here as education, where both 
are expected to foster critical thinking, autonomy, and general cognitive skills (Inglehart & 
Welzel 2005). This would be somewhat consistent with the negative effect of income, if the 
latter’s effect is to generate support for the status quo rather than (or at the expense of) a 
democratic state that will provide ‘political self-expression’ (Inglehart & Welzel 2005, p.164). 
Middle class status likewise continues to have no significant effect, suggesting that the 
Russian middle class and their Ukrainian and Belarusian counterparts may indeed be 
‘ambivalent’ towards democracy (Ross 2016, p.82). 
 Next, income loses its negative effect in Ukraine but gains it in Russia and Belarus. 
While household income has elsewhere been found to have no significant effect on regime 
support (Rose et al. 2006), having a higher standard of living has been found to correspond 
with greater satisfaction with the regime (McAllister & White 2016a, Rose et al. 2006). Ceka 
 Russia Belarus Ukraine 
 b beta b beta b beta 
Tertiary education 
 
.25* (.11) .07* .19 (.1) .05 .38** (.12) .09** 
Income 
 
-.12*** (.03) -.12*** -.09** (.03) -.09** .0 (.03) 0 
Non-manual work 
 
.32** (.11) .08** .26* (.1) .07* -.01 (.10) 0 
Middle class 
 
.1 (.10) .03 .15 (.1) .04 -.07 (.11) -.02 
Urban resident 
 
.24* (.10) .07* -.01 (.11)    0 .5*** (.10) .13*** 
Transition cohort 
 
.02 (.17)    0 .21 (.21) .03 -.5** (.18) -.11** 
Authoritarian / 
revolution cohort 
-.10 (.20) -.02 -.16 (.19) -.04 -.64** (.23) -.12** 
Age (years) 0 (0.01) -.01 -.01 (.01) -.10 -.01* (.05) -.08* 
Constant 6.57 8.1 7.1 
Adj R2 0.03 0.02 0.03 
N 1,438 1,458 1,487 
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and Magalhães (2016) have recently argued that in young democracies, those with higher 
social status (as measured by education and income) are less supportive of democracy. To 
explain this finding they turn to social dominance theory, which argues that ‘subordinate	
groups are more likely to reject the status quo than are dominant groups, consistent with 
the self-interest of both’ (Turner & Reynolds 2003, p.201). This argument may have some 
merit for the 2011 model in Russia and Belarus, where higher income means lower support 
for democracy – and by implication, more support for the authoritarian status quo. Social 
dominance theory, however, has less utility for the positive effect of income in these 
countries in 1996, when Belarus was beginning its authoritarian trajectory and Russia was 
relatively more democratic under Yeltsin (Freedom House 1997). It might therefore be that 
earning a higher income fosters approval of the status quo and the Putin and Lukashenka 
regimes, and in turn a rejection of democracy – but that the modernisation explanation was 
more powerful for Russia in 1996. 
 Urban residence in 2011 functions as theorised in Russia and Ukraine, confirming 
the hypotheses. What is striking is that far from being the negative influence it was fifteen 
years prior, urban residence is now the most important predictor of democratic support in 
Ukraine. The changing effect of urban residence in Ukraine is, however, reflected in the 
literature. Using data from 2010, De Haas et al (2016, p.101) found no significant effect of 
urban residence on whether respondents found ‘democracy preferable’. Moreover, survey 
data from 2001 found that residence in Kyiv was negatively associated with political 
liberalism, while settlement size showed a positive association (Shulman 2005). The positive 
effect of urban residence in 2011 also explains more of the variance than it did in 1996, with 
1.5 percent as opposed to 0.7 percent. The expected positive relationship between urban 
residence and support for democracy is thus more consequential in this respect. 
 While there are no significant cohort or lifecycle effects for Russia or Belarus, both 
again have negative consequences for democratic support in Ukraine. It is again striking 
that variables such as income or occupation do not explain away any of these effects given 
they are often associated with aging. This is not a new finding, however: Shulman (2005) 
found age to negatively affect support for political liberalism even when controlling for 
education, income, and material wellbeing. In this analysis, however, generational and 
lifecycle effects only explain one percent of support for democracy between them. 
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Table 5.8: Social modernisation and democratic support, 2017-18 
Ordinary least squares regression showing partial (b) and standardised (beta) coefficients predicting support for 
democracy. The dependent variable is scored 0-12. Education, non-manual work, class and urban residence 
are dummy variables scored 0 and 1. Income is a 0-10 scale. See Chapter 4 for cohort coding. 
Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05. Source: World Values Survey, available at 
www.worldvaluessurvey.org.  
 
 
 Table 5.8 presents the last of the aggregate models with Russian and Belarusian 
WVS data from 2017 and 2018, respectively. The trend of modernisation variables 
explaining a declining proportion of variance continues here, with an R2 of two percent at 
most. The only modernisation variable available in this latest data for Belarus is income, 
which again reverses its effect to the positive one seen in 1996. Despite membership of 
both cohorts having a negative effect, income accounts for virtually all of the explained 
variance (0.015 percent). Given the lack of measures for the other modernisation variables, 
however, it is impossible to say whether this result would be moderated or cancelled out 
by, for instance, education or occupation.  
 For Russia, education is the only variable with a significant effect. It does, however, 
have the positive influence on democratic support as predicted by modernisation theory. 
Income, non-manual work and urban residence have all lost the significant effects seen in 
2011. While it may indeed be that the apparent stability and endurance of the Putin regime 
over the past seventeen years has muted the effects of previously influential modernisation 
variables, the results are not entirely at odds with other scholarship. Gerber and Chapman 
(2018, p.484) argue that it is not urban residence but living in a global city that exposes 
Russians to ‘global communications’ and makes them more receptive to democracy. While 
Gerber and Chapman’s (2018) data was from 2011, their results may be indicative of the 
manner in which the effect of modernisation variables may shift (or decline) over time. 
 Russia Belarus 
 b beta b beta 
Tertiary education .45** (.13)  .10** na  
Income -.02 (.03) -.02 .15*** (.04)  .13** 
Middle class -.13 (.13) -.03            na  
Urban resident -.17 (.14) -.04            na  
Transition cohort -.3 (.22) -.06 -.56* (.25) -.08* 
Authoritarian cohort -.4 (.28) -.09 -.57* (.27) -.14* 
Age (years) -.01 (.01) -.08 -.01 (.01) -.08 
Constant 7.86 6.58 
Adj R2 0.01 0.02 
N 1,212       1,100 
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Within-generation analyses  
 To further explore the effects of the modernisation variables on democratic support, 
this section runs the same models on the cohort subsamples. It does so using the 2011 
data, which provides sufficient sample size for each cohort to run the full model in each 
generation.27 Table 5.9 shows the results of the model in 2011. Consistent with the minimal 
explanatory power of the modernisation model in the overall sample from this period, the 
variables explain no more than four percent of variance in democratic support for any 
cohort. Perhaps the most striking result is the lack of significance of education across 
cohorts. It has no significance in Russian or Belarusian cohorts, and only has an effect on 
the Ukrainian Soviet generation. Moreover, urban residence explains more of the variance 
in democratic support in this cohort, confirming that even though education is significant its 
influence is quite small. Given that education is frequently one of the key predictors of 
democratic support, this is certainly at odds with both the theoretical and empirical 
literature. As noted above, however, it does fit with some prior scholarship on Russia 
specifically (Rose et al. 2011).  
 In Russia, modernisation variables have the greatest influence on the Soviet 
generation, where higher income depresses democratic support but non-manual work and 
urban residence increase it. None of the variables reach significance in the transition 
generation and only non-manual work has a significant effect on the authoritarian 
generation, suggesting that there may indeed be something about growing up in the post-
Soviet period that has made socio-economic factors less relevant. This is intriguing in the 
case of the transition generation specifically, given that their socialisation coincided with a 
series of economic crises (Person & Landry 2016); however, it may be that such a 
socialisation experience affected the cohort in such a way that made socio-economic 
status a moot point. Non-manual work, nonetheless, retains a positive effect on the 
authoritarian generation. 
 The picture is similar in Belarus, where income negatively affects democratic 
support for the Soviet generation and non-manual work has a positive effect for the 
authoritarian generation. Again, the variance explained for each cohort is minimal. One 
finding not present in the overall samples model was the negative effect of age within the 
 
27 The 1996 data, of course, has either very few members of younger cohorts and none at all in the case of the 
newest generations. 
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Soviet cohort. One explanation is that as they are the eldest Belarusian cohort, they are 
more susceptible to lifecycle effects and thus become more sceptical of democracy as they 
age, in line with previous findings (Colton & McFaul 2002, Rose et al. 2004). 
 In Ukraine, as with the overall samples model, the results differ from its neighbours. 
First, all three cohorts have the positive effect of urban residence in common, as per the 
expectations of the theory and literature. Second, it is the revolution generation rather than 
the transition generation where the modernisation model has the least explanatory value. 
As something of an outlier of the nine cohorts – with the most exposure to democratic rule 
in young adulthood relative to all other generations28 – perhaps this makes sense, at least in 
the case of Ukraine. However, modernisation variables such as education and income are 
often found to foster democratic support in democratic countries (see for instance Norris 
2011), indicating that this cohort having experienced ‘more democracy’ is not an adequate 
explanation. Nonetheless, it does not differ greatly from other cohorts given that the 
modernisation model accounts for little variance across all generations. 
 The findings presented in this chapter are therefore only partially consistent with the 
arguments of modernisation theory. Some variables, such as education, did have the 
expected positive effect but only for some cohorts and survey waves. Others, such as 
income and urban residence, at times had a negative effect that contradicted theoretical 
expectations. However, the modernisation variables explained no more than six percent of 
variance in democratic support for any survey wave or cohort and their influence declined 
over time. Clearly, other factors may be at work – the following chapters will therefore 
explore alternative theoretical models. 
 
28 Refer to chapter 4 for an overview of democracy ratings in this period. 
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Table 5.9: Within-generation analyses 
Ordinary least squares regression showing partial (b) and standardised (beta) coefficients predicting support for democracy. The dependent variable is scored 0-12. Education, non-
manual work, class and urban residence are dummy variables scored 0-1. Income is a 0-10 scale. See chapter 4 for cohort coding. Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05. 
Source: World Values Survey, available at www.worldvaluessurvey.o
Russia Soviet  Transition  Authoritarian 
 b beta  b beta  b beta 
Education .26 (.15) .07  .42 (.28) .12  .11 (.24) .03 
Income -.12 (.03) -.13  -.1 (.07) -.09  -.12 -.11 
Non-manual work .27 (.13) .08  .24 (.29) .07  .48 (.24) .13 
Middle class .18 (.13) .05  -.10 (.25) -.03  .06 (.24) .02 
Urban resident .34** (.12) .09**  .28 (.25) .07  -.11 (.25) .03 
Age (years 0 (.01) -.01  .02 (.04) .03  .05 (.04) .08 
Constant 6.6  5.98  5.52 
Adj R2 0.03  0.01  0.01 
N 883   257  298 
Belarus Soviet  Transition  Authoritarian 
 b beta  b beta  b beta 
Education .13 (.13) .04  .32 (.41) .08  .12 (.17) .03 
Income -.10 (.04) -.10  -.09 (.10) -.08  -.07 (.05) -.06 
Non-manual work .14 (.14) .04  .36 (.43) .09  .44** (.17) .12** 
Middle class .16 (.14) .05  .58 (.41) .14  .07 (.18) .02 
Urban resident -.14 (.13) -.09  .72 (.42) .16  .09 (.21) .02 
Age (years) -.02** (.01) -.10**  -.08 (.16) -.04  .03 (.02) .09 
Constant 8.56  9.67  6.57 
Adj R2 0.02  0.04  0.02 
N 838  112  508 
Ukraine Soviet  Transition  Revolution 
 b beta  b beta  b beta 
Education .41** (.16) .09**  .39 (.24) .1  .19 (.28) .05 
Income .04 (.04) .04  -.06 (.06) -.06  -.10 (.08) -.09 
Non-manual work .03 (.13) .01  -.20 (.22) -.05  .10 (.28) .03 
Middle class .11 (.15) .03  -.60* (.20) -.15*  -.05 (.29) -.01 
Urban resident .46*** (.13) .12***  .53* (.22) .13*  .64* (.3) .15* 
Age (years) -.01 (.01) -.04  -.07* (.03) .13*  .03 (.06) .04 
Constant 6.67  9.28  6.00 
Adj R2 0.03  0.04  0.01 
N 937  330  220 
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Conclusion 
 Social modernisation theory argues that economic development and rising living 
standards have important implications at the individual level for political attitudes. As a 
country modernises, its citizens benefit from increased access to education, 
industrialisation, higher income and urbanisation. An individual’s growing wealth, 
educational level, class status, occupation and place of residence should in theory foster 
democratic support. These factors should do so by increasing the will and capability to 
participate in politics and demand civil liberties (Inglehart & Welzel 2005).  
 Given the importance afforded to education in the literature, the first notable finding 
is that the effect of education is uneven. Although its effect, when significant, is always 
positive as anticipated, it is rarely significant in the cohort subsamples. Indeed, the 
discrepancy in the significance of independent variables between cohorts suggests that the 
processes by which each generation develops democratic values may differ. The only 
variable to have a consistent effect across generations is urban residence, which has a 
positive effect in each Ukrainian cohort. 
 Two variables that deserve further attention are income and non-manual work. First, 
income, while expected to have a positive effect on democratic support by increasing 
demand for civil and political liberties (Inglehart & Welzel 2005), had both positive and 
negative effects. In 1996, its effect was positive in Russia and Belarus and negative in 
Ukraine; by 2011, its effect had reversed in Russia and Belarus and become insignificant in 
Ukraine. Clearly, the mechanisms linking income and democratic attitudes vary over time or 
context, and further research is warranted to determine why. Second, non-manual 
occupation was the least-studied variable to be included in this chapters’ analysis. Given 
the inconsistent and often insignificant effects of other modernisation variables, the effect 
of non-manual occupation, while not always significant, did have a relatively frequent 
positive effect. It was therefore one of the only variables to function as expected, perhaps 
by increasing cognitive autonomy and demands for greater political rights and freedoms 
(Welzel & Inglehart 2006). While education was theorised to have the same effect, it is 
possible that increasing state influence on universities under Putin and Lukashenka means 
that higher education is not producing citizens who desire and demand democratic 
freedoms (Glaeser et al. 2007). As the model controls for measures such as education and 
income, then, the effect of non-manual work specifically warrants more attention. 
 The uneven and declining influence of the social modernisation variables raises 
questions as to how salient they remain in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. The impact of the 
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economic collapse in the 1990s may mean that democracy is associated with this period, 
particularly among those ‘too old to be retrained but too young to be able to retire’ (Person 
& Landry 2016, p.234). The negative effect of income in Russia and Belarus could be 
related to this perception and has been found elsewhere to negatively affect democratic 
support in autocratic regimes (Ceka & Magalhães 2020). This may explain the limited power 
of the model in authoritarian Russia and Belarus and hybrid Ukraine insofar as 
modernisation indicators such as income, education and middle class identification are also 
markers of prosperity. If a citizen is doing well under the current authoritarian regime, this 
may lessen support for a democratic system.  
 Overall, the argument of social modernisation theory that these indicators and their 
associated cognitive and material resources develop support for democracy is only partially 
supported. None of the independent variables retained significance across time or cohort. 
While education had the most consistent effect, as is frequently noted by the literature, 
others had only occasional effects or were inconsequential. Together, they explained little 
of the variance in democratic support, and this decreased over time. Moreover, 
generational and lifecycle effects were not accounted for by these variables, most notably 
for both age and cohort in 2011 Ukraine. This, and the finding that social modernisation is 
losing its explanatory power over time, suggests that other forces must be at work. The 
following chapters test competing explanations to further explore what these influences 
might be. 
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Regime performance over the lifetime 
 
 How does the performance of a regime affect support for democracy? This chapter 
employs the performance model and theories of lifetime learning to explore this question. 
Performance theories are important to consider because an effective regime is likely to 
command citizen approval (Dahl 1971, Linz 1978). System support ‘can change quite 
dramatically in response to regime performance’ (Diamond 1999, p.164) and citizens 
‘support democracies because they are seen to work’ (Evans & Whitefield 1995, p.501). 
Performance theories are thus related to rational choice arguments, which hold that 
regimes are judged in terms of what they are able to deliver (Rose et al. 1998). 
 Most studies testing the relationship between regime performance and democratic 
support focus on democratic countries, where positive performance evaluations should 
lead to greater support (Magalhães 2014). A far less studied hypothesis, however, is 
whether positive performance evaluations in non-democracies correspond to lower support 
for democracy. This is the hypothesis to be tested in this chapter, given that Russia, 
Belarus and Ukraine are not considered democratic by most measures.29 In a study of fifty-
five countries, Magalhães (2014, p.92) found that effective authoritarian regime 
performance results in ‘greater popular rejection of democracy’. This suggests that positive 
performance evaluations in an authoritarian regime may result in less support for 
democracy (Magalhães 2014). 
 When considered in terms of political learning and socialisation, performance 
evaluations may be considered a part of lifetime learning, where the performance of the 
current regime gradually becomes more important than memories of prior regimes (Mishler 
& Rose 2001b, Rose et al. 1998). While political socialisation focuses on experiences early 
in life, lifetime learning accounts for later experiences such as regime transitions and the 
performance of the new system (Mishler & Rose 1997). Informed by these theories and the 
available survey data, this chapter tests the effect of perceived electoral integrity, 
corruption and economic performance as well as whether an individual has been exposed 
to democratic rule by visiting a democratic country. All constitute adult experiences that 
 
29 Refer to chapter 4 for an overview of regime classifications.  
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may affect attitudes to democracy, while the first three are widely used measures of regime 
performance (Mishler & Rose 2001b, Rose & Mishler 2009). 
 As the World Values Survey does not ask about these topics in our countries of 
interest, this chapter employs McAllister and White’s Research Surveys fielded in Russia, 
Ukraine and Belarus in 2018, 2010 and 2006 respectively – the most recent available.30 
While country-level indicators are available for electoral integrity, corruption and economic 
performance, the focus of this thesis remains on the experience of individuals with 
reference to their socialisation and subsequent political learning across the lifetime. As 
ever, literature on Ukraine and Belarus in particular is scarce; this chapter therefore 
contributes to the research by extending tests of the performance model to this region. One 
notable related study is that of McAllister and White (McAllister & White 2015); however, its 
dependent variable is satisfaction with democracy rather than support for a democratic 
system, and does not focus on generational or lifecycle effects. 
 This chapter starts with an overview of theories of political and economic 
performance in relation to lifetime learning and democratic support. Section 6.1 also 
presents the four hypotheses to be tested with the McAllister and White surveys later in the 
chapter. Second 6.2 reviews the existing empirical literature with a focus on Russia, 
Ukraine and Belarus. Section 6.3 presents descriptive statistics for the independent 
variables by cohort. Finally, section 6.4 tests the hypotheses with aggregate and within-
cohort multivariate models. 
 
6.1 Theorising the performance model 
 In Easton’s (1965) theory of system support, output – or regime performance – is 
key to predicting attitudes towards the regime. An individual’s experience of a regime and 
its outputs should also therefore have some bearing on attitudes towards other systems, 
such as democracy in this case. The performance of a regime and political socialisation are 
component parts of a ‘lifetime learning’ model, where attitudes are modified in response to 
experiences over the life course (Mishler & Rose 2002, p.8). This chapter therefore 
considers three performance measures – perceptions of electoral fairness, extent of 
corruption and the state of the national economy – as well as whether an individual has 
 
30 The most recent surveys available for Belarus and Ukraine are 2010 and 2012 respectively. Belarus 2010 does 
not include all necessary items for the dependent variable, and Ukraine 2012 does not include the question 
tapping travel to the United States. Refer to chapter 3 for a detailed overview of the data used in this thesis. 
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visited a democratic country, which by exposing someone to democratic rule constitutes an 
experience that may be expected to affect political attitudes. In Rose et al.’s (1998, p.190) 
study of post-communist countries, similar variables were conceptualised as ‘contextual 
influences’. In either formulation, the focus remains on how experience of a regime affects 
public attitudes towards democracy. 
 Lifetime learning and regime performance models acknowledge that regime support 
‘does not emerge overnight’ and must be built over time as citizens experience and 
evaluate the system (Hofferbert & Klingemann 1999, p.156). Where socialisation suggests 
that experiences during youth are paramount, performance indicators account for later 
experience – or ‘what has society done for me lately?’ (Mishler & Rose 1997, p.434). 
Lifetime learning parallels an important strand of the party identification literature where 
support is conceived as ‘a running tally of retrospective evaluations’ (Fiorina 1981, p.84); 
similarly, regime support represents ‘the cumulation of a person’s evaluations of the 
regime… based on the experiences of a lifetime’ (Mishler & Rose 2002, p.9). For the older 
generations studied in this thesis, the lifetime learning model predicts that performance 
considerations will surpass the influence of memories of the old regime (Mishler & Rose 
2001b, p.309, Rose et al. 1998). Moreover, the current regime’s performance will become 
increasingly important as time passes (Mishler & Rose 2001b, p.309). The ‘accumulation of 
a lifetime of learning’ is therefore particularly appropriate for countries in transition, or 
where cohorts exist that have been socialised under different regimes (Rose et al. 1998, 
Rose & McAllister 1990, p.35).  
 If the performance of the current regime does not meet citizen expectations, then, 
they may seek alternatives. As Schmitter (1994, p.58) argues, support for democracy can 
wither ‘as disillusionment with the actual performance of neodemocracies mounts and as 
disaffected actors revive old authoritarian themes or invent new ones’. By similar logic, in 
autocracies such as Belarus or Russia where governance is effective and citizens judge its 
performance well, the performance model predicts that citizens may support the autocracy 
and reject democracy (Magãlhaes 2014). The performance model has therefore been 
described as a ‘broader interpretation of rational choice theory’ (Huang et al. 2008, p.51), 
given that rational choice suggests people will support the regime if it delivers political 
goods such as free elections and a government with minimal corruption. In sum, then, if 
citizens are dissatisfied with aspects of the current system, we should expect them to be 
more likely to support an alternative regime. 
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 The first factor, perceptions of electoral fairness, is central to democratisation. As 
well-established by Dahl (1971) and Schumpeter (1942) among others, democracy at a 
minimum requires free elections. Regular free elections foster system legitimacy (Banducci 
& Karp 2003, p.443) and are essential for the durability of democracy (Birch 2008, p.305). 
Democratic support rests on ‘public trust and confidence’ in institutions such as elections, 
and when electoral legitimacy declines ‘democratic regimes have fewer effective bulwarks 
against the risks of backsliding under authoritarian leaders’ (Norris 2018, p.3). Perceiving 
elections as free and fair should also encourage citizens to vote which, in turn, fosters a 
democratic political culture (Anderson et al. 2005). Citizens experiencing free elections is, 
then, an important component in developing support for democratic systems and 
progression ‘towards democratic consolidation’ (Elklit & Reynolds 2002, p.88). Regular free 
elections over time may encourage citizens to value democratic procedures intrinsically 
rather than, for instance, democracy’s ability to deliver economic growth (Mattes et al. 
2016, p.9). 
 The extent to which this theory holds in authoritarian or hybrid systems that claim to 
hold free elections is not fully clear. As Anderson (2005, p.22) notes, elections are ‘a way for 
governments to enhance citizens’ attachment to the system’. Rose and Mishler (2009, 
p.119), however, argue that if competitive elections lend legitimacy to the regime, then 
unfair elections should ‘reduce commitment to the political system’. If elections are 
manipulated, there is likely to be media coverage and ‘fairly widespread popular awareness 
of this fact’ (Birch 2008, 307). While individuals should therefore be better able to judge the 
fairness of elections than other measures of procedural fairness (Birch 2008, p.307), this 
chapter includes an interaction term to account for voting for the incumbent president.  
 As put bluntly by Rose and Mishler (2009, p.125), ‘whether your party wins is more 
important than how it wins’. Voters for the incumbent should be inclined to view the 
performance of the regime and its institutions more favourably (Anderson & Tverdova 2003, 
p.91). If supporting the incumbent functions as a heuristic when evaluating electoral 
integrity (Zaller 1992), then those who voted for the winning candidate ought to be less 
concerned with whether the election was conducted fairly. Nonetheless, if citizens believe 
their elections to be free and fair, this should foster support for a democratic system (Elklit 
& Reynolds 2002, p.88). 
 Like manipulated elections, corruption also threatens democratic principles such as 
equality and accountability (Dahl 1971). Defined here as ‘the misuse of public office for 
private gain’ (Sandholtz & Koetzle 2000, p.32), corruption can restrict access to public 
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goods to those with money or connections and undermine support for democracy in this 
manner (Treisman 2000). While Seligson (2002, p.412) points out that corruption may have 
positive uses in authoritarian states, such as enabling wider access to resources, it creates 
dysfunction and dissatisfaction under democracy. Ultimately, corruption violates a 
fundamental aspect of democratic governance: ‘impartiality in the exercise of public power’ 
(Linde & Erlingsson 2013, p.587). In the case of younger members of post-authoritarian 
societies, corruption is one of ‘a number of performance-based realities that can be 
expected to erode or perhaps undermine their support for democracy’ (Mattes et al. 2016, 
p.9). Further, there may not be a clear break from the past regime and new generations may 
be socialised under a regime with ‘significant echoes of the past’ (Mattes et al. 2016, p.9). 
 If citizens perceive high levels of corruption, then, this should affect their evaluations 
of the political system. If support is a product of continuing interactions between 
government responses to public demands (Easton 1965), and if citizens expect to be 
treated equally and fairly in those interactions, higher corruption should foster 
dissatisfaction with the regime (Rose & Mishler 2010). However, by the same logic, if 
citizens perceive widespread corruption but are pleased with other performance indicators 
such as the state of the economy, the regime may be supported as a ‘lesser evil’ (Rose & 
Mishler 2010, p.150). A recent study of the Americas concludes that the relationship 
between corruption and regime support is ‘conditional on economic context’ (Zechmeister 
& Zizumbo-Colunga 2013, p.1190). On the basis that corruption produces negative 
evaluations of a regime’s level of procedural fairness, citizen perceptions of corruption 
should result in less support for the regime (Linde & Erlingsson 2013). Ultimately, then, 
corruption can foster dissatisfaction with the system and may result in lower political 
participation or, in authoritarian states, protests that ‘may even lead to regime change’ 
(Rose & Mishler 2010, p.146). 
 A complementary theory is that support for regimes is driven by their economic 
performance. The economic voting literature differentiates the effects of egocentric 
economic evaluations such as income and sociotropic judgements, which concerns the 
economic performance of the nation as a whole (Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier 2007);31 similarly, 
studies of regime support often consider both income and the national economy. 
Regardless of what political benefits a democratic system may hold, support for democracy 
 
31 This is not to say the two may not overlap: ‘voters who feel personally secure may project that positive 
assessment on to their evaluations of the national economy’ (McAllister & White 2011, p.481). 
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in transitioning countries may be shaped by its ability to deliver ‘economic and physical 
security’ (Mattes et al. 2016, p.9).  
 In arguments particularly relevant to post-communist societies, scholars have 
highlighted the ability of poor economic performance to depress initial enthusiasm for 
democratisation. Evans and Whitefield (1995, p.490) note that enduring loss of employment 
and inflation may ‘turn people against the political system’, particularly given that post-
communist citizens were used to the state providing ‘for their economic wellbeing’ 
(Waldron-Moore 1999, p.38). More recently, White and McAllister (2014, p.82) point out that 
many Russians were willing to go without democratisation should Putin deliver economic 
growth and prevent a repeat of the crisis of the 1990s.  
 As put by Przeworski, the survival of the new democracies would ‘depend to a large 
extent on their economic performance’ (1991, p.189). While many post-Soviet democracies 
have plainly not survived, support for a democratic system may emerge if individuals 
believe it will deliver economic benefits (Huang et al. 2008, p.51). Rational individuals, in 
short, may demand democracy if it is in ‘their best interests’ (Waldron-Moore 1999, p.39). 
Moreover, in post-communist contexts where there is a legacy of prioritising society over 
the individual, citizens may be even more inclined to put the national interest ahead of self-
interest (Waldron-Moore 1999, p.39). Economic growth may give citizens more of ‘a stake 
in their society’ and foster non-zero sum political conflict (Evans & Whitefield 1995, p.490). 
A distinction between personal income and national economic performance must therefore 
be made in evaluating the effect on democratic support (Waldron-Moore 1999, p.39). 
 Lastly, this chapter controls for respondents having travelled to democracies 
outside the region. The logic is that by exposing people to democratic governance, this 
may affect how they perceive their own regimes. Communicating with friends or relatives 
living in democracies, for example, leads to the diffusion of democratic norms 
(Rohrschneider 1999), and the same mechanism can be expected to operate here. While 
understudied, Wang (2017, p.140) regards the influence of studying abroad in Taiwan on 
attitudes towards democracy among Chinese students to be ‘the result of political learning’ 
and a step in political socialisation. Having visited a democratic country is thus another 
aspect of political learning alongside our performance variables. 
 The lifetime learning model and its three performance variables and one experiential 
variable suggest four hypotheses. Due to the performance model assuming that individuals 
are evaluating the performance of the current regime, negative perceptions of corruption 
and economic performance should increase support for a democratic regime over the 
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current authoritarian system. Russia and Belarus were both fully authoritarian at the time of 
the surveys in 2018 and 2006 respectively; Ukraine was considered a ‘transitional 
government or hybrid regime’ by Nations in Transit 2010.32 The logic of perceptions of 
electoral fairness, however, may differ. The theory reviewed here suggests that viewing 
elections as fair increases support for democracy, both through means of participation and 
by fair elections themselves being a fundamental aspect of democratic governance. 
Therefore, if elections are perceived as performing fairly – that is, democratically – this 
should increase support for democracy. The literature suggests that those who voted for 
the incumbent should also be more likely to perceive the elections as fair, and the effect on 
democratic support may therefore be more pronounced among this group. 
 While these effects should not vary greatly by cohort, the lifetime learning model 
suggests that older generations socialised under a different system may compare the 
performance of the current regime to that of the old regime (Rose et al. 1998). This may 
explain differences between, for instance, the Soviet cohort and transition cohorts on 
perceived fairness of elections. Section 6.3 therefore provides an overview of each variable 
by generation. The hypotheses this chapter will test in section 6.4 are: 
 
H1. Perceiving elections as fair will positively affect support for democracy. 
H2. Perceiving higher levels of corruption will have a positive effect on support for 
democracy. 
H3. Positive evaluations of national economic performance will have a negative effect on 
support for democracy. 
H4. Travelling to democracies will positively affect support for democracy. 
 
6.2 Prior empirical findings 
 Regime performance has long been an important predictor of regime support. 
Indeed, citizens in democracies with a positive impression of regime performance ‘tend to 
develop a stronger belief in democracy’s superiority’ whether the system is an older 
advanced democracy or relatively young (Huang et al. 2008, p.59). However, the 
relationship also functions in reverse: effective autocratic governments also tend to 
 
32 For a detailed assessment, refer to chapter 4.  
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decrease public support for an alternative democratic regime (Magalhães 2014). In the 
post-communist context, political and economic performance are prominent explanations 
of regime support (Mishler & Rose 2002), and debate has centred on whether economic or 
political performance is more important. Mishler and Rose (2002) note that both combined 
explained most of the variance in regime support, yet political performance was more 
influential and increasing. Earlier in the transition, Evans and Whitefield (1995) find that 
political performance was the strongest predictor, while the effect of economic 
performance largely disappears when controlling for support for marketisation. Finally, 
Mishler et al. (2016) conclude that economic performance was more important for attitudes 
towards authoritarianism and democracy, while political performance was slightly less 
influential. 
 On the first measure, electoral fairness, performance varies. In Russia’s case, the 
widespread view is that ‘the Kremlin is not interested in real elections’ (Luzin 2018, p.2). 
Correspondingly, successive waves of survey data show Russian views on electoral 
integrity worsening after 2000 (McAllister & White 2011a, McAllister & White 2015). The 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s election-monitoring arm, the Office 
for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), justifies these perceptions. In the 
2018 presidential election, Russian media covered the campaign with ‘extensive, 
unchallenged and at times promotional reporting’ on Putin’s activities (ODIHR 2018, p.16). 
Other candidates were given less favourable times and locations for meeting voters during 
the campaign, and their staff were sometimes subjected to harassment by police (ODIHR 
2018, p.12). For the vote itself, problems with privacy and other irregularities were reported 
(ODIHR 2018).  
 Electoral conditions in Belarus are similar, where ‘voting, counting and tabulation 
lack procedural safeguards’ (ODIHR 2016, p.1). The media is systematically biased in 
Lukashenka’s favour (ODIHR 2006, ODIHR 2016), the electoral commissions are not 
sufficiently pluralistic, and opposition workers were ‘routinely harassed, detained and 
arrested’ (ODIHR 2006, p.1; ODIHR 2016). In 2006, when fieldwork for this chapter’s survey 
was conducted, between ten and thirty thousand protestors gathered in Minsk to protest 
the election results and ‘the intimidation campaign unleashed by the authorities’ 
(Korosteleva 2009, p.325). This was up to ten times greater than similar protests in 2001, 
where up to three thousand protestors demonstrated (Korosteleva 2009, p.325). While 
Belarus has now had autocratic elections under Lukashenka for twenty years, at least some 
are evidently still willing to object. 
 144 
 Ukraine has shown the most variability in the conduct of elections, and its citizens 
have experienced the most opportunity to vote in relatively free circumstances. The 2004 
presidential elections failed to meet minimum OSCE standards and were notably followed 
by the Orange Revolution involving up to one million protestors on the streets (Freedom 
House 2005). By 2009, however, the campaign was ‘largely free and fair’ (Freedom House 
2010a). While regional media coverage seemed to bias the dominant regional players and 
nation-wide programs favoured Yanukovich and Tymoshenko, candidates were able to 
campaign ‘freely throughout the country’ (ODIHR 2010, p.13). While voters were offered a 
‘genuine choice between candidates’ and able to cast ballots in ‘an orderly, professional 
and transparent manner’, unfounded allegations of fraud undermined public faith in the 
process (ODIHR 2010, p.22). Preliminary analyses of the 2019 election suggest it was 
competitive, offered genuine choice and allowed free campaigning of candidates, yet some 
problems of media bias and possible ‘misuse of state resources’ remain (ODIHR 2019, p.1). 
 How, then, do citizens view their elections? Birch (2008) indicates that more than 
half of Russians and Ukrainians view them neutrally or unfavourably; however, this may be 
complicated by ‘cultural conflict about the meaning of fair elections’ in Putin’s ‘sovereign 
democracy’ (Rose & Mishler 2009, p.131). Rose and Mishler’s (2009, p.132) survey 
evidence suggest that Russians broadly viewed the 2007 election as fair because it was 
won by ‘the most popular party’. Similarly, Wilson (2012) provides evidence from focus 
groups that the 2007-2008 elections were viewed as broadly fair because any interference 
did not, in their view, ultimately affect the results. Although post-election protests emerged 
in Belarus in 2006 and Russia in 2011 – often centred around young people and students 
(Korosteleva 2009, White & McAllister 2014) – this perception persists. While many 
Russians may have objected to electoral malpractice, ‘no one had failed to win office, or 
lost office, because of it’ (White & McAllister 2014, p.82). Ukraine, in contrast, saw 
malpractice cost a democratic candidate the election and prompt the Orange Revolution 
and later, the Revolution of Dignity (Reznik 2016, White & McAllister 2014). By the 2010 
election, OSCE observers reported that ‘unsubstantiated allegations of electoral fraud 
negatively affected… voter confidence in the process’ rather than there being actual 
malpractice (Norris 2013, p.584). 
 While views of electoral integrity thus seem to depend on country and specific 
elections, the literature does suggest that it will affect democratic support. In an early post-
transition study, Evans and Whitefield (1995, p.488) demonstrate that ‘perceived extent of 
democracy’ was a stronger predictor of democratic support than economic performance. In 
Russia specifically, perceiving an election as unfair negatively affects institutional trust, 
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national pride and support for the regime (Rose & Mishler 2009). Seeing elections as fair, 
however, increases satisfaction with democracy in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus (McAllister 
& White 2015). Birch’s (2008, 2010) work suggests that lower confidence in the integrity of 
elections leads to weaker support for democratic governance in both old and new 
democracies. 
 Research on the relationship between perceptions of electoral integrity and support 
for democracy in Russia, and particularly in Belarus and Ukraine, is therefore very limited. 
The studies above indicate that perceiving an election as unfair lowers support for the 
current regime (Rose & Mishler 2009) but seeing it as fair fosters satisfaction with 
democracy (McAllister & White 2015), which clearly indicates a need for investigation in 
authoritarian contexts. As outlined above, this chapter therefore includes an interaction 
term to control for voting for the incumbent. Evidence from Russia suggests that perceived 
electoral integrity is inconsequential if one is pleased with their party’s performance (Rose & 
Mishler 2009). McAllister and White’s assessment of the 2016 election also finds that 
supporters of Putin were more likely to see the election as fair and ‘turnout to vote as a 
consequence’ (2017a, p.424). As we know that participating in elections breeds positive 
feelings about the regime (Anderson et al. 2005), it is thus important to account for support 
for the incumbent in assessing the relationship between perceptions of electoral fairness 
and democratic support. 
 The second performance variable, corruption, is another with which post-Soviet 
citizens have extensive experience. Freedom House’s latest Nations in Transit report argues 
that corruption is ‘still the main barrier to the democratization of Russia’ (Luzin 2018, p.12). 
Corruption remains endemic within the highest levels of government, while networks of 
officials form connections with organised crime and businesspeople (Luzin 2018, p.12). 
Transparency International also notes that the government frequently replaces non-
government organisations with puppet bodies, and ensures the judicial system does not 
compromise its agenda (2019).  
 In Belarus, authorities often use ‘the fight against corruption to increase the 
government’s popularity and legitimacy’, promoting high-profile arrests (Kazakevich 2018, 
p.11). While ‘petty bribery is not widespread’, institutional forms of corruption remain 
(Kazakevich 2018, p.11). Although Belarus controls corruption ‘better than most post-
Soviet states’ (Rose & Munro 2002, p.59), it remains 70th in the world on Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, while Russia is 138th and Ukraine is 120th. The 
latter suffers from ‘pervasive’ corruption, where oligarchs wield extensive influence and 
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government transparency is severely limited (Freedom House 2010a). Despite more 
anticorruption reforms being passed since 2014 than there were over the prior 25 years 
(Jarabik & de Waal 2018), around one-third of people surveyed had experienced corruption 
in the last three months (Yesmukhanova 2018, p.11). 
 Corruption ‘is an important indicator of the performance of the political system’ 
(Anderson & Tverdova 2003, p.91). In line with the expectations of the performance model, 
it has frequently been found to affect regime support. Mishler and Rose’s (2001b) study of 
38 countries finds that higher perceived corruption decreased support for the regime, 
whether democratic or not. Corruption has the same effect in Latin America (Booth & 
Seligson 2009), even when controlling for membership of generational cohorts socialised 
under democracy (Moreno & Lagos 2016). It also erodes trust in Asian countries (Chang & 
Chu 2006) and satisfaction with democracy in Sweden, one of the least corrupt states in 
the world (Linde & Erlingsson 2013). On a related measure, Linde (2012) shows that 
perceptions of fair treatment from the government predicts democratic support in ten new 
post-communist democracies. However, as with electoral integrity, supporting the 
incumbent government may attenuate the negative effect of perceived corruption on 
attitudes towards the regime (Anderson & Tverdova 2003). Anderson and Tverdova (2003, 
p.101) note that this effect is particularly evident in the most corrupt countries, where 
‘members of the political majority still… [evaluate] the system positively’. 
 Existing studies show mixed results for Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Rose et al. 
(2006) find that perceived corruption negatively affects support for the current regime, but 
that it has no effect on rejecting other undemocratic regimes such as dictatorship or a 
return to communism. Rose and Mishler later find perceived corruption has no effect on 
support for the Putin regime, but that it does decrease trust in institutions (Rose & Mishler 
2009, Rose & Mishler 2010). Viewing officials as corrupt has a negative effect on 
satisfaction with democracy in Belarus and Ukraine (McAllister & White 2015). Lastly, those 
who thought the current regime was less corrupt than under communism showed higher 
trust in their institutions (Mishler & Rose 2001a, p.52). 
 Extensive research has explored economic and political performance as competing 
explanations for regime support (notable studies on the region include Evans and Whitefield 
1995 and Rose & Mishler 2009). This is of course particularly relevant for the post-
communist region, where societies underwent the ‘dual transition’ to both democracy and 
the market economy (Fish 1994, p.40). Russia experienced post-transition economic 
turmoil in ‘what appeared to be a direct consequence of the transition to a market  
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Figure 6.1: Unemployment rate (%), 1991 - 2018 
 
Unemployment rate as percentage of total labour force. Source: World Bank 2019b. 
 
 economy’, enjoyed a boom under Putin and then suffered another recession during 
the Global Financial Crisis (McAllister & White 2011b, pp.477, 481). Belarus experienced a 
‘milder collapse’ but still endured wage declines (Person 2016, p.339) before GDP began to 
rise in the 2000s (World Bank 2019a). Ukraine endured a ‘truly devastating’ collapse 
(Person 2016, p.339) and experienced a similar climb in GDP in the 2000s but suffered a 
sharp decline during the GFC just before this chapter’s survey was fielded (World Bank 
2019a). To illustrate how the economic crisis was experienced at the individual level, Figure 
6.1 shows unemployment rates as a percentage of the total labour force from 1991 - 
2018.33 Unemployment rose rapidly in the post-Soviet period in Russia and Ukraine in 
particular but decreased fairly quickly after 2000. In contrast, unemployment in Belarus 
remained under four percent until the Global Financial Crisis in 2008.  
 While chapter 4 found that income negatively effects democratic support in Russia 
and Belarus, national economic performance is a frequently significant predictor of regime 
support in post-communist societies. Despite not being as strong a predictor as political 
performance, economic evaluations remained significant for democratic support (Evans & 
Whitefield 1995). The post-communist states that showed the best economic performance 
also had higher proportions of people showing support for democracy (Hofferbert & 
Klingemann 1999). This trend reversed in Rose and Mishler’s (2009, p.131) study of Russia, 
 
33 For a detailed overview of GDP growth over time, refer to chapter 4. 
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where economic performance ‘far outweighs’ views of electoral integrity in predicting 
support for the regime; moreover positive economic evaluations increase support for Putin 
(McAllister & White 2011b, White & McAllister 2008). In ten democratic post-communist 
countries, economic performance fosters support for democracy and the current 
democratic regime and negatively affects support for authoritarian alternatives and the 
former communist regime (Mishler et al. 2016). While results differ, then, the broad pattern 
is that positive evaluations of the economy foster support for the current regime, 
democratic or not, and by implication should decrease support for alternative regimes. 
 The last variable to consider is travel to democracies, which itself is not a 
performance variable but another lifetime learning variable that could be expected to affect 
evaluations of the regime and democracy itself. Travel may also have a generational aspect, 
with recent polls from the Levada Center suggesting that those aged between 18 and 24 
were twice as likely to want to emigrate as their elders (The Moscow Times 2019). While 
travel is the least-studied of the variables in this chapter, research on related measures 
suggests it should foster support for democracy. Visits to democracies negatively affects 
Soviet nostalgia in Ukraine and decreases support for Lukashenka in Belarus and 
Yanukovich in Ukraine (McAllister & White 2016a).  
 We should therefore expect all four indicators – perceived electoral fairness and 
extent of corruption, evaluation of economic performance and travel to democracies – to 
affect democratic support, albeit in different ways. The next section provides an overview of 
the independent variables with reference to generational cohorts, before testing their effect 
on democratic support in section 6.4. 
 
6.3 Public views of regime performance 
 How do post-Soviet citizens view the performance of their regimes? This section 
gives an overview at the individual level of perceptions of electoral fairness, extent of 
corruption and economic performance as well as whether they have travelled to 
democracies. It employs the most recent Research Surveys for which all dependent and 
independent variables are available: Russia 2018, Belarus 2006 and Ukraine 2010.  
 To measure perceptions of electoral integrity, this chapter uses a standardised 0 – 
10 scale. The contributing survey items ask the extent to which elections in each country 
are fair in relation to the composition of the ballot paper and counting votes, television 
coverage of the electoral campaign and the conduct of the campaign in the respondent’s  
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Figure 6.2: Perceived fairness of elections (mean), 1999 - 2018 
 
Standardised 0-10 scale combining scores on perceived fairness of counting ballots, television electoral 
coverage, and local campaigns. Source: McAllister and White Russia 1999, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014 
and 2018 surveys, Belarus 2006 and 2011 surveys, Ukraine 2006, 2007, 2010 and 2012 surveys. 
 
 
district.34 Figure 6.2 presents views of electoral integrity over time using earlier waves of the 
Research Surveys. 
 To the extent that there is a trend, Russians have come to view their elections as 
slightly more fair than not over the past two decades. There was, however, a decline of 
around 0.7 of a point between 2010 and 2012 following accusations of malpractice in the 
2011 legislative and 2012 presidential elections (McAllister & White 2015). For the two 
surveys available for Belarus, there is minimal change from 2006 to 2011; citizens again 
view their elections as reasonably fair at just under 7 on the 10-step scale. In Ukraine the 
most substantial increase was from 2007 to 2010, before declining again by around one 
point by 2012.  
 
 
 
 
 
34 For descriptive statistics on these items see the Appendix. 
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Table 6.1: Perceptions of electoral integrity 
  (Mean 0-10)  
 Russia (2018) Belarus (2006) Ukraine (2010) 
Soviet 7.13  6.93  6.78  
Transition 6.91  6.05*  6.51  
Authoritarian / Revolution 6.76*  6.13**  6.37  
Mean score on standardised 0-10 scale combining scores on perceived fairness of counting ballots, television 
electoral coverage, and local campaigns. *Significantly different from Soviet generation at p<.05, **p<0.1, 
***p<.001. Source: McAllister and White Russia 2018, Belarus 2006, Ukraine 2010 surveys. 
 
 Table 6.1 shows perceptions of electoral integrity by generation. Russians are 
broadly the most likely to see their elections as fair, though this still does not exceed 7.13 in 
the case of the Soviet cohort. Belarusians saw their electoral process as slightly more fair 
than not, with the Soviet cohort again seeing higher levels of electoral integrity than their 
younger counterparts. For Ukrainians there is little difference between generations; 
however, the Soviet generation is slightly more likely to see elections as fair, perhaps in 
comparison to their experience under communism. The younger cohorts possibly report 
less perceived electoral integrity precisely because they do not have as stark a comparison 
to make.  
 Next, Figure 6.3 presents perceived corruption over time for each country. It shows 
that Ukrainians are most likely to believe that corruption among public officials is 
widespread, with a decline of only 0.4 of a point from 2007 and 2012. However, Russians 
also believe that most officials are corrupt, a view that persists until 2014, when perceived 
corruption drops to the lowest level of any country. Lastly, Belarusians perceive the least 
corruption, reflecting the view that corruption in Belarus is lower than most Soviet states 
(Rose & Munro 2002) as a result of the regime promoting its fight against corruption 
(Kazakevich 2018). 
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Figure 6.3: Perceived corruption (mean), 2003 - 2018 
 
‘How widespread, in your opinion, are bribery and corruption in central and local government?’ Ranges from 1 
‘hardly any officials have anything to do with it’ to 4 ‘nearly all officials are corrupt’. Source: McAllister and White 
Russia 1999, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2018 surveys, Belarus 2006 and 2011 surveys, Ukraine 
2006, 2007, 2010 and 2012 surveys. 
 
 Table 6.2 shows the mean values of perceived extent of corruption on a four step 
scale, where higher values indicate higher perceived corruption. All cohorts err towards 
viewing the government as reasonably corrupt; however, Ukraine stands out with a mean of 
at least 3.19 in the case of the transition cohort. This agreement that many officials are 
corrupt is in line with the contemporaneous Freedom House Nations in Transit report 
concluding that corruption is ‘pervasive’ in Ukraine (2010a). There is little disagreement 
between cohorts on this point. Similarly, opinions do not differ greatly between Russian or 
Belarusian cohorts, though Russians are slightly more likely to view their regime as corrupt. 
Belarusians see slightly less evidence of corruption, particularly among the Soviet cohort. 
 
Table 6.2: Perceptions of corruption  
  (Mean 0-4)  
 Russia (2018) Belarus (2006) Ukraine (2010) 
Soviet 3.02 2.84 3.33 
Transition 2.99 2.92 3.19* 
Authoritarian / revolution 2.94 2.91 3.29 
‘How widespread, in your opinion, are bribery and corruption in central and local government?’ Ranges from 1 
‘hardly any officials have anything to do with it’ to 4 ‘nearly all officials are corrupt’. *Significantly different from 
Soviet generation at p<.05, **p<0.1, ***p<.001. Source: McAllister and White Russia 2018, Belarus 2006, Ukraine 
2010 surveys. 
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Table 6.3: Perceptions of economic performance 
 (Mean 0-5) 
 Russia (2018) Belarus (2006) Ukraine (2010) 
Soviet 2.81 3.39 1.85 
Transition 2.90 3.33 1.92 
Authoritarian / Revolution 2.83 3.29 2.04* 
‘What do you think about the present economic situation?’ Ranges from 1 ‘very bad’ to 5 ‘very good’. 
*Significantly different from Soviet generation at p<.05, **p<0.1, ***p<.001. Source: McAllister and White Russia 
2018, Belarus 2006, Ukraine 2010 surveys. 
  
 Table 6.3 presents views on national economic performance, asked on a five-point 
scale. Again, Ukrainians are the least satisfied with the economic fortunes of their country; 
however, the Ukraine survey was conducted closer to the global financial crisis. Indeed, this 
may contribute to more positive evaluations of the economy in Belarus, where the data was 
collected in 2006.35 While Belarusian cohorts do not differ greatly, the Ukrainian Revolution 
cohort is slightly less dissatisfied than their older counterparts. The most recent data from 
Russia suggests Russians are not broadly satisfied with the state of their economy. While 
this does not differ greatly by cohort, the transition generation is the most optimistic. 
 Finally, Table 6.4 presents the mean level of democracies visited by each cohort. 
While Russia and Ukraine are on 0 – 3 cumulative scale of visits to the United States, 
Poland and the Baltics, Belarus is a 0 – 2 scale for Poland and Lithuania (respondents were 
not asked about visits to the United States). Belarusians of all cohorts, then, have on 
average travelled to less than one democracy. The same is true for Russia and Ukraine. The 
best-travelled generation in all three cases is the Soviet cohort, which may be related to 
both income and having had more time over the lifespan to do so. 
 
 
 
 
35 Belarusian evaluations of their economy do not greatly differ in 2011, however, when mean values were 3.19, 
3.19 and 2.95 for the Soviet, Transition and Authoritarian generations respectively. 
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Table 6.4: Travel to democracies  
 (Mean 0-3. Belarus mean 0-2) 
 Russia (2018) Belarus (2006) Ukraine (2010) 
Soviet 0.29 0.81 0.45 
Transition 0.18** 0.56* 0.28*** 
Authoritarian / Revolution 0.13*** 0.60** 0.16*** 
‘Have you ever visited any of the following countries?’ Count of visits to USA, Baltic countries and Poland. Scale 
0-3 and 0-2 for Belarus, where the USA option was not included. *Significantly different from Soviet generation 
at p<.05, **p<0.1, ***p<.001. Source: McAllister and White Russia 2018, Belarus 2006, Ukraine 2010 surveys. 
 
6.4 Results 
 Performance theory holds that citizen evaluations of what a regime is able to deliver 
determines their level of support for the system. So far, this chapter has shown that 
Ukrainians in particular view the system as corrupt and are disappointed in their country’s 
economic performance; and that younger cohorts broadly tend to have the least confidence 
in electoral integrity and are less well-travelled than older generations. To explore the extent 
to which these attitudes matter for democratic support, this section tests their effects in 
multivariate models. 
 In order to explore how performance evaluations affect support for democracy, 
Table 6.5 presents the multivariate model, including generational cohort and age to control 
for generational and lifecycle effects. Following the other analyses presented in this thesis, 
the dependent variable is a battery of items used to ensure that support for democracy is 
‘robust’ and not accompanied by simultaneous support for authoritarian rule (Inglehart 
2003, Mattes & Bratton 2007, Rose et al. 1998). With the data used in this chapter, 
respondents must support democratic rule and reject an unconstrained strong leader, a 
return to monarchy or communism, and army rule to be considered supportive of 
democracy – in other words, reject all authoritarian options given and endorse the 
democratic item. As outlined earlier in this thesis, this should account more fully for the fact 
that ‘even respondents who show full support for democracy do not necessarily fully 
oppose authoritarian rule’ (Shin & Wells 2005, p.92). The first model includes all 
independent variables except having voted for the incumbent, which was hypothesised to 
interact with electoral integrity. Model 2 therefore includes voting for the incumbent and an 
interaction term between it and perceived electoral integrity. 
 154 
Table 6.5: Lifetime learning and democratic support 
 
 
(Continued over page) 
 
 
 
 
 
Russia Model 1 Model 2 
 b beta b beta 
Electoral integrity .22*** (.03) .16*** .12* (.05) .09* 
Corruption -.38*** (.11) -.09*** -.4*** (.11) -.09*** 
Economy .26* (.10)* .06* .26* (.1) .06* 
Travel .83*** (.17) .12*** .79*** (.17) .11*** 
Voted for Putin - - -1.14* (.5) -.16* 
Integrity*Putin - - .18** (.07) .21** 
Transition cohort -.16 (.33) -.02 -.18 (.33) -.02 
Authoritarian cohort -.40 (.45) -.05 -.45 (.44) -.06 
Age (years) -.05*** (.01) -.21*** -.05*** (.01) -.22*** 
Constant 14.99 15.67 
Adj R2 0.08 0.08 
N 1,634 1,634 
Belarus Model 1 Model 2 
 b beta b beta 
Electoral integrity -.24*** (.05) -.2*** -.15** (.09) -.13** 
Corruption -.21 (.15) -.05 -.21 (.15) -.05 
Economy .17 (.17) .04 .27 (.17) .06 
Travel .15 (.15) .04 .13 (.15) .03 
Approve Lukashenka - - 1.4 (.95) -.1 
Integrity*Lukashenka - - -.04 (.11) -.04 
Transition cohort -.67 (.45) -.06 -.66 (.45) -.06 
Authoritarian cohort -.72 (.43) -.1 -.76 (.43) -.1 
Age (years) -.05*** (.01) -.26*** -.05*** (.01) -.26*** 
Constant 19.62 19.46 
Adj R2 0.07 0.08 
N 739 739 
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Ordinary least squares regression with partial (b) and standardised (beta) coefficients predicting support for 
democracy. The dependent variable is scored 0-12. See Tables 6.1-6.4 for coding of independent variables. 
Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05. Source: McAllister & White surveys. 
 
 For all three countries, the model explains six to eight percent of the variance in 
democratic support – only marginally more than the modernisation model in the previous 
chapter. Moreover, the most important influence on democratic support was not a 
performance variable but age, which exerted a significant negative effect.  
 The first variable, perceived electoral integrity, has a different effect in each country. 
In Russia, it increases support for democracy as predicted by the first hypothesis, 
suggesting that citizens believing their elections are free develops support for democratic 
governance (Elklit & Reynolds 2002). This adds to focus group evidence indicating that 
Russians may consider elections democratic due to a perception that violations would not 
ultimately change the results – that is, that the winners would win in a free contest anyway 
(Wilson 2012). Survey data from Rose and Mishler (2009, p.132) also indicate that many 
Russian elections are ‘fair’ in the sense that ‘the most popular party won’, and that the 
extent of democracy perceived positively affected regime support. 
 In Belarus perceived electoral integrity had a negative effect, but with the least 
democratic experience of all three countries, its population could again have different ideas 
about democracy. Lukashenka has ‘won’ every election held in the post-Soviet period, so it 
is possible that electoral integrity itself is understood differently in Belarus. The dataset 
shows that seventy-seven percent of respondents approve of Lukashenka’s work as 
president, which makes it reasonable on the one hand to believe that the elections were fair 
and that people are broadly satisfied with the status quo on the other. Indeed, this further 
Ukraine Model 1 Model 2 
 b beta b beta 
Electoral integrity -.11* (0.04) -.08* -.09 (0.06) -.07 
Corruption -.19 (0.15) -.04 -.18 (0.15) -.04 
Economy .34* (0.16) .07* .26 (0.16) .05 
Travel .69*** (0.18) .12*** .64*** (0.18) .11*** 
Approve Yushchenko - - -.95 (0.66) -.13 
Integrity*Yushchenko - - .04 (0.09) .04 
Transition cohort .02 (0.41) 0 -.04 (0.41) 0 
Revolution cohort -.89 (0.55) -.08 -.88 (0.55) -.09 
Age (years) -.05*** (0.01) -.21*** -.04*** (0.01) -.2*** 
Constant 16.91 17.22 
Adj R2 0.06 0.07 
N 968 968 
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adds to the idea from Russian focus groups that the incumbent would win in a fair contest 
anyway, and that the electorate supports the current regime (Wilson 2012). The results 
therefore accord with Schedler’s (2006, p.13) argument that authoritarian elections ‘institute 
the principle of popular consent, even as they subvert it in practice’.  
 It may simply be a different mechanism for Russia as opposed to Belarus: while 
Russians perceiving elections as fair because the outcome would not change in a fair 
contest increases democratic support, the negative effect in Belarus may mean they do not 
necessarily associate free elections with democracy. Indeed, Russia’s greater experience of 
democratic politics may have made them more likely to associate free elections with 
positive views of democracy. Elections may also be ‘a way for governments to enhance 
citizens’ attachment to the system’ (Anderson et al. 2005, p.22); it could therefore be that 
Belarusians viewing elections as fair means they are satisfied with the status quo and do 
not see a need for a different, democratic system. The question of what Belarusians 
associate with democracy will be explored in the next chapter. 
 In Ukraine, perceived electoral integrity has a negative effect on democratic support, 
which is at odds with the performance model. This is also counterintuitive in the same 
manner as Belarus, given that perceived electoral fairness should in theory correlate with 
higher democratic support (Elklit & Reynolds 2002). However, the effect disappears in the 
second model when accounting for an interaction between electoral integrity and vote for 
the incumbent. While the interaction term is itself insignificant, running the same model 
without the interaction term shows that voting for Yanukovich negatively effects democratic 
support and cancels out the prior negative effect of perceived electoral integrity. In short, 
while a complex relationship, we can conclude that perceptions of electoral integrity itself 
does not meaningfully affect support for democracy in Ukraine.  
 Adding the interaction term in the second model is only significant for Russia. Voting 
for Putin has a significant effect, suggesting that this itself influences democratic support. 
Figure 6.4 shows the marginal effect of moving from negative to positive perceptions of 
electoral integrity depending on whether one voted for Putin or not. While perceiving 
elections as fair positively effects support for democracy independently, the effect is more 
pronounced among those who voted for Putin. When elections are viewed as having very 
little integrity, non-Putin voters are more likely to support democracy, which accords with 
the performance model insofar as democracy represents an alternative regime where their 
candidates would have a fair electoral contest. Similarly, Putin voters seeing their candidate 
win elections they see as fair aligns with the theoretical expectation that voters for the  
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Figure 6.4: Marginal effect on democratic support, Russia 2018 
 
Varying effect of perceptions of electoral integrity on democratic support according to whether respondents 
voted for Putin (Model 2, Russia 2018). 
 
incumbent will view the electoral process more favourably (Anderson & Tverdova 2003, 
p.91) and that your candidate winning is more important than their means of winning (Rose 
& Mishler 2009, p.125). However, the model still explains eight percent of the variance in 
democratic support; the interaction term therefore does not improve the model’s predictive 
ability. 
 The second performance variable, perceived levels of corruption, has no significant 
effect in Belarus or Ukraine, contrary to the literature suggesting that it should erode 
satisfaction with the existing regime (Rose & Mishler 2010). Given that the dependent 
variable is support for democracy, it may still be that perceived corruption does produce 
dissatisfaction with the current regime but does not necessarily produce support for 
democracy as a less corrupt alternative. In Russia, however, corruption perceptions have a 
negative effect on democratic support. Prior research has found corruption to negatively 
affect satisfaction with democracy in Belarus and Ukraine (McAllister & White 2015). Initial 
analyses tested for an interaction between corruption and voting for the incumbent to 
account for Anderson and Tverdova’s (2003) suggestion that viewing the government 
favourably may attenuate the effect of perceived corruption on attitudes towards the 
regime; however, this was insignificant in all three countries. Around 60 percent of Russian 
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respondents in the survey agree that corruption had increased since Soviet times, which 
may indicate that the negative effect of perceived corruption on democratic support is a 
product of comparison with prior regimes. The within-cohort analyses may shed light on 
this if the same effect is found among members of the Soviet generation. Moreover, 
previous research has found that evaluations of economic performance have more 
influence on regime support that perceptions of corruption among Russians (Rose & 
Mishler 2010, p.150), which may simply suggest that a strong economy excuses the 
presence of corruption in citizens’ minds. Per Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga (2013, 
p.1192), people ‘tend to tolerate corruption when [economic] times are good’. 
 Evaluations of the economy have a more consistent effect in fostering democratic 
support, but this is only the case for Russia and Ukraine. Contrary to the performance 
model’s prediction that positive evaluations of the economy under Russia and Ukraine’s 
non-democratic regimes would decrease support for democracy, the opposite effect has 
occurred. In Ukraine’s case, the positive effect of economic evaluations on democratic 
support is plausibly because citizens believed their regime to be democratic. While 
Freedom House’s Nations in Transit report for 2010 concluded that Ukraine was a 
‘transitional government or hybrid regime’, its broader Freedom in the World report 
concluded it was ‘Free’. Indeed, broadly in line with Freedom House conclusions, 67 
percent of Ukrainians in the sample thought Ukraine was either moving towards democracy 
or was more democratic than previously. Given that neither perceived electoral integrity or 
corruption had any significant effect, positive evaluations of the economy fostering 
democratic support may reflect Ukrainian attitudes towards their own (somewhat) 
democratic regime.  
 In Russia however, the picture is more complex, given that the regime is 
authoritarian. Possibly, the relationship between economic performance and support for 
democracy is complicated by the popularity of Putin and his association with economic 
recovery, compounded by memories of the 1990s economic crisis (McAllister & White 
2011b, White & McAllister 2008). Kruse et al. have demonstrated that material satisfaction 
is ‘the strongest preservative of autocratic legitimacy’, noting as well that respondents often 
mistake autocracy for democracy (2019, p.333). Put simply, ‘economically successful 
autocracies safeguard their survival by satisfying people’s material needs’ (Kruse et al. 
2019, p.333). 
 Having visited a democracy has a positive effect on democratic support in both 
Russia and Ukraine, as hypothesised. It is the strongest and second-strongest predictor in 
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Ukraine and Russia respectively. Prior research found that it decreases both Soviet 
nostalgia and support for Yanukovich in Ukraine (McAllister & White 2016a), which is 
consistent with the notion that experiencing democratic rule may make alternatives less 
attractive. While under-theorised, Rohrschneider’s (1999) idea of democratic values 
diffusing via mechanisms such as communicating with friends or relatives living in 
democracies is persuasive – visits to democracies may simply be a first-hand variety of 
exposure to democratic norms. In any case, Wang’s (2017, p.140) argument that changes 
in political attitudes resulting from visits to democracies is ‘the result of political learning’ 
suggests that travel to democracies constitutes a potentially powerful component of 
lifetime learning. 
 
Within-generation analyses 
 To more closely examine the effects of lifetime learning and the performance model 
on democratic support, this subsection runs the same models on the cohort subsamples. 
However, most subsamples are of insufficient size to include the interaction terms; at any 
rate, the Soviet generations are the largest cohorts and younger generations with fewer 
members do not allow for comparison. Similarly, the sample for the Belarus transition 
generation was so small that the age variable was excluded (there was, however, only a 
four-year difference between the oldest and youngest members of this cohort). The same 
surveys – Russia (2018), Belarus (2006) and Ukraine (2010) – are used. Table 6.6 shows the 
results by country. While membership of the Ukrainian revolution cohort was the only 
generational effect found in the aggregate model, the results here show that cohorts 
respond very differently to the performance model. Results range from the model having no 
explanatory power for the Ukrainian transition generation and Belarusian authoritarian 
generation, to accounting for up to ten percent of the variance in democratic support in 
others.
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Table 6.6: Lifetime learning and democratic support (cohorts) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ordinary least squares regression showing partial (b) and standardised (beta) coefficients predicting support for democracy. The dependent variable is scored 0-12. See 
Tables 6.1-6.4 for coding of independent variables. Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05. Source: McAllister & White Research Surveys. 
Russia Soviet  Transition  Authoritarian 
 b beta  b beta  b beta 
Integrity .27*** (.05) .20***  .26** (.08) .19**  .12* (.06) .09* 
Corruption -.49** (.15) -.11**  -.52* (.24) -.12*  -.13 (.20) -.03 
Economy  .06 (.15) .01  .22 (.23) .06  .62* (.19) .15* 
Travel .60 (.21) .10  1.45*** (.39) .20***  1.02** (.37) .12** 
Age (years) -.05*** (.01) -.12***  -.10 (.06) -.08  -.03 (.03) -.04 
Constant 15.78  17.10  12.94 
Adj R2 0.08  0.10  0.05 
N 808  305  521 
Belarus Soviet  Transition  Authoritarian 
 b beta  b beta  b beta 
Integrity -.26*** (.06) -.21***  -.38** (.14) -.35**  -.11 (.09) -.11 
Corruption -.12 (.19) -.03  -.99* (.48) -.26*  -.18 (.30) -.05 
Economy .17 (.21) .04  .37 (.48) .10  -.01 (.33) 0 
Travel .15 (.18) .04  .02 (.50) 0  .13 (.29) .04 
Age (years) -.05*** (.01) -.18***  (omitted)   -.05 (.07) -.05 
Constant 19.37  19.86  18.54 
Adj R2 0.07  0.10    0 
N 501  69  168 
Ukraine Soviet  Transition  Revolution 
 b beta  b beta  b beta 
Integrity -.06 (.06) -.04  -.13 (.08) -.11  -.27* (.13) -.02* 
Corruption -.04* (.20) -.08*  .05 (.18) .0  .25 (.47) .05 
Economy .40 (.21) .08  .22 (.26) .06  .19 (.49) .04 
Travel .96*** (.22) .17***  .29 (.33) .06  -.56 (.70) -.08 
Age (years) -.05*** (.01) -.14***  -.03 (.05) -.03  .07 (.16) .04 
Constant 17.20  16.14  13.62 
Adj R2 0.06  0    0 
N 629  229  110 
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 In Russia, the greatest variance explained is in the transition cohort. The strongest 
predictor of democratic support is having visited democracies and the second strongest is 
electoral fairness, both of which mirror the aggregate results. For the Soviet generation this 
is reversed, with electoral fairness the most influential variable. It is possible that 
socialisation under more democratic circumstances made the transition cohort more 
receptive to the democratic values they were exposed to while travelling; however, this 
does not explain why travel should have a positive effect for the Soviet cohort but not the 
authoritarian cohort.  
 As in the aggregate analyses, corruption retains its negative effect for both the 
transition and Soviet generations. With the dataset indicating that many Russians believe 
corruption has worsened since Soviet times, its negative effect on democratic support for 
these cohorts may indeed be a product of lifetime learning insofar as they are making 
comparisons with previous, supposedly less democratic regimes. The authoritarian 
generation is the exception here, with only five percent of variance explained and only 
economic evaluations reaching significance. Having been socialised under only one 
system, the distinctiveness of the youngest cohort may relate to the nature of lifetime 
learning – while the Soviet and transition cohorts can compare the performance of different 
regimes, the authoritarian generation has only one reference point.   
 In Belarus, the authoritarian cohort is also unique in that none of the predictors 
reach significance and the model has zero explanatory power. While very few predictors 
were significant in the aggregate model, perceived electoral integrity retains a negative 
effect for the Soviet and transition generations. This may reflect the proposed mechanism 
described above, where elections encourage support for the status quo rather than a 
regime change (Anderson et al. 2005). Similar to the youngest cohorts in Russia and 
Ukraine, this generation has experienced only one regime and may be less equipped to 
evaluate its performance, much less in terms of evaluating a democratic alternative.  
 For Ukraine, it is the transition and revolution generations for which the model 
cannot explain democratic support: while electoral integrity has a negative effect in the 
youngest cohort, it explains less than one percent of the variance. In the aggregate model, 
age was the strongest (negative) predictor of democratic support, and given its significance 
in the Soviet cohort, the performance model perhaps could not be expected to hold much 
explanatory power for the younger generations. Perhaps Ukraine experiencing the widest 
range of regimes, and the most democratic rule, means that relating experiences such as 
elections to regime evaluations is a more complex process not captured by the 
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performance model. The negative effect of perceived corruption on democratic support for 
the Soviet generation may simply be the product of an association between corruption and 
the post-Soviet period: Ukrainians were deeply pessimistic about corruption before the 
Orange Revolution, and reported it becoming even worse after the event (White & McAllister 
2009).  
 Lastly, age retains a negative effect in the Soviet generations in all three countries. 
As the eldest and largest cohorts, there is a much wider age range for lifecycle effects to 
come into play; indeed, in line with previous findings, members of the Soviet cohort feel 
more negatively towards democracy as they age (Colton & McFaul 2002, Rose et al. 2004). 
While only lifecycle and not generational effects were found in the aggregate models, the 
cohorts respond very differently to the same predictors. 
 What could account for these generational discrepancies? One consideration is that 
authoritarian regimes limit information available to citizens on certain indicators of regime 
performance such as electoral integrity and corruption (Reuter & Szakonyi 2013, p.29). 
Social media, however, is ‘all but impossible for elites to control’ due its easy availability, 
diversity and ‘low entry costs’ (White & McAllister 2014, p.73), and it is younger citizens 
who tend to be more active in these communities (Reuter & Szakonyi 2013, Smyth & Oates 
2015). Since the lifetime learning model has less explanatory value among the younger 
cohorts, we can investigate whether social media mediates perceptions of regime 
performance and accounts for these generational differences. 
 The Research Surveys used in this chapter include social media variables only for 
Russia 2018. It includes items on several social media websites, as well as a question 
asking how often a respondent uses social networks in general. Preliminary testing 
incorporated dummy variables for each specific social media site36 into the lifetime learning 
model. Only VKontakte (InContact) reached significance, and its effect was cancelled out 
when the item on general social media use was included. Table 6.7 therefore presents the 
model with the general social media use variable, which ranges from 1 ‘never’ to 5 
‘regularly’. 
 
 
36 VKontake, Odnoklassniki, Facebook, Twitter, and Other. 
 163 
Table 6.7: Lifetime learning, social media and democratic support, Russia 2018 
 
Ordinary least squares regression showing partial (b) and standardised (beta) coefficients predicting support for 
democracy. The dependent variable is scored 0-12. Social media is scored 1-5. See Tables 6.1-6.4 for coding 
of independent variables. Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05. Source: McAllister & 
White Research Surveys. 
 
 Studies on the effects of social media and online activity more broadly have found 
that it builds social capital (Kittilson & Dalton 2010), spreads information about democracy 
(Cho 2014b, Mattes & Bratton 2007, Nisbet 2008), and can be used to organise dissent 
against authoritarian or hybrid regimes (Stepanova 2011, White & McAllister 2014). It should 
therefore have a positive effect on democratic support, and this is seen in the above 
results. While the lifetime learning model explained more of the variation in support among 
younger Russian cohorts than in Belarus and Ukraine, social media still increases the 
explanatory power of the model. It cancels out the negative effect of corruption, the 
positive effect of electoral integrity in the authoritarian generation, and the negative lifecycle 
effect in the Soviet cohort. This suggests that social media use may indeed ‘increase 
political awareness in authoritarian regimes’ (Reuter & Szakonyi 2013, p.30) by ensuring 
that ‘democracy’ does not receive the blame for corruption instead of the existing 
authoritarian regime. It may also be that the younger generation are more accurately 
informed about electoral integrity to the extent that perceiving current elections as fair does 
not increase support for democracy: Russian surveys have found that social media users 
were indeed more likely to be aware of electoral fraud (Reuter & Szakonyi 2013).37 
 
37 Reuter and Szakonyi found this effect only for Twitter and Facebook, ‘which were politicised by opposition 
elites’ (2013, p.29). As noted above, this thesis tested the effects of Twitter, Facebook, VKontakte and 
 Soviet Transition Authoritarian 
b beta b beta b beta 
Integrity .24*** (.06) .17*** .25** (.08) .18** .10 (.06) .08 
Corruption -.27 (.21) -.06 -.48 (.25) -.11 -.19 (.2) -.04 
Economy .21 (.19) .05 .24 (.23) .06 .64** (.19) .15** 
Travel .29 (.25) .05 1.47*** (.39) .21*** .98* (.38) .11* 
Social media .38*** (.10) .16*** .27* (.13) .12* .52*** (.13) .17*** 
Age (years) -.02 (.02) -.04 -.07 (.07) -.06 -.01 (.03) -.01 
Constant 12.34 14.76 10.41 
Adj R2 0.07 0.11 0.08 
N 469 286 502 
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Moreover, the disappearance of the negative lifecycle effect suggests that it is access to 
online networks and information rather than being younger that drives democratic support.  
 While social media is therefore an important predictor to account for, the lack of 
social media variables in the Belarus and Ukraine surveys means we cannot fully account 
for why the performance model has so little explanatory value for the youngest cohorts 
there. Similar problems with the World Values Surveys prevents testing whether social 
media mediates the social modernisation and democratic knowledge models in the same 
way. Nonetheless, the Russian results presented here suggest that access to information 
and open discussion less subject to government interference suggests that citizens can 
gain more accurate information about the regime and adjust their attitudes accordingly. 
 The analyses presented in this chapter are therefore only partially in line with the 
expectations of the performance model. Travel to democracies was the only variable to 
have the expected positive effect on democratic support, but this was not the case in 
Belarus nor for younger cohorts in Russia and Ukraine. The performance model, which 
requires individuals to evaluate political and economic goods and make a subsequent 
judgement about the existing regime, does clearly operate differently between countries 
and cohorts. For the latter, this is complicated by some cohorts possibly comparing the 
current regime to prior ones, and in this case evaluating the desirability of a hypothetical 
democratic alternative. This issue was seen in all three countries. In Russia, perceived 
electoral integrity led to democratic support as the literature suggested it should, but 
corruption and economic evaluations contradicted theoretical expectations. For Ukraine, 
only economic performance had an effect on democratic support. In a counterintuitive 
version of the performance model, Belarusians perceiving elections as fair negatively 
affecting support for democracy suggests that they are satisfied with the performance of 
the current regime and do not desire a democratic one instead. To further explore these 
issues, the next chapter will examine what regime characteristics citizens associate with 
democracy. 
 
 
Odnoklassniki and found that only VKontakte had a significant effect; moreover, this disappeared when the 
question tapping use of any social network was included. It is the latter that is thus included here. 
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6.5 Conclusion 
 Theories of regime performance argue that positive performance evaluations will 
foster support for the regime. The lifetime learning model suggests that performance 
evaluations will become gradually more important as memories of previous regimes fade in 
time (Mishler & Rose 2001a). This chapter employed perceived electoral integrity, 
corruption and economic evaluations as performance indicators and travel to democracies 
as a related lifetime learning variable. In non-democracies, dissatisfaction with levels of 
corruption or economic performance should lead to support for an alternative regime such 
as democracy, while viewing elections as fair and having visited democracies were 
hypothesised to increase democratic support.  
 Studies testing the effect of regime performance on democratic support generally 
focus on democracies (see Magãlhaes [2014] for a review). Magãlhaes’ (2014) hypothesis 
that viewing the performance of a non-democratic regime positively should lower support 
for democracy was only partially supported in this chapter. It was further complicated by 
the existence of two popular authoritarian leaders in Russia and Belarus who may 
encourage the impression among their citizens that they win elections fair and square (or 
would do so in an actually fair contest). However, there appear to be different mechanisms 
linking electoral integrity and democratic support in Russia and Belarus. Counter to the 
Magãlhaes (2014) thesis, perceived corruption in Russia lowered support for democracy, 
and positive economic evaluations led to higher democratic support in Russia and Ukraine. 
As suggested earlier, a view that corruption has increased since Soviet times may confuse 
the relationship in Russia.  
 Nonetheless, this chapter did demonstrate that in Russia, the effect of perceived 
electoral integrity on democratic support depends on whether one voted for Putin. In line 
with the theoretical expectations that seeing your candidate win favourably influences 
views of the electoral process (Anderson & Tverdova 2003; Rose & Mishler 2009), it also 
sheds some light on the dynamics of democratic support in authoritarian states with 
popular rulers. Putin voters who see their candidate win elections they assume are fair 
increases support for ‘democracy’, while supporters of other candidates who think the 
process is unfair are more likely to support democracy, where their candidate would 
presumably enjoy a fair contest. However, this interaction was not significant in Belarus or 
Ukraine, leaving more to be explored in this area. 
 Overall, the usefulness of performance theories for explaining support for 
democracy was limited and uneven. One key conclusion is that the effects of the 
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performance model differ greatly between each country, perhaps because performance 
indicators can be closely tied to popular authoritarian leaders, and as well may be mediated 
by the different post-Soviet political experiences of each country. None of the independent 
variables were significant across all cohorts. Having travelled to a democracy did have a 
consistently positive effect as hypothesised, and as such deserves more attention in future 
studies to determine when and how it fosters democratic support among citizens from non-
democratic countries. The variables explored here were also least useful for explaining 
democratic support among younger generations, which may suggest that performance 
evaluations are more important for older citizens with multiple regime experiences to 
compare. While the inclusion of social media in the model did shed light on how 
performance indicators operate, it did not greatly increase explanatory power; moreover, 
the lack of data for Belarus and Ukraine on this measure prevents us from determining 
exactly why the model explains so little among younger cohorts. In any event, this and 
perceived electoral integrity having opposite effects in Russia and Belarus raises questions 
as to how citizens in these societies understand democratic governance. The following 
chapter explores this question and tests the effect of democratic knowledge on support for 
democracy. 
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Democratic knowledge and support for democracy 
  
 Does knowing more about democracy increase democratic support? As this thesis 
has already argued, many leaders of the region have employed the ‘democracy’ label for 
their own gain – from Gorbachev’s ‘democratisation’ to Putin’s ‘managed democracy’ 
(Gerber & Chapman 2018, p.486, Rosefielde & Hedlund 2009, p.179). Unsurprisingly, 
citizens living under such regimes are often found to have little awareness of what 
democracy is (see, for example, Cho 2015, Shin 2015a). While the literature on democratic 
understanding is comparatively small compared to other sources of democratic support 
(Cho 2014a), the few existing studies on Russia suggest that its citizens are similarly under-
informed (Hale 2011, Gerber & Chapman 2018). Research has also indicated that the post-
communist legacy has led citizens to emphasise social-democratic conceptions, such as 
welfare provisions or wealth redistribution (Rose et al. 2006). Knowing more about 
democracy tends to be associated with political tolerance and participation, which means 
that ‘the growth of democratic knowledge among mass publics is crucial to building 
democratic political culture’ (Shin 2012, p.224). 
 One clear and consistent finding from the comparative literature is that being better-
informed about democracy typically leads to stronger support for democracy regardless of 
regime type (Bratton & Mattes 2001, Cho 2014a, Miller et al. 1997, Norris 2011). Citizens 
who are better informed about democracy ‘resist authoritarian socialisation forces including 
governmental propaganda and elite discourses defending their own regime’ (Cho 2014, 
p.9), which suggests that democratic knowledge is an important variable to account for in 
hybrid and authoritarian regimes such as Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Given the focus of 
this thesis, it is also important to evaluate whether democratic knowledge mitigates 
generational or lifecycle effects, and if it has the same explanatory power regardless of how 
an individual was socialised. As in previous chapters, an overview of democratic knowledge 
is presented for all generations and its effect on support for democracy evaluated within 
each cohort. As put by Welzel (2013, p.310), ‘how strongly people desire democracy is 
meaningless unless we also know how people understand democracy’. 
 This chapter extends and updates this literature by focusing on Russia, Ukraine and 
Belarus, countries where history may be expected to have produced ‘democratic novices’ 
(Shin 2015b, p.13). The post-Soviet region, where the legacy of communism has its own 
impact on attitudes towards democracy (Hale 2011; Pop-Eleches & Tucker 2014; Rose, 
 168 
Mishler & Haerpfer 1998), has received comparatively little attention. There is also very little 
literature on how different forms of authoritarian regimes may differ in shaping their citizens’ 
understanding of democracy; however, this chapter is able to attempt to address that by 
examining whether citizens socialised in the Soviet period understand democracy 
differently to those growing up under Putin or Lukashenka’s tightly controlled 
authoritarianism.  
 Wave Six of the World Values Survey is used here to explore how post-Soviet 
citizens understand ‘democracy’, and how this may shape their support for democracy 
itself. Following the literature reviewed in chapters 1 and 2, the central hypothesis of this 
chapter is that citizens who are well-informed about democracy to hold more favourable 
attitudes towards it. However, there is little scholarship to guide expectations on how 
citizens socialised under different post-Soviet regimes should understand democracy in the 
first place. A detailed overview of how democracy is understood across countries and 
generations is thus presented in this chapter. 
 First, an overview of the existing theory and literature on democratic knowledge and 
its relationship with support for democracy is provided. Section 7.1 reviews the theoretical 
literature and presents the hypotheses to be tested later in the chapter. Section 7.2 
summarises the empirical literature, focusing on Russia, Ukraine and Belarus where 
possible. Section 7.3 presents an overview of how citizens understand democracy in 
Russia, Ukraine and Belarus with reference to any generational effects, before using factor 
analysis to shed light on how these understandings are structured. Finally, Section 7.4 tests 
the effect of democratic knowledge on support for democracy.  
 
7.1 Theorising and conceptualising citizen understandings of democracy 
  ‘Democracy’ is among the most prominent and debated of political concepts 
(Collier & Levitsky 1997). The most basic element is the requirement for free and fair 
elections (Schumpeter 1942); however, most scholarship draws on Dahl (1971) to add civil 
rights and full suffrage to the criteria a respondent should be able to identify as being 
essential to democracy. Empirically, this is complicated by the reality that democracy is 
measured by degree: projects such as the Varieties of Democracy Project and Freedom 
 169 
House give ratings on indices such as electoral processes and judicial independence and 
award a final score.38  
 A further problem is the ability of autocracies to proclaim that ‘they too are 
democracies’ (Shin 2015a, p.5). This has become more popular among twenty-first century 
authoritarian rulers, particularly in competitive authoritarian states (Levitsky & Way 2010). 
Notable examples are, of course, Putin’s ‘managed democracy’ (Rosefielde & Hedlund 
2009, p.179), ‘democracy embedded in Asian values’ in Singapore and ‘democracy with 
Chinese characteristics’ (Lu & Shi 2014, p.6). The ‘normative legitimacy of democracy’ is 
rarely disputed in these countries; instead, leaders will often spread ‘alternate discourses 
on democracy that both deprive [democracy] of constraints on their power and enhance the 
likelihood of their political survival’ (Lu & Shi 2014, p.5). The citizenry receives these 
‘emasculated discourses on democracy’ through ‘effectively controlled education and 
media systems’ (Lu & Shi 2014, p.5). For Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, the situation is 
complicated by how the Soviet Union portrayed socialism as ‘a higher form of democracy’ 
than the West (Gerber & Chapman 2018, p.485) and as a ‘people’s democracy’ (Carnaghan 
2007, p.77). Moreover, Gorbachev referred to reforms in the 1980s as ‘democratisation’ 
(Gerber & Chapman 2018, p.486) and post-Soviet reformers were often ‘more faithful to 
free markets than to political equality’ (Carnaghan 2007, p.77). The dual legacies of 
socialism and authoritarianism, then, may mean that post-Soviet citizens feel that 
democracy ‘lacks any intrinsic meaning’ (Gerber & Chapman 2018, p.488). 
 Scholars have long noted that an important part of democratisation is the public 
learning ‘democratic norms, principles and values’ (Diamond 2006, p.110). Scant attention, 
however, has been paid to ‘the distinct nature of alternate discourses on democracy in 
societies with different experiences of democratic politics’ (Lu & Shi 2014, p.4). The focus 
should therefore move beyond ‘institutional and structural factors and study the political 
competition over the ideas and discourses that shape citizens’ attitudes about concepts 
like democracy’ (Lu & Shi 2014, p.2, see also Shin 2015a). 
 How, then, do ordinary citizens understand democracy? While a burgeoning 
literature explores this question, debates continue as to how to classify various 
understandings of democracy, and which constitute an ‘informed’ understanding. Large 
comparative studies such as that of Dalton, Shin and Jou (2007a) have grouped 
 
38 See, for instance, https://freedomhouse.org/report/methodology-freedom-world-2018 and https://www.v-
dem.net/en/about/. 
 170 
understandings into the categories of political freedoms, democratic institutions and social 
benefits. This does not mean, however, that a liberal-procedural understanding of 
democracy is dominant and exclusive worldwide. The social or ‘economic-substantive’ 
understanding of democracy prioritises ‘reducing the income gap and providing for basic 
necessities’ (Shin 2012, p.242). 
 This is subject to more debate, given that economic or social benefits may be 
regarded as consequences of democratic governance rather than crucial features of the 
system itself (Collier & Levitsky 1997). Held (2006), however, notes that understanding 
democracy in social as well as procedural terms simply translates to a social-liberal 
understanding rather than a market-liberal understanding.  
 The normative debate is reflected in the empirical literature, as researchers must 
make judgements on how to treat various understandings of democracy. Norris (2011) 
regards social understandings as contradictory to procedural understandings because a 
focus on economic outcomes does not suggest a lasting commitment to democracy. 
Welzel (2011, p.15), however, follows Held (2006) in arguing that ‘social’ understandings 
simply distinguish between ‘social liberal’ and ‘market liberal’ understandings of 
democracy. This thesis follows Shin (2015a) and Welzel and Kirsch (Welzel & Kirsch 2017, 
Kirsch & Welzel 2019) as treating social understandings as being an exclusive characteristic 
of neither democracy nor authoritarianism.  
 Comparative scholars have also explored country-specific conceptions of 
democracy. Lu and Shi’s work on China (2014, p.6, Shi & Lu 2010) develops a ‘democracy 
of guardians’ idea, arguing that the shadow of Confucianism and Leninism cultivated an 
appreciation for ‘morally competent rulers to act as guardians of a society [who] can be 
trusted to effectively serve the public interest’. Leaders thus need ‘the discretional power 
and authority… with limited constraints from the citizenry’ (Lu & Shi 2014, p.6). This work, 
guided by Dahl’s (1989, p.52) point that a ‘perennial alternative to democracy is 
government by guardians’, relates to recent work on Russia. Hale (2011, pp.1359, 1371) 
argues that Russians favour ‘delegative democracy’, where there is a strong leader whom 
they can freely elect, but who is ‘largely unconstrained by other institutions in solving 
Russia’s immense challenges of transition’. 
 The second task of this chapter is to explore how well-informed post-Soviet citizens 
are about democracy and what effect this may have on democratic support. Given this 
maelstrom of competing perceptions of democracy and governance, it is unsurprising that 
socialisation under non-democratic regimes in particular may produce ‘democratic novices’ 
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who have trouble differentiating between democracy and authoritarianism, or support 
aspects of both concurrently (Shin 2015b, p.13). There is broader consensus in the 
literature on how to measure how well-informed citizens are about democracy. The first and 
most common approach is to evaluate whether respondents can ‘associate democracy 
with any of its own properties… as distinct from non-democratic traits’ (Shin 2015a, p.8). 
These approaches stem from the argument that understanding a political concept relies on 
the ability to distinguish between its key attributes and those that contradict it (Cho 2014a, 
McClosky & Zaller 1984). Welzel (2011, p.14) argues that ‘what matters is how exclusively 
people connote democracy in liberal [procedural] terms’. Beyond correctly identifying 
procedural minimums such as elections and civil rights, common items tapping 
authoritarian understandings are military takeover and religious interpretation of laws (Cho 
2014, 2015; Norris 2011; Welzel 2011; Welzel & Kirsch 2017).  
 While these items are by no means an exhaustive list of authoritarian regime 
characteristics, neither are compatible with democracy and as such serve as useful 
differentiators (Linz & Stepan 1996; Norris 2011; Welzel & Kirsch 2017). The religion and 
military items effectively ask ‘about conditions that are antithetical to the democratic tenets 
of citizen control of the military and separation of church and state’ (Shin 2015a, p.22). 
Lastly, while open-ended questions may allow for a wider range of understandings to be 
expressed, they are also affected by how researchers code responses, which ‘is widely 
known to shape the results’ (Shin 2015a, p.13). Because we are interested in comparing 
different understandings of democracy between countries and cohorts, the closed-ended 
approach is most appropriate. The World Values Survey offers one of the ‘best examples’ 
of the closed-ended approach (Shin 2015a, p.10), and allows the integration of democratic 
understanding into the larger model of this thesis.  
 Why should knowing more about democracy increase democratic support? There 
are two key and related explanations provided by the literature. First, being aware of what 
democracy is means being aware of the rights and freedoms it provides, and support for 
democracy develops among those ‘who want it largely because of what it is’ (Mattes & 
Bratton 2007, p.202). Second, knowing what democracy is as well as being able to 
distinguish it from authoritarianism means knowing that the systems are different. Knowing 
that democracy offers freedoms that authoritarian systems do not creates ‘a positive bias 
to endorse democracy and a negative bias to reject its alternatives’ (Cho 2014, p.3). 
Ultimately, then, democratic knowledge should ‘erode authoritarian legitimacy and boost 
democratic legitimacy’ (Cho 2014, p.9). 
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 The existing theory on democratic knowledge therefore suggests two hypotheses. 
First, if citizens socialised in authoritarian regimes have less knowledge about democracy, 
we should expect post-Soviet cohorts with more exposure to democracy to also have 
higher knowledge of democracy. Second, if knowledge of democracy sensitises citizens to 
the benefits of democratic rule and shields them from authoritarian propaganda, we should 
also expect democratic knowledge to have a positive effect on support for democracy. 
The hypotheses this chapter will test in Section 7.4 are therefore: 
 
H1. Democratic knowledge will be higher among generations socialised during transitional 
or revolutionary periods. 
H2. Democratic knowledge will have a positive effect on support for democracy. 
 
7.2 Prior empirical findings 
 Surveys may field open- or closed-ended questions to gauge conceptions of 
democracy, with two slightly different outcomes. While open-ended questions tap whether 
respondents can offer a definition of democracy, and how they define it, closed-ended 
questions are generally geared more towards discovering which conceptions are more 
widespread (Dalton et al. 2007a). One clear finding, at least, is that people’s ability to define 
democracy ‘varies considerably across countries and different time periods’ (Dalton, Shin & 
Jou 2007a). However, open-ended questions have also indicated that liberal-procedural 
understandings are most widespread (Bratton et al. 2005, Dalton et al. 2007a, Dalton et al. 
2007b). Open-ended surveys do not test whether respondents offering a definition of 
democracy can distinguish democracy from authoritarianism (Shin 2012).  
 Given that many communist regimes presented themselves as ‘democratic’, post- 
communist countries present particularly interesting case studies. Most autocratic states of 
the twentieth century did not claim to be democratic; communist regimes were the 
exception (Pop-Eleches & Tucker 2017). This ‘rhetorical commitment to democracy’ (Dalton 
1994, p.474) has become more popular among twenty-first century authoritarian rulers, 
particularly in competitive authoritarian states (Levitsky & Way 2010). In contrast to citizens 
of advanced democracies, who are generally socialised into believing democracy is the 
only option (Mishler & Rose 1996), communist citizens in Europe ‘were socialised into an 
ambiguous – almost schizophrenic – mix of democratic and authoritarian values’ (Dalton 
1994, p.474). However, the extent to which this matters for generational effects is 
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debatable given that many 21st century authoritarian leaders claim to be democratic 
(Levitsky & Way 2010). As discussed in chapter 3, Putin himself coined the term ‘managed 
democracy’ (Rosefielde & Hedlund 2009, p.179). 
 In a study of forty-nine countries, Cho (2015, p.255) notes that citizens unable to 
distinguish between characteristics of democratic and authoritarian regimes constitute a 
majority in non-Western countries, particularly in South Asia and the Middle East. Shin 
(2015a, p.27), analysing both democratic and authoritarian East Asian countries, found that 
‘overwhelming majorities’ of citizens were either uninformed as to the difference between 
authoritarian and democratic systems, or simultaneously supported both types of regime. 
The concern has therefore been expressed that widespread support for democracy may 
‘lack substance’ due to a lack of understanding or interest in what democracy actually is 
(Dalton et al. 2007a).  
 While Miller, Hesli and Reisinger’s (1997) research in Russia and Ukraine finds that 
citizens saw political freedom as central to democracy, other research is less conclusive. 
Mishler and Willerton (2003, p.113) report that a ‘dual political culture - embracing both 
authoritarian and democratic features’ was emerging in Russia, and indeed Hale (2011) 
found that only forty-one percent of Russians identified institutions such as fair elections 
and civil rights as elements of democracy (Hale 2011, p.1360). More than one-quarter could 
not offer any definition of democracy, yet fifty-four percent were able to identify that Russia 
was not a democratic country (Hale 2011). More recent research, however, finds that a 
majority of Russians could correctly report that ‘free and fair elections’ were a key feature 
of democratic systems (Gerber & Chapman, p.489). While the literature on Russia is 
inconclusive, there is also very little evidence as to whether there is any uniform post-Soviet 
trend on democratic knowledge that extends to Ukraine and Belarus as well. 
 The literature also suggests that citizens outside the advanced democracies may be 
more inclined to hold social understandings of democracy. Cross-national research from 
Norris (2011) finds that social understandings are highest in autocracies such as Russia, 
Iraq and China. While historical experience of democracy does not emerge as a predictor of 
procedural understandings after controlling for factors such as education and income, it 
does undermine authoritarian and social understandings (Norris 2011, p.159). Similarly, Cho 
(2015, p.255) reports that only in the West were citizens able to distinguish between 
democracy and authoritarianism constitute a majority. In sum, the global findings suggest 
that widespread procedural views of democracy are not necessarily accompanied by the 
ability to distinguish democratic regime characteristics from authoritarian ones.  
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 A similar pattern emerges in post-communist countries, where legacy effects may 
also result in stronger social understandings of democracy. A widespread expectation in 
Russia was that democracy would bring ‘primarily prosperity and individual welfare’, which 
was certainly an persuasive reason to support democratisation (Bashkirova 2006, p.368). 
Majorities of Russians consistently name prosperity and a basic income as essential to 
democracy in New Russia Barometer Surveys (Rose et al. 2006, pp.127–128). A more 
recent study on Russia noted that ‘those familiar with the concept [of democracy] more 
often associate it with social and economic benefits than with political rights and 
institutions’ (Gerber & Chapman 2018, p.482). Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2017) find that 
post-communist citizens are more likely than those from other regions to identify items 
such as economic growth and a welfare state as key to democratic governance. This did 
not, however, preclude post-communist citizens from also identifying institutions such as 
free elections as democratic (Pop-Eleches & Tucker 2017). Research on Ukraine and 
Belarus specifically, however, is scarce, and some studies suggest that socialisation under 
communism makes citizens less likely to see redistribution as an essential feature of 
democratic governance (Wegmann & Knutsen 2014). However, if socialisation under 
communism does lead citizens to understand democracy in social terms, then only the 
Soviet generations in this study should be affected by this, in line with the expectations of 
socialisation theory. Given that social understandings are also more commonplace in 
authoritarian regimes (Norris 2011), Belarus and Russia in particular should display high 
levels of social democratic understandings of democracy. We might then expect social 
understandings to be relatively high in these countries. 
 Nonetheless, being able to distinguish between democracy and authoritarianism 
does appear to have a positive effect on support for democracy. In China, for example, Lu 
and Shi (2014, p.18) find that understanding liberal democracy made individuals much more 
likely to see the regime’s ‘true authoritarian nature’. Accepting the Chinese Communist 
Party’s definition of democracy results in respondents being more likely to see the regime 
as ‘more or less a democracy’ (Lu & Shi 2014, p.18). In the case of Africa, Bratton and 
Mattes (2001, p.117) note that ‘individuals who cannot define democracy are much less 
attached to it as a preferred form of regime’. Moreover, those with procedural 
understandings of democracy held more supportive attitudes towards a democratic 
system, and negative attitudes towards forms of authoritarian rule (Mattes & Bratton 2007). 
This finding has been replicated in Latin America (Baviskar & Malone 2004, Carrion 2008), 
and a recent study of forty-four countries worldwide (Cho 2014). While one study found the 
effect of democratic knowledge in democracies to be double the strength of that in 
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authoritarian countries (Cho 2014), most do not report significant differences by regime 
type (Carrion 2008; Mattes & Bratton 2007). 
 More specifically, the same relationship has been observed in a 1997 study of 
Russia and Ukraine (Miller, Hesli & Reisinger 1997), indicating that the effect of democratic 
knowledge on support for democracy is similar in the post-Soviet region. Russians who 
understood the procedural basics of democracy are significantly more likely to demand 
democratisation (Gerber & Chapman 2018). A study of the broader post-communist region 
also found that having a procedural knowledge of democracy increased democratic 
support, but so too did understanding democracy in terms of economic benefits and 
redistributive tax policy (Pop-Eleches & Tucker 2017, p.131). Pop-Eleches and Tucker 
(2017), however, did not account for whether citizens were able to distinguish between 
democracy and authoritarianism, which is the mechanism necessary for testing democratic 
knowledge. Moreover, they found that post-communist citizens’ knowledge of democracy 
did not explain the ‘lower overall support for democracy’ in post-communist countries 
relative to other societies (Pop-Eleches & Tucker 2017, p.132). While the existing research 
tends to differ on its measures of democratic knowledge and reports varying results, the 
small literature on the post-communist region suggests that knowing more about 
democracy should indeed strengthen support for democracy. 
 Having reviewed the theoretical and empirical literature, we should expect 
procedural and social understandings of democracy to be relatively high in Russia, Ukraine 
and Belarus, but not necessarily expect citizens to be fully able to distinguish between 
characteristics of democratic and authoritarian systems. Further, given that socialisation 
under both communist and (other) authoritarian regimes may lead citizens to understand 
democracy in social terms, there is no reason to expect generational differences on the 
social democratic survey items. The only exception may be the Ukrainian revolution 
generation, which had the most exposure to democratic governance from 2006 – 2010 
(Freedom House 2010b). 
 However, we would expect citizens socialised during transitional periods to be 
somewhat more capable of distinguishing between democracy and authoritarianism, simply 
because citizens with minimal experience of democracy are likely to have ‘limited 
sophistication about democratic politics’ (Shin 2015b, p.13). Previous studies have also 
found ‘personal experience of democratic politics’ to be the strongest predictor of 
democratic knowledge (Shin 2012, p.258). Thus, the transitional generations in each 
country plus the revolutionary generation in Ukraine should be expected to be more well-
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informed about democracy than their Soviet and authoritarian counterparts. We should also 
expect informed understandings of democracy in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus to have a 
positive effect on support for democracy, in line with the dominant finding from the existing 
literature. Given that the literature has found knowledge of democracy to positively 
influence democratic support across both authoritarian and democratic regimes (Cho 
2014), this relationship should hold regardless of generation.  
 
7.3 Democratic knowledge in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus  
 How is democracy understood in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus? This section 
explores what post-Soviet citizens view as ‘essential’ to a democratic system. First, it will 
provide an overview of the World Values Survey Wave 6 (2011) items and their ratings by 
respondents. Second, generational differences on these items will be explored. Lastly, 
factor analyses will determine how citizens structure their understandings of democracy.   
 The World Values Survey provides measures for procedural, social and authoritarian 
understandings of democracy, which allows us to explore the procedural, social and 
authoritarian notions of democracy identified in the literature (Norris 2011, Welzel 2011). 
However, as these items were only introduced in Waves 5 and 6, the opportunity to explore 
trends over time is limited. As noted by Welzel and Kirsch (2017, p.7), questions that ‘did 
not work so well in round five’ were altered for Wave 6. For this reason, and because Wave 
5 did not include Belarus, this chapter limits itself to the more recent Wave 6. Nonetheless, 
the World Values Survey offers full, standardised coverage of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, 
allowing for comparisons to be made with the existing literature as well as addressing a 
regional gap in the present scholarship. Finally, it allows this chapter to build on the results 
of previous chapters and evaluate the effect of democratic understanding in relation to the 
socio-economic and lifetime learning models. 
 Table 7.1 shows the survey items measuring democratic understanding and their 
means by country and cohort. As suggested by the existing literature, procedural 
understandings of democracy are high in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus: the items tapping 
free elections, civil rights and equality for women are all generally seen as essential to 
democracy. Moreover, the Soviet cohort in Russia is significantly more likely to identify 
these as key elements of a democratic system. There are no significant generational 
differences on any item in Belarus; in Ukraine, the transitional generation is less likely to 
identify free elections as essential to democracy. Consistent with the prior finding that 
social understandings of democracy are higher outside the advanced democracies (Shin 
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2015b, p.13), these are also widely seen as essential components of a democratic system 
across the three countries. However, this differs by country: tax and equal incomes are 
seen as less essential in Belarus than in its neighbours. In Russia, however, generations 
differ on all three social items. As with the procedural items, the transitional and 
authoritarian generations differ significantly from the Soviet generation as viewing the social 
items as less essential to democracy, in line with literature suggesting communist 
socialisation results in less support for capitalism (Pop-Eleches & Tucker 2014). Lastly, the 
authoritarian items are viewed as less essential to democracy but are by no means fully 
rejected. Again, this was suggested by earlier studies suggesting authoritarian 
understandings would be higher in countries with less exposure to democracy (Cho 2015, 
Norris 2011, Welzel & Kirsch 2017). This is particularly the case with ‘people obey their 
rulers’, which was seen as more essential than not in all three countries. Religious 
interpretation of laws was seen as least essential to democracy of any items in all three 
countries. However, in the case of an army takeover from an incompetent government, 
Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2017) demonstrate that post-communist citizens were no more 
likely than others to believe this was compatible with democracy. 
 To explore how citizens structure their understandings of democracy, Table 7.2 
presents the results of the factor analyses. The most striking result is the relatively high 
scores of all three social items on the same factor as the procedural items in all three 
countries. This suggests that citizens understand democracy in social-democratic terms; 
that is, alongside the core elements of elections, civil rights and gender equality, 
unemployment aid, redistributive tax policy and equal incomes are also seen as ‘essential’ 
to a democratic system. This is consistent with previous research that broadly suggested 
that social understandings would be more prevalent in post-communist societies (Rose et 
al. 2006). 
  Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2017, p.130) also find that ‘these more economic 
conceptions of democracy’ such as welfare and economic growth are more prevalent in 
post-communist states, but that post-communist respondents were no less likely than 
others to identify free and fair elections as essential to democracy. This apparent effect of 
communist socialisation is also evident in Fuchs’ (1999) study of divided Germany, which 
shows that East Germans held an understanding of democracy that was both social and 
procedural. In Russia specifically, three-quarters of citizens reported a social understanding 
of democracy (Gerber & Chapman 2018, p.488). Lastly, as Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2017, 
p.130) point out, the social items and women’s rights were ‘in line with communist-era 
principles’ while civil rights may be a response to the ‘abuses and paternalism’ of the Soviet  
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Table 7.1: Mean scores (1-10) on ‘essential characteristics of democracy’ by generation, 2011 
 
 ‘Many things are desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy. Please tell me for each of the following things how essential you think it is as a 
characteristic of democracy. Use this scale where 1 means “not at all an essential characteristic of democracy” and 10 means it definitely is “an essential characteristic of 
democracy”. *Significantly different from Soviet generation at p<.05, **p<0.1, ***p<.001. Source: World Values Survey Wave 6, available at www.worldvaluessurvey.org. 
 Procedural understanding                Social understanding Authoritarian understanding 
 People 
choose their 
leaders in 
free 
elections 
Civil rights 
protect 
people from 
state 
oppression 
Women 
have the 
same 
rights as 
men 
People receive 
state aid for 
unemployment 
Governments 
tax the rich 
and subsidise 
the poor 
The state 
makes 
people’s 
incomes 
equal 
The army 
takes over 
when 
government 
is 
incompetent 
Religious 
authorities 
ultimately 
interpret the 
laws 
People obey 
their rulers 
Russia          
Soviet 8.53 8.38 8.62 8.24 7.56 7.65 4.88 3.74 6.63 
Transition 8.06** 7.97** 8.12*** 7.85* 6.95*** 7.22* 4.84 4.01 6.53 
Authoritarian 7.79*** 7.72*** 7.90*** 7.67*** 6.85*** 6.89*** 4.78 3.80 6.20* 
Belarus          
Soviet 7.86 7.40 7.47 6.86 5.88 6.37 4.36 3.94 5.41 
Transition 8.05 7.47 7.53 7.02 5.75 5.93 4.44 3.70 5.35 
Authoritarian 7.86 7.38 7.49 6.78 5.57 6.06 4.42 3.92 5.31 
Ukraine          
Soviet 8.52 8.33 8.54 8.42 7.61 7.67 4.52 3.98 5.58 
Transition 8.18* 8.15 8.28 8.20 7.48 7.35 4.54 4.02 5.45 
Revolution 8.45 8.26 8.45 8.20 7.48 7.45 4.74 3.96 5.17 
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period. The results in Table 7.2 nonetheless demonstrate that post-communist citizens view 
democracy in procedural and social terms even after twenty years of a different regime. 
This analysis also highlights further differences between these three post-Soviet states. In 
Belarus, two factors emerge that may be broadly termed procedural and authoritarian, in 
contrast to Russia and Ukraine’s single social-democratic factor. Further, two social items 
load almost equally on the two Belarusian factors, suggesting that they resist categorisation 
as democratic or authoritarian. It is worth noting that Welzel and Kirsch’s (2017) worldwide 
study found that social items showed ‘weak and inconsistent’ loadings on two procedural 
and authoritarian factors; as such, there is no strong theoretical or empirical reason to 
expect the social items to load on one dimension over another. It may be that Belarus’ 
relatively swift transition to an authoritarian state under Lukashenka provided less 
opportunity for citizens to encounter democratic norms or processes. In contrast, Freedom 
House did not classify Russia as ‘not free’ until 2004, while Ukraine has been categorised 
as ‘partly free’ or better since the collapse of the Soviet Union.39  
 Moreover, a second dimension in Belarus suggests that people understand 
democracy in authoritarian terms to an extent not seen in Russia or Ukraine. A separate 
authoritarian understanding of democracy suggests a ‘misunderstanding’ of the concept, 
and thus the potential to give some legitimacy to an authoritarian regime (Welzel & Kirsch 
2017, p.3). Indeed, Shin (2015b) argues Belarusians’ limited exposure to democratic politics 
has resulted in a correspondingly limited understanding of democracy. 
 Also striking is the appearance of ‘people obey their rulers’ on the single dimension 
alongside free elections in Russia, suggesting that citizens may value obedience or perhaps 
a strong leader as a feature of democracy. This echoes Hale’s (2011) argument that 
Russians are inclined towards ‘delegative democracy’, whereby a democratically-elected 
president is allowed significant power to rule as they see fit (see O’Donnell 1994). Russians 
want a ‘strongman leader at the same time they want that leader to respect their rights’ 
(Hale 2011, p.1368). For this reason, and because ‘people obey their rulers’ is used 
inconsistently in the literature, this item is not included as a characteristic of authoritarian 
governance in the ‘informed understanding’ variable.  
 
 
 
39 See https://freedomhouse.org for ratings and details.  
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Table 7.2: Understandings of democracy factor analysis 
    Russia Belarus      Ukraine 
 Procedural – 
social 
Procedural – 
social 
Authoritarian 
– social 
Procedural 
- social 
People choose their leaders in 
free elections 
0.77 0.72 -0.14 0.69 
Civil rights protect people from 
state oppression 
0.77 0.69 -0.02 0.69 
Women have the same rights as 
men 
0.71 0.66 -0.04 0.66 
People receive state aid for 
unemployment 
0.56 0.52 0.31 0.67 
Governments tax the rich and 
subsidise the poor 
0.56 0.21 0.32 0.54 
The state makes people’s 
incomes equal 
0.62 0.31 0.31 0.53 
The army takes over when 
government is incompetent 
-0.04 -0.15 0.61 -0.06 
Religious authorities ultimately 
interpret the laws 
-0.21 -0.25 0.53 -0.11 
People obey their rulers 0.35 0.06 0.51 0.09 
Eigenvalue 3.1 1.95 1.12 2.43 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 0.87 0.76 0.81 
Cronbach’s alpha 0.83 0.75 0.63 0.8 
N 1,849 1,495 1,500 
Factor loadings of items considered ‘essential to democracy’, varimax rotation. Source: World Values Survey, 
available at www.worldvaluessurvey.org. 
 What is clear is that all three procedural items are differentiated from the army rule 
and religious law items. This paper follows Welzel (2011; Welzel & Kirsch 2017) in viewing 
the social items as legitimate but not essential elements of democracy, in contrast to the 
authoritarian items which are antithetical to the concept. As the social items are not core 
elements included in empirical measures of democracy, and because the loadings were 
inconsistent between countries, they are excluded from the ‘informed understanding of 
democracy’ variable included in the multivariate analysis.  
 Having explored how citizens understand democracy, the next task is to evaluate 
how well-informed they are. As discussed earlier in this chapter, citizens must be able to 
identify core characteristics of democracy as well as distinguish these from authoritarian 
options to be considered to have an informed understanding of democracy (Cho 2014a, 
Shin 2015a). A respondent must therefore identify the World Values Survey items of free 
elections, civil rights and equal rights for women as essential to democracy, and the army 
rule and religious interpretation of law items as not essential. The ‘informed understanding 
of democracy’ variable is constructed as follows: 
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(elections + civil rights + gender equality) – (army rule + religious law) 
 
 Combining these five items into a composite scale provides a parsimonious 
measure of democratic knowledge to include in the multivariate model. The resulting 
variable is standardised on a 0 - 10 scale. Does democratic understanding differ by 
generation? The literature suggests it may, given that knowledge of democracy is higher in 
established democracies (Cho 2015, Norris 2011) and socialisation under authoritarian 
regimes may produce ‘democratic novices’ (Shin 2015b). However, literature is scarce on 
the relationship between socialisation into authoritarian and hybrid regimes and 
generational effects specifically: even if socialisation into such a system results in not 
knowing much about democracy, later learning under a more democratic system may 
ameliorate this. Further, it is not clear, for example, whether socialisation under Putin’s 
authoritarian regime should produce more or less democratic knowledge than socialisation 
under the Soviet system. Table 7.3 shows the means of the democratic knowledge index by 
country and cohort.  
 
Table 7.3: Generations and democratic knowledge 
 Russia Belarus Ukraine 
Soviet generation 7.58 7.04  7.64  
Transition generation 7.19**  7.17  7.44  
Authoritarian or 
Revolution generation 
7.07***  7.01  7.54  
N 1,924 1,507 1,487 
Mean score on ‘knowledge of democracy’ variable (0-10 scale). *Significantly different from Soviet generation at 
p<.05, **p<0.1, ***p<.001. Source: World Values Survey, available at www.worldvaluessurvey.org.  
 
 There are no statistically significant generational differences in Belarus or Ukraine, 
indicating that socialisation into different regimes does not have an impact on how well-
informed individuals are about democracy. This is perhaps unsurprising in Belarus, where 
only the transition generation were exposed to democracy under what Freedom House 
deemed a ‘partly free’ regime. This was also during the early 1990s, where the diffusion of 
information about democracy over such mediums as the Internet was less readily available. 
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Given that such diffusion is a key theorised influence on levels of democratic understanding 
(Cho 2015, Diamond 2010), the lack of generational differences in Belarus is not puzzling. In 
Ukraine, however, the higher levels of democracy after the Orange Revolution in particular 
might have been expected to shape understanding of democracy in some way. 
Nonetheless, this finding is in line with Shin’s (2012) research in Confucian Asia, which finds 
that older cohorts socialised under authoritarian rule were no less knowledgeable about 
democracy than other generations. 
 In Russia, however, we can reject the hypothesis that generations socialised in 
transitional phases would be better informed about democracy: belonging to both the 
transition and authoritarian generations has a significant negative effect on democratic 
understanding. Growing up in the post-Soviet period where information about democracy is 
more readily available thanks to the ‘growing availability of mass communication 
technologies’ might be expected to increase young people’s knowledge about democracy 
(Rohrschneider 1999, p.22). However, this mass communication and increased flow of 
information across borders (Dalton et al. 2007a) is not generationally specific. Democratic 
knowledge increasing with age has been reported in cross-national studies (Norris 2011) 
and this appears to hold in Russia. However, the effects are very small and explain only one 
percent of the total variance in democratic understanding, suggesting that generational 
effects are only one small part of the puzzle. 
 As the effect of both the transitional and authoritarian generations was significant, 
Table 7.4 presents the results of a regression including age to test whether these were 
lifecycle rather than generational effects. Belarus and Ukraine are included in the analysis to 
determine whether age affects democratic understanding, even if generations do not. Age 
does indeed explain away the generational effects from Table 7.3, while generational and 
lifecycle effects are irrelevant for democratic knowledge in Ukraine and Belarus. In other 
words, growing older has a positive effect on democratic understanding, rather than being 
socialised under a Soviet system specifically. This is in line with Norris’ (2011) worldwide 
study that found older respondents were more likely to hold procedural understandings of 
democracy and less likely to hold authoritarian understandings. Cho (2015) finds that age 
had a positive effect only in democratic countries; in authoritarian systems, it has the 
opposite effect. A recent study on Russia finds that age has no significant effect on 
knowledge of democracy (Gerber & Chapman 2018). While this finding is therefore puzzling, 
it may simply be that older Russians, who have experienced several regimes and 
fluctuations in level of democracy over their lifetime, have thus accumulated a better 
understanding of democracy than younger citizens who cannot make such comparisons. 
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Table 7.4: Generations, age and democratic knowledge 
 Russia Belarus Ukraine 
 b beta b beta b beta 
Transition generation .11 (.15) .02 .05 (.19) .01 -.28 (.16) -.07 
Authoritarian/ 
revolution generation 
.19 (.18) .04 -.13 (.19) -.03 -.2 (.2) -.04 
Age (years) .02*** (0) .2 0 (.01) -.03 0 (0) -.03 
Constant 6.69 7.23 7.81 
R2 0.03 0 0 
N 1,924 1,507 1,487 
Ordinary least squares regression showing partial (b) and standardised (beta) coefficients predicting democratic 
knowledge. Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05. Source: World Values Survey, 
available at www.worldvaluessurvey.org.  
 
 However, the model still explains only three percent of the variance in democratic 
knowledge, and neither generational nor lifecycle effects are present in Belarus and 
Ukraine. The hypothesis that informed understandings of democracy would be higher 
among transitional generations, and the revolutionary generation in Ukraine, therefore finds 
no support from these analyses.  
 
7.4 Democratic knowledge and support for democracy 
 
 The growing literature on democratic knowledge argues that understanding the 
difference between democracy and authoritarianism develops democratic support by 
promoting a ‘positive bias’ towards the rights and freedoms democracy has to offer (Cho 
2014, p.3). So far, this chapter has shown that post-Soviet citizens are generally competent 
at distinguishing between democracy and authoritarianism and tend to combine procedural 
and social conceptions of democracy. Those who know little about democracy are less 
likely to support it as a system of government (Bratton & Mattes 2001). Moreover, 
understanding democratic processes is itself an important component of democratisation 
and consolidation (Diamond 2006). To test the second hypothesis - that democratic 
knowledge positively affects support for democracy - Table 7.5 regresses democratic 
knowledge on support for democracy separately by country, controlling for generation and 
age.  
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Table 7.5: Democratic knowledge and support for democracy, 2011 
 Russia Belarus Ukraine 
 b beta b beta b beta 
Democratic 
knowledge 
.28*** (.02) .28*** .24*** (.02) .24*** .38*** (0.04) .32*** 
Transition .06 (.16) .01 .11 (.19) .02 -.35* (0.18) -.07 
Authoritarian/ 
revolution 
-.07 (.19) -.02 -.14 (.18) -.04 -.44* (0.22) -.08 
Age (years) 0 (0) -.01 -.01* (0) -.1 -.01 (0) -.08 
Constant 4.51 6.3 4.55 
R2 0.08 0.06 0.10 
N 1,536 1,483 1,487 
Ordinary least squares regression showing partial (b) and standardised (beta) coefficients predicting support for 
democracy. The dependent variable is scored 0-12. Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, 
*p<0.05. Source: World Values Survey, available at www.worldvaluessurvey.org.  
 The effect of democratic knowledge is highest in Ukraine. It does not, however, 
wash out generational effects: membership of both the transitional (1991 – 2003) and 
revolution (2004 – 2011) generations retains a negative effect on democratic support. 
However, a semi-partial R2  analysis shows that democratic understanding accounts for 
10.6 percent of the variance; the generational effects, while statistically significant, 
therefore each only account for 0.2 percent. Similarly, in Belarus the significant lifecycle 
effect only accounts for around one percent of the variance in democratic support. Holding 
an informed understanding of democracy is therefore the most influential variable in all 
three countries. 
 Moreover, the explanatory power of democratic knowledge is increasing over time. 
Table 7.6 presents the last of the aggregate models with the Russia 2017 and Belarus 2018 
World Values Survey data. Democratic knowledge explains 12 and 15 percent of variance in 
democratic support in Russia and Belarus respectively, which is an increase of almost ten 
percentage points in Belarus’ case. Generational and lifecycle effects are insignificant, as 
they were in 2011 for both countries. These results are striking given their relative 
explanatory power as compared to the models presented in previous chapters. We know 
from chapter 4 that age and generation explained little variance in support for democracy; 
thus, it seems that having an informed understanding of democracy is exerting a 
particularly large effect here. It may also mean that more traditional models of democratic 
support should be rethought, particularly given that as it stands, most theories ‘pay little 
attention to the cognitive origin of democratic support’ (Cho 2014a, p.1). Indeed, the  
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Table 7.6: Democratic knowledge and support for democracy, 2017-18 
 Russia  Belarus 
 b beta  b beta 
Democratic knowledge .36*** (0.03) .35***  .39*** (0.03) .39*** 
Transition generation -.14 (0.2) -.03  -.11 (0.24) -.02 
Authoritarian generation -.08 (0.25) -.02  -.4 (0.25) -.1 
Age (years)     0 (0.01) -.03  -.01 (0.01) -.09 
Constant 4.99  4.56 
Adj R 0.12  0.15 
N 1,314  1,126 
Ordinary least squares regression showing partial (b) and standardised (beta) coefficients predicting support for 
democracy. The dependent variable is scored 0-12. Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, 
*p<0.05. Source: World Values Survey, available at www.worldvaluessurvey.org.  
explanatory power of the modernisation model tested in chapter 5 decreased over time, 
and it is possible that factors such as democratic knowledge are becoming comparatively 
more important for democratic support.  
 
Within-generation analyses 
 Table 7.7 presents the results of regressions run within each generation, controlling 
for any lifecycle effects with the age variable. The democratic knowledge variable remains 
significant within each generation in all three countries. In Russia, it explains fourteen 
percent of the variance in democratic support for the authoritarian generation, compared to 
seven for the Soviet generation and five percent for the transition generation. This may 
suggest that being well-informed about democracy matters more for those raised under an 
authoritarian system where information about democracy is scarce or misleading. 
Moreover, the youngest Russian cohort has experienced only consolidated 
authoritarianism. It may be this limited exposure to other regime types that make 
knowledge of democracy more important in explaining democratic support. 
 This may be the case to a lesser extent in Belarus as well, where democratic 
understanding accounts for eight percent of the variance in the authoritarian generation. 
The difference, however, is not as stark as the R2 value sits at six percent for the Belarusian 
Soviet generation and seven percent for the transition generation. Democratic knowledge 
has the most explanatory power for the transition generation in Ukraine, and it is unclear 
why the Ukrainian generation should be different in this respect to transitional cohorts in 
Russia and Belarus. 
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 Moreover, democratic knowledge still holds strong explanatory power for the 
revolution generation, which had the greatest exposure to democracy of any generation in 
any country. Freedom House ratings show that this generation was socialised in a ‘free’ 
and ‘partly free’ society.40 Given that prior studies have shown democratic understanding to 
be a strong predictor of democratic support in advanced democracies, this is not 
particularly surprising: the results here simply suggest that being well-informed about 
democracy is a useful predictor regardless of regime type. 
 However, age still has a negative effect for the Soviet Belarus generation and the 
Ukraine transition generation. Although the model accounts for 17 percent of the variance 
in the transition generation, some of this is due to the lifecycle effect of cohort members 
becoming less supportive of democracy as they age. A post-hoc semi-partial R2 test shows 
that only one percent of the variance for both the Soviet Belarus and transitional Ukraine 
cohorts is explained by age. There is thus still a lifecycle effect at play that results in elder 
members of the Soviet Belarus and Ukrainian transition cohorts being less supportive of 
democracy, but this effect is very small in comparison to how knowledgeable one is about 
democracy. 
 
40 See https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/ukraine for annual ratings since 1999. 
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Table 7.7: Within-generation democratic knowledge and democratic support 
 
 
Ordinary least squares regression showing partial (b) and standardised (beta) coefficients predicting support for democracy. The dependent variable is scored 0-12. Standard 
errors in parentheses. ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05. Source: World Values Survey Wave 6, available at www.worldvaluessurvey.org.  
Russia Soviet  Transition  Authoritarian 
 b beta  b beta  b beta 
Democratic 
knowledge 
.26*** (.03) .25***  .22*** (.06) .24***  .36*** (.05) .36*** 
Age (years) -.05*** (.01) -.01***  -.01 (.04) -.01  .03 (.03) .05 
Constant 4.6  5.2  3.1 
Adj R2 .06  .05  .13 
N 929  263  344 
Belarus Soviet  Transition  Authoritarian 
 b beta  b beta  b beta 
Democratic 
knowledge 
.21*** (.03) .22***  .31*** (.08) .30***  .27*** (.04) .26*** 
Age (years) -.01** (.01) -.09**  -.02 (11) -.02  .04 (.02) .09 
Constant 6.70  6.28  4.77 
Adj R2 .05  .08  .08 
N 850  147  486 
Ukraine Soviet  Transition  Revolution 
 b beta  b beta  b beta 
Democratic 
knowledge 
.32*** (.04) .28***  .50*** (.06) .40***  .41*** (.07) .36*** 
Age (years) -.01 (0) -.05  -.06* (.03) -.01*  .03 (.05) .03 
Constant 4.88  4.84  3.12 
Adj R2 .08   .17  .12 
N 937  330  220 
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 Overall, these findings add further weight to the argument that knowing more about 
democracy develops democratic support. Gerber and Chapman (2018, p.494) demonstrate 
that democratic knowledge increases demand for democratisation in Russia, and argue 
that ‘if more Russians came to understand democracy as requiring some combination of 
free and fair elections with majority rule, minority rights, and freedom to criticise the 
government… then overall support for democracy would increase’. Cho (2014, p.9) claims 
that the ‘diffusion of democratic understanding into authoritarian societies’ would likewise 
boost support for democracy. With the caveat that attitudinal variables leave causality 
‘inherently indeterminate’ (Gerber & Chapman, p.493), the findings in this chapter further 
demonstrate the importance of democratic knowledge in developing democratic support. 
 The analyses presented in this chapter therefore largely accord with the existing 
literature. Being well-informed about democracy has a significant positive effect on 
democratic support across all countries and generations, lending further support to 
previous findings (Carrion 2008; Cho 2014; Gerber & Chapman 2018; Lu & Shi 2014; Miller, 
Hesli & Reisinger 1997). There are two key explanations for this relationship. First, 
understanding democracy in procedural terms highlights the freedoms and rights that it can 
provide, and demonstrates that other regimes are unlikely to offer such benefits (Mattes & 
Bratton 2007, p.202). Second, citizens who are well-informed about democracy ‘know that 
it is different from authoritarianism’; understanding democracy therefore fosters a ‘positive 
bias to endorse democracy and a negative bias to reject its alternatives’ (Cho 2014, p.3). 
These explanations are clearly not mutually exclusive, and both offer persuasive accounts 
as to why well- informed post-Soviet citizens show higher support for democracy.  
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has demonstrated the significance of being well-informed about 
democracy in explaining levels of democratic support. Holding an informed understanding 
of democracy had a significant effect in all three countries, adding further to the findings of 
existing studies (Baviskar & Malone 2004; Bratton & Mattes 2001; Canache 2012; Carrion 
2008; Cho 2014; Mattes & Bratton 2007; Miller, Hesli & Reisinger 1997). Moreover, this 
effect held across country and generation, indicating that democratic knowledge increases 
democratic support regardless of what kind of regime an individual is socialised into. 
 In contrast, the first hypothesis – that informed understandings of democracy would 
be higher among generations socialised under transitional or revolutionary periods – found 
no support. Moreover, in Russia democratic knowledge increases with age, which 
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contradicts the other studies that find no relationship (Gerber & Chapman 2018). However, 
the effect explains very little of the variance in democratic understanding, which suggests 
Russia is not so different from its neighbours in this respect. Moreover, Shin’s (2012) 
research on Confucian Asia also finds no evidence for socialisation theory affecting 
democratic knowledge. While explaining the sources of democratic understanding was 
outside the remit of this chapter, it seems that generational and lifecycle effects have little 
impact.  
 In terms of how citizens understand democracy in general, two main findings stand 
out. First, social understandings of democracy remain high in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. 
This is in line with literature suggesting that both post-communist and authoritarian states’ 
citizens are more likely to hold this view (Gerber & Chapman 2018; Norris 2011; Rose, 
Mishler & Munro 2006). However, only in Russia were there significant differences between 
generations – and this was only true when comparing the Soviet generation to the two 
post-Soviet cohorts. While the Russian Soviet generation regarded social items as more 
essential to democracy, the factor analysis demonstrates that citizens in all three countries 
view democracy as a mixture of rights, freedoms and social benefits. 
 The second takeaway is that Belarusians understand democracy in different terms 
to their counterparts in Russia and Ukraine. The emergence of a second authoritarian 
dimension in the factor analysis may be a product of its relatively brief transition period, and 
its citizens having received relatively less exposure to some level of democracy. Again, this 
is in line with the relevant literature suggesting less democratic experience means less of an 
ability to differentiate between characteristics of democratic and authoritarian regimes (Shin 
2015b, Welzel & Kirsch 2017). Overall, democratic understanding appears to be a key 
predictor of democratic support at the individual level. It exerts a significant positive effect 
regardless of country and generational membership, and thus adds further support to the 
growing scholarly argument that knowledge of democracy fosters demand for democracy.  
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Conclusion 
 
 This thesis was motivated by the view that support for democracy matters 
normatively and empirically. Public support is essential for the consolidation and ongoing 
stability of a democratic system (Easton 1975, Linz & Stepan 1996). Without popular 
support, democracy is vulnerable, and this is even more the case in transitional or new 
democracies where Easton’s ‘reservoir of good will’ has not yet developed (Easton 1975, 
p.44; see also Mattes & Bratton 2007, Rose et al. 1998). Countries with high popular 
support for autocratic rule tend to have low levels of democracy (Inglehart 2003). Likewise, 
if a large proportion of citizens in an authoritarian regime support democracy, the system 
will lack legitimacy (Mishler & Rose 2002). In sum, support for democracy has been shown 
to have a positive effect on democratisation and the future stability of democracy (Claassen 
2019b).  
 This study was driven by one central puzzle. Support for democracy in authoritarian 
and hybrid systems contradicts the core arguments of political socialisation, which hold 
that citizens are socialised into support the existing regime (see Mattes et al. 2016). 
However, contrary to expectations, prior research has found that socialisation into an 
authoritarian regime results in less support for democracy. How, then, do citizens in 
authoritarian countries develop support for a system with which they have little experience? 
These questions were studied using data from the World Values Surveys and McAllister and 
White’s Research Surveys to test the explanatory power of each model on support for 
democracy. By using data spanning over twenty years, this study was able to track levels of 
democratic support across the post-Soviet period and fluctuations in regime type in each 
country.  
 The results presented here have extended the literature on democratic support and 
political socialisation by broadening inquiry beyond single-country studies of Russia 
(Mishler & Rose 2007) while focusing closely on the national context of three comparable 
case studies. Perhaps most uniquely, it has investigated the effect of socialisation into the 
post-Soviet period, as opposed to other studies that focus on the effects of communist 
socialisation (Mishler & Rose 2007, Pop-Eleches & Tucker 2014, 2017).  By testing four 
competing models of democratic support in authoritarian and hybrid regimes, it has 
demonstrated that these models are becoming less useful over time. The findings show 
that even among three culturally and historically similar societies, theories of democratic 
support operate differently. This concluding chapter discusses each of the main findings in 
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order of the theoretical models tested in this thesis. Following this, it considers the 
implication of the findings and the contributions made by this study to the literature.  
 
Main findings 
 The first central finding is that most citizens are ‘weak democrats’ who support 
democracy but do not fully reject alternative authoritarian regimes. There was little change 
in this pattern evident over time; however, democrats became slightly more numerous in 
Russia. As a preliminary exercise, the chapter tested the effect of post-Soviet socialisation, 
but this was only significant in Belarus. It then tested the effect of socialisation into more 
precise generational cohorts. There were no significant effects in Russia, while in Belarus, 
socialisation into the transition period (1991 - 1995) did positively affect democratic 
support. In Ukraine, however, citizens socialised during and after the Orange Revolution 
were less supportive of democracy. Both effects, however, were very small. When 
controlling for lifecycle effects, the results were again not statistically significant in Russia. 
In Belarus, a negative lifecycle effect was present across time, while in the most recent 
survey wave in Ukraine, membership of both cohorts exposed to some level of democracy 
were less supportive than those socialised in the Soviet period. The results therefore 
contradicted the bulk of the socialisation literature, clearly demonstrating that we require an 
alternative explanation for the levels of democratic support in these countries. 
 The thesis then turned to social modernisation theories, which hold that individual-
level indicators of modernisation such as education and income develop popular support 
for democracy by increasing demand for greater civil and political rights (Inglehart & Welzel 
2005). Taking university education, income, non-manual work, middle class status and 
urban residence as its independent variables, the study again used the WVS to test this 
model. It noted that younger cohorts tend to be better-educated, wealthier, and slightly 
more likely to view themselves as middle-class and live in urban areas; however, these 
differences were only slight. The modernisation model was a more powerful explanation for 
democratic support than socialisation; however, its influence declined to almost zero in the 
most recent survey wave. Holding a university education proved to be the most consistent 
influence on democratic support, while employment in a non-manual occupation emerged 
as another variable that develops support for democracy. Given the decline in the 
explanatory power of the modernisation model over time and the fact that non-manual 
occupation was unavailable in the most recent surveys, this is a variable that warrants 
further attention. Less-utilised indicators of social modernisation such as occupation may 
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shed light on how individual socio-economic experiences affect support for democracy 
today. 
 Moreover, the most recent WVS data for Ukraine collected in 2011 showed that the 
positive effects of urban residence and education did not explain the negative generational 
or lifecycle effects seen in the previous chapter. Clearly, neither socialisation nor 
modernisation operates in the same way even in three similar case studies. Another 
counterintuitive result was the negative effect of income in Russia and Belarus, which could 
suggest that rather than increasing demand for democratisation, profiting under Putin or 
Lukashenka may lead to support for the system instead of an alternative democratic 
regime. As suggested in chapter 5, this may be a matter of self-interest where earning a 
higher income generates support for the status quo (Ceka & Magalhães 2016); alternatively, 
those with more to lose may view democracy more negatively as a result of the economic 
crisis of the 1990s (Person 2016). While the effect of income in Belarus was positive in the 
latest survey, the inability to control for other social modernisation variables means we 
cannot be fully confident in this result. Lastly, the modernisation model has differing effects 
for each cohort, and tended to have little explanatory power among the youngest 
generations. Indeed, one of the most influential predictors, education, was insignificant in 
all but one cohort. One conclusion, then, may be that while generational effects have little 
weight, cohorts respond differently to each predictor of democratic support. 
 The thesis then moved on to test theories of regime performance as part of a 
lifetime learning model. As the WVS did not include the necessary survey items, it turned to 
McAllister and White’s Research Surveys. The aim was to test the theory’s central 
hypothesis that the performance of a regime determines the level of its popular support 
(Dahl 1971, Diamond 1999). It therefore used perceived electoral integrity, corruption, and 
economic performance, as well as travel to democracies, as independent variables tapping 
experience with various regimes throughout adulthood. It showed that citizens see their 
elections as moderately fair, while Ukrainians reported more corruption than Russians or 
Belarusians. Belarusians were the most positive about national economic performance; 
however, the timing of the surveys may be responsible for this effect. Lastly, the average 
citizen in each country had not visited a democracy. 
 The performance model was a more effective predictor of democratic support than 
socialisation or social modernisation. Perceived electoral integrity did predict support for 
democracy in Russia, and this was more pronounced among Putin voters. In Belarus and 
Ukraine, however, it had a negative effect. The study suggested that the results may be 
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explained by the fact that electoral authoritarian regimes ‘institute the principle of popular 
consent, even as they subvert it in practice’ (Schedler 2006, p.13). In other words, even if 
elections are manipulated as they are in Russia and Belarus in particular, the regime can 
nevertheless claim to be elected by popular will (Waterbury 1999). The thesis has therefore 
highlighted that theories of democratic support do not adequately account for the dynamics 
of ‘hybrid’ (Diamond 2002) or ‘electoral authoritarian’ regimes (Schedler 2006) where 
elections are manipulated but leaders remain popular to the extent that citizens believe that 
they would win a free and fair contest (Rose & Mishler 2009, Wilson 2012).  
 Perceived corruption decreases support for democracy in Russia among the Soviet 
and transition cohorts, suggesting that they are comparing democracy to the current 
regime or the communist period when corruption was less widespread. Positive economic 
evaluations also increased support for democracy in Russia and Ukraine, which reflects the 
fact that Ukraine was an ‘electoral democracy’ at the time of the survey (Freedom House 
2010b). In the case of Russia, however, strong economic performance has been found to 
be the greatest influence on authoritarian legitimacy (Kruse et al. 2019). Having visited a 
democracy was a strong predictor of democratic support in Russia and Ukraine, which is 
consistent with the idea that exposure to democracy breeds positive attitudes towards it 
(Rohrschneider 1999, Wang 2017). 
 Lastly, the study tested the effect of democratic knowledge on support for 
democracy. Including this model controls for the many definitions of democracy employed 
in this region, such as Gorbachev’s ‘democratisation’ and Putin’s ‘managed democracy’ 
(Gerber & Chapman 2018, p.486, Rosefielde & Hedlund 2009, p.179). The literature on 
democratic knowledge argues that citizens socialised into non-democracies show less 
awareness of what democracy is (Cho 2015, Shin 2015a). There is also an argument 
relating to post-communist countries that socialisation under communism leads citizens to 
emphasise social-democratic understandings of democracy that include welfare provisions 
or wealth distribution (Rose et al 2006). However, knowing more about democracy has 
been found to increase democratic support by making citizens more aware of what 
democracy has to offer (Cho 2014, Shin 2012).  
 The first of these prepositions were only partially supported: citizens were broadly 
able to distinguish between democratic and authoritarian regime characteristics. Only in 
Russia were there significant generational differences, where the Soviet cohort showed 
more understanding of democracy, perhaps because of their experience with multiple 
regimes. However, this ultimately proved to be a lifecycle effect. Second, citizens in all 
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three countries did understand democracy in social-democratic terms, including items such 
as unemployment aid and income equalisation in their definition of democracy. These 
social-democratic items, however, do not contradict the core tenets of democracy such as 
free elections and political rights (Held 2006, Welzel 2011), and did not affect citizens’ 
ability to distinguish between democracy and authoritarianism. 
 The effect of democratic knowledge on support was strongest in Ukraine; however, 
the negative generational effect of belonging to the transition and revolution cohort 
remained. Explaining why Ukrainians socialised in the post-Soviet period are least 
supportive of democracy is therefore the clearest avenue for future research. Moreover, the 
influence of democratic knowledge is increasing over time, with the most recent survey 
data from Russia and Belarus showing democratic knowledge to have the most explanatory 
power of any model tested in this thesis. In Russia, knowledge had the most influence 
among the authoritarian cohort, suggesting that being well-informed about democracy 
matters more for those raised under an authoritarian system where information about 
democracy is scarce or misleading. In Belarus, there was little difference between 
generations. Democratic knowledge was most influential for the Ukrainian transition 
generation, yet still held great explanatory power for the revolution cohort, which had the 
greatest exposure to democracy of any generation in any country. However, this is 
consistent with the prior research demonstrating that being well-informed about democracy 
is a powerful predictor of support regardless of regime type (Bratton et al. 2005, Cho 2014, 
Gerber & Chapman 2018, Norris 2011). 
 
Theoretical and empirical contributions 
 This study has made five broad contributions to the literature, which can be 
summarised as follows. First, socialisation has no effect on democratic support in Russia, 
Ukraine and Belarus, suggesting that we must distinguish more clearly between 
socialisation into democracy and mere exposure to democracy. Specifically, the 
socialisation mechanisms that produce support for democracy must be better identified. 
Second, democratic support is conditional on other institutional experiences, such as 
economic performance. When democratisation is accompanied by economic collapse as it 
was in the post-Soviet region, and followed by a more prosperous authoritarian regime as 
occurred in Russia and Belarus, traditional models of democratic support do not function 
as theorised. Third, the findings show that socialisation theory does not sufficiently account 
for socialisation into a hybrid regime where elements of both democracy and autocracy are 
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present. Fourth, it demonstrates that theories of democratic support do not adequately 
explain support for democracy outside consolidated democracies. And lastly, it sheds light 
on what the sources of democratic support in such regimes may be. Specifically, it 
highlights the importance of what earlier studies have called ‘demonstration effects’ (Finkel 
2001, p.341), where democratic support develops through indirect experience with 
democracy rather than socialisation. This section elaborates on these contributions and 
outlines how the thesis revises the existing literature. 
 First, there is little theoretical difference between exposure to democracy and 
socialisation into democracy in the current literature, which tends to treat democratic 
exposure as essentially uniform across countries. The results presented here demonstrate 
that the measurement of political socialisation should be revised. Rather than younger 
generations being socialised into democracy after earlier regime changes in Germany 
(Baker et al. 1981, Rohrschneider 1994) or Japan (Richardson 1974), young post-Soviet 
citizens grew up in a period where democratic reform was limited. Instead of experiencing 
the full realisation of democratic rights and procedures, citizens were exposed to only 
limited levels of democratisation. This indicates that specific elements of democratic 
socialisation may have been missing. 
 Specifically, the current literature assumes that socialisation into democracy as 
‘normal politics’ means that democracy can generate its own popular support (Mattes et al. 
2016, p.3). If a country does not fully democratise but instead becomes a consolidated 
authoritarian regime, or a hybrid system in the case of Ukraine, the results presented here 
suggest that key mechanisms of socialisation are missing. Instead of ‘continued exposure’ 
to a democratic system and popular support slowly developing in its favour (Dalton 1994, 
p.472), there are no cohorts of young people in these countries to have been fully socialised 
into a stable and consolidated democratic system.  
 There are thus several socialisation mechanisms missing in these countries that may 
explain why post-Soviet cohorts did not develop more support for democracy than those 
socialised into communism. First, these countries lack party systems strong enough to 
function as a source of political cues and political learning (Gel’man 2008, Kynev 2018). In 
consolidated democracies, party identification can function as a key heuristic in learning 
about and engaging with politics, simply because ‘parties are so central to democratic 
politics’ (Dalton 2016, p.7). Second, while independent political participation and 
organisations were seen as ‘schools of democracy’ in the early 1990s (Weigle 1994, p.240), 
political participation has declined ever since (Lussier 2011). Third, while civic education 
 196 
was responsible for developing support for the new democratic system in countries such as 
East Germany (Dalton 1994), effective civic education was limited in the 1990s when the 
post-Soviet region was democratising (Bogolubo et al. 1999). When democratisation is only 
limited, socialisation experiences such as these are absent. The lack of significant 
generational effects found in this thesis therefore have profound implications for the 
socialisation literature. To be precise, the measurement of socialisation experiences needs 
to be sensitive to national context and pay more attention to the exact mechanisms that 
affect democratic support.  
 Second, prior research has not sufficiently considered that the effect of democratic 
exposure is likely conditional on other institutional circumstances. Although Russia, Ukraine 
and Belarus experienced some limited democratisation in the post-Soviet period, this was 
characterised by economic crisis and corruption (Person 2016). The results here indicate 
that such a socialisation experience does not develop support for democracy. This ‘dual 
transition’ (Fish 1994, p.40) of a political and an economic system may explain why 
exposure to democracy has not produced democratic support in these countries. Indeed, 
chapter 7 demonstrated that post-Soviet citizens understand democracy in terms of free 
elections and civil rights alongside a degree of economic stability provided by the state. 
When economic stability does not accompany free elections and other political rights, 
democracy is not delivering what citizens expect and they are not socialised into 
supporting the system. 
 Supporting this point is prior research demonstrating that many post-Soviet citizens 
associate democracy with ‘the disorder, instability, chaos, and hardship’ of the 1990s 
(Person 2016, p.335). Given that economic performance itself is a key predictor of 
democratic support (Dalton 1994, Rohrschneider 1999), economic crisis of the magnitude 
seen in the years following the fall of the USSR may have neutralised any socialisation 
effects. Indeed, panel data from East Germany has shown that democratic support 
‘increased dramatically’ in the 1990s as a reunited Germany delivered economic growth 
(Finkel 2001, p.340). This mechanism - democratisation accompanied by economic stability 
- is one that is absent in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, and may explain the lack of 
socialisation effects. 
 Third, a clearer distinction between cumulative and cross-sectional exposure to 
democracy should be made. The literature pays little attention to the effect of fluctuating 
levels of democracy, instead focusing on the influence of socialisation into communism 
(Mishler & Rose 2007, Pop-Eleches & Tucker 2014, 2017) or into a consolidated democracy 
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(Mattes et al. 2016). The results indicate that a lifetime learning model will best account for 
changing levels of democracy over the lifecycle, given its acknowledgement of ‘adaptive 
learning’ that can occur in response to regime change (Mishler & Rose 2007, p.832). The 
finding that socialisation has little effect on democratic support in Russia, Ukraine and 
Belarus demonstrates that socialisation theory does not clearly account for the effect of 
growing up in a hybrid regime where elements of both democracy and autocracy are 
present. 
 Fourth, the study has highlighted that theories of democratic support cannot fully 
explain what happens when an authoritarian system delivers where democracy has failed. 
Specifically, Russians and Belarusians have popular authoritarian leaders whom citizens 
believe would win a fair contest (Wilson 2012, Rose & Mishler 2009), and these leaders are 
associated with economic recovery (White & McAllister 2008). Whether or not the 
government was elected democratically, then, may not be relevant if citizens think it would 
win in a free and fair contest. This complicates the use of survey items that refer only to 
abstract concepts and not to specific national context. Chapter 6, for example, 
demonstrated that viewing elections as fair increases democratic support, particularly 
among Putin voters. Measures therefore need to be more specific to national context: while 
growing up in a consolidated democracy may produce support, socialisation into a chaotic 
system that never fully democratises does not produce the same effect.   
 The last key contribution to the literature is that experience with democracy takes 
many forms, and that the traditional model of socialisation is not sufficiently sensitive to 
national context. Socialisation into a regime has not produced the results expected by the 
literature. The results here instead accord with what earlier studies have called 
‘demonstration effects’ (Finkel 2001, p.341). Rather than direct socialisation into a 
democracy, these effects refer to the diffusion of information about democracy through 
sources such as the media, personal contacts or travel (Dalton 1994, Finkel 2001). Chapter 
7 found that Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians are knowledgeable about democracy, 
which demonstrates that information about democracy is indeed spreading to these 
countries. Where exposure to democracy is limited, experiences such as visiting 
democratic countries or learning about democracy via social media, education or in the 
workplace may fill the vacuum.  
 This finding has important empirical implications relating to survey measurement. 
First, having visited a democracy is not an experience likely to be randomly distributed 
across the population. The Soviet cohort was the most well-travelled in every country, 
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suggesting that it is likely the older and wealthier who are more easily able to travel. Future 
studies should therefore investigate the extent to which the effect of visiting democracies is 
independent of other factors such as socio-economic status. Second, while citizens in 
Russia, Ukraine and Belarus can largely differentiate between democracy and 
authoritarianism, chapter 6 suggested that they nonetheless may regard their current 
regimes as democratic. One implication of this is that measures need to be more sensitive 
to local contexts, particularly in authoritarian regimes where citizens (and some scholars) 
believe their leader would be elected in a democratic context (Wilson 2012, Rose & Mishler 
2009). This, of course, confounds citizen judgement as to how democratic their country 
truly is. The other implication relates to the measurement of democratic knowledge. It has 
been noted elsewhere that measuring political knowledge is challenging (Gidengil & 
Zechmeister 2016). Chapter 7 demonstrated that there are differences even between three 
culturally similar states in how democracy is understood. Popular emphasis on economic 
issues may hold more weight for attitudes towards democracy than previously thought. 
 Overall, the results show that while socialisation has no effect on democratic 
support, cohorts do have different sources of support for democracy. This adds further 
weight to the lifetime learning model insofar as cohorts that have only experienced one 
regime type evaluate democracy different to those who have lived through regime change 
(Mishler & Rose 1997, 2001b, Rose et al. 1998). Ultimately, however, the lack of 
generational effects found in this research suggest that citizens would learn to support any 
future democratisation. This thesis has extended the existing literature by showing that the 
attitudes of Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians are not determined by the regime in 
which they grew up. Instead, it seems that attitudes are malleable over the lifecycle in 
response to experience, which fits with a lifetime learning model. The nature of lifetime 
learning, however, means pinpointing what experiences are influential over the life course. 
While the sources of support for authoritarian regimes are outside the remit of this thesis, a 
popular authoritarian system may command support and produce negative attitudes 
towards democracy (Magalhães 2014). Thus, theories of democratic support must pay 
further attention to specific mechanisms at play during the socialisation and learning 
process. 
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Appendix: Description and measurement of variables 
Generational cohort coding 
Source: World Values Survey 1981 - 2014 aggregate longitudinal file, Russia 2017 and Belarus 2018 files, Research Surveys.  
 
 
 
 
Measure Question Coding Mean 
   1996 2011 2017/18 
Russia cohorts 
(WVS) 
X002/Q261 (2017) Year of birth 1 Soviet ( - 1972) 
2 Transition (1973 - 1982) 
3 Authoritarian (1983 -) 
1.06 1.58 1.84 
Belarus cohorts 
(WVS) 
X002/Q261 (2018) Year of birth 1 Soviet ( - 1972) 
2 Transition (1973 - 1977) 
3 Authoritarian (1978 -) 
1.13 1.75 1.9 
Ukraine cohorts 
(WVS) 
X002 Year of birth 1 Soviet ( - 1972) 
2 Transition (1973 - 1985) 
3 Revolution (1986 -) 
1.08 1.52 n/a 
Russia cohorts 
(Research Survey 
2018) 
G2 Age 1 Soviet (46 - 88) 
2 Transition (36 - 45) 
3 Authoritarian (18 - 25) 
1.83 
Belarus cohorts 
(Research Survey 
2006) 
V183 Age 1 Soviet (34 - 80) 
2 Transition (29 - 33) 
3 Authoritarian (18 - 28) 
1.55 
Ukraine cohorts 
(Research Survey 
2010) 
G2 1 Soviet (38 - 87) 
2 Transition (25 - 37) 
3 Revolution (18 - 24) 
1.47 
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Russia: Social modernisation 
Source: World Values Survey 1981 - 2014 aggregate longitudinal file, Russia 2017 file.  
 
 
 
 
 
Measure Question Coding Mean 
   1996 2011 2017 
University 
education 
X025, Q278 (2017). What is the highest 
educational level you have attained? 
1 = at least some university education 
0 = no university 
0.21 0.31 0.34 
Scale of incomes X047, Q288 (2017). We would like to 
know in what income group your 
household is. Please specify the 
appropriate number, counting all 
wages, salaries, pensions and other 
incomes that come in. 
1 Lower step to 10 Highest step 4.88 4.21 4.77 
Middle class X045, Q287 (2017). Would you 
describe yourself as belonging to… 
1 = Upper or lower middle class 
0 = other 
0.39 0.49 0.54 
Non-manual work X053. Are the tasks you do at work 
mostly manual or mostly intellectual? If 
you do not work currently, 
1 = non-manual (>7 on ten-step scale) 
0 = manual 
0.39 0.37 n/a 
Urban resident X049, G_TOWNSIZE (2017). 
Interviewer-coded size of town 
1 = over 10,000 
0 = <10,000 
0.72 0.37 0.74 
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Russia: Performance model 
 
Measure Question Coding Mean 
   2018 
Perceived electoral integrity V78, V80, V81 
See Table 1 
Standardised 0 - 10 scale. Higher values 
correspond to higher perceived integrity 
6.97 
Perceived corruption V41. How widespread, in your opinion, are 
bribery and corruption in central and local 
government in Russia? 
1 Hardly any officials are corrupt, to 
4 All officials are corrupt 
2.99 
Economic performance V20. What do you think about the present 
economic situation in Russia? 
1 Very bad, to 
5 Very good 
2.83 
Travel to democracies Have you ever visited any of the following 
countries? 
D6c, D6e, D6g 
0 - 3 countries visited 
(Baltics, Poland, USA) 
0.22 
Voted for Putin V87. Which of the candidates did you vote 
for in the presidential election on 18 March 
2018? 
0 Did not vote for Putin 
1 Voted for Putin 
0.61 
Social media use F2B. How often do you use social 
networks? 
1 Never, to 
5 Regularly 
3.84 
 
Source: Russian Research Survey 2018. 
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Russia: Democratic knowledge 
Source: World Values Survey 1981 - 2014 aggregate longitudinal file, Russia 2017 file. 
Source: World Values Survey 1981 - 2014 aggregate longitudinal file, Russia 2017 file. 
 
 Question Coding Mean 
   2011 2017 
Many things are 
desirable, but not all 
of them are essential 
characteristics of 
democracy. Please 
tell me for each of the 
following things how 
essential you think it 
is as a characteristic 
of democracy.  
 
E224. Governments tax the rich 
and subsidise the poor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 = not an essential 
characteristic of democracy 
to 
10 = essential characteristic 
of democracy 
7.31 7.41 
E225. Religious authorities 
interpret the laws 
3.8 3.84 
E226. People choose their leaders 
in free elections 
8.3 7.99 
E227. People receive state aid for 
unemployment 
8.05 7.61 
E228. The army takes over when 
government is incompetent 
4.85 5.17 
E229. Civil rights protect people’s 
liberty against oppression. 
8.17 7.83 
E233A. The state makes people’s 
incomes equal 
7.42 7.12 
E233B. People obey their rulers 6.53 7.15 
E233. Women have the same 
rights as men 
8.39 8.15 
Democratic 
knowledge 
(E226 + E229 + E233) - (E225 + 
E228) 
Standardised 0 - 10 scale 7.4 6.47 
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Belarus: Social modernisation 
 
Measure Question Coding Mean 
   1996 2011 2018 
University 
education 
X025. What is the highest 
educational level you have 
attained? 
1 = at least some university education 
0 = no university 
0.22 0.44 Not asked 
Scale of incomes X047, Q288 (2018). We would 
like to know in what income 
group your household is. Please 
specify the appropriate number, 
counting all wages, salaries, 
pensions and other incomes 
that come in. 
1 Lower step to 10 Highest step 5.58 4.74 4.96 
Middle class X045. Would you describe 
yourself as belonging to… 
1 = Upper or lower middle class 
0 = other 
0.63 0.59 Not asked 
Non-manual work X053. Are the tasks you do at 
work mostly manual or mostly 
intellectual? If you do not work 
currently, characterize your 
major work in the past. 
1 = non-manual (>7 on ten-step scale) 
0 = manual 
0.36 0.41 Not asked 
Urban resident Interviewer-coded size of town 1 = over 10,000 
0 = <10,000 
0.67 0.74 Not asked 
 
Source: World Values Survey 1981 - 2014 aggregate longitudinal file, Belarus 2018 file. 
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Belarus: Performance model 
 
Measure Question Coding Mean 
   2006 
Perceived electoral integrity V76, V78, V79 
See Table 1 
Standardised 0 - 10 scale. Higher values 
correspond to higher perceived integrity 
6.67 
Perceived corruption V24. How widespread, in your opinion, is 
bribery and corruption in the Belarusian 
power bodies? 
1 Hardly any officials are corrupt, to 
4 All officials are corrupt 
2.86 
Economic performance V2. What do you think about the present 
economic situation in Belarus? 
1 Very bad, to 
5 Very good 
3.36 
Travel to democracies Visited… 
V121 and V122 
0 - 2 countries visited 
(Lithuania and Poland) 
0.74 
Voted for Lukashenka V105. Who did you vote for at the 
presidential election in March 2006? 
0 Did not vote for Lukashenka 
1 Voted for Lukashenka 
0.72 
 
Source: Belarus Research Survey 2006. 
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Belarus: Democratic knowledge 
Source: World Values Survey 1981 - 2014 aggregate longitudinal file, Belarus 2018 file. 
BELARUS Question Coding Mean 
   2011 2018 
Many things are 
desirable, but not 
all of them are 
essential 
characteristics of 
democracy. 
Please tell me for 
each of the 
following things 
how essential you 
think it is as a 
characteristic of 
democracy.  
 
E224. Governments tax the rich and 
subsidise the poor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 = not an essential 
characteristic of democracy to 
10 = essential characteristic of 
democracy 
5.76 6.15 
E225. Religious authorities interpret 
the laws 
3.91 3.31 
E226. People choose their leaders in 
free elections 
7.87 8.11 
E227. People receive state aid for 
unemployment 
6.84 7.55 
E228. The army takes over when 
government is incompetent 
4.39 4.26 
E229. Civil rights protect people’s 
liberty 
7.4 8.13 
E233A. The state makes people’s 
incomes equal 
6.23 6.59 
E233B. People obey their rulers 5.37 6.26 
E233. Women have the same rights as 
men 
7.48 8.27 
Democratic 
knowledge 
(E226 + E229 + E233) - (E225 + E228) Standardised 0 - 10 scale 7.04 7.08 
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Ukraine: Social modernisation 
Ukraine Question Coding Mean 
   1996 2011 
University education X025. What is the highest 
educational level you have 
attained? 
1 = at least some university 
education 
0 = no university 
0.21 0.34 
Scale of incomes X047. We would like to 
know in what income group 
your household is. Please 
specify the appropriate 
number, counting all 
wages, salaries, pensions 
and other incomes that 
come in. 
1 Lower step to 10 Highest 
step 
3.69 4.32 
Middle class X045. . Would you describe 
yourself as belonging to… 
1 = Upper or lower middle 
class 
0 = other 
0.47 0.48 
Non-manual work X053. Are the tasks you do 
at work mostly manual or 
mostly intellectual? If you 
do not work currently, 
characterize your major 
work in the past. 
1 = non-manual (>7 on ten-
step scale) 
0 = manual 
0.38 0.39 
Urban resident X049. Interviewer-coded 
size of town 
1 = over 10,000 
0 = <10,000 
0.62 0.59 
Source: World Values Survey 1981 - 2014 aggregate longitudinal file. 
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Ukraine: Performance model 
 
Measure Question Coding Mean 
   2006 
Perceived electoral integrity C4_a, C4_c, C4_d 
See Table 1 
Standardised 0 - 10 scale. Higher 
values correspond to higher 
perceived integrity 
6.67 
Perceived corruption B14. How widespread, in your 
opinion, is bribery and corruption in 
central and local government in 
Ukraine? 
1 Hardly any officials are corrupt, to 
4 All officials are corrupt 
3.29 
Economic performance A1. What do you think about the 
present economic situation in 
Ukraine? 
1 Very bad, to 
5 Very good 
1.89 
Travel to democracies Visited… 
D6_c, D6_d, D6_g 
0 - 2 countries visited 
(Baltics, Poland, USA) 
0.38 
Voted for Yanukovich C18. Who did you vote for in the 
second round of the presidential 
elections of 2010? 
0 Did not vote for Yanukovich 
1 Voted for Yanukovich 
0.46 
 
Source: Ukraine Research Survey 2010. 
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UKRAINE Question Coding Mean 
   2011 
Many things are 
desirable, but not all of 
them are essential 
characteristics of 
democracy. Please tell 
me for each of the 
following things how 
essential you think it is 
as a characteristic of 
democracy.  
 
E224. Governments tax the rich and subsidise 
the poor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 = not an essential characteristic 
of democracy to 
10 = essential characteristic of 
democracy 
7.57 
E225. Religious authorities interpret the laws 3.98 
E226. People choose their leaders in free 
elections 
8.43 
E227. People receive state aid for 
unemployment 
8.34 
E228. The army takes over when government 
is incompetent 
4.54 
E229. Civil rights protect people’s liberty 8.29 
E233A. The state makes people’s incomes 
equal 
7.57 
E233B. People obey their rulers 5.51 
E233. Women have the same rights as men 8.47 
Democratic 
knowledge 
(E226 + E229 + E233) - (E225 + E228) Standardised 0 - 10 scale 7.58 
Source: World Values Survey 1981 - 2014 aggregate longitudinal file. 
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Construction of electoral integrity variable 
 Composition of the ballot paper and counting votes 
 Russia Belarus Ukraine 
Fair to significant extent 5 6 6 
Fair to some extent 17 15 21 
Fair to insignificant extent 42 49 42 
Not fair at all 36 30 31 
Total 100 100 100 
N 1,823 901 1,060 
 Television coverage of the election campaign 
Fair to significant extent 6 11 5 
Fair to some extent 19 19 21 
Fair to insignificant extent 42 43 45 
Not fair at all 33 26 29 
Total 100 100 100 
N 1,819 915 1,081 
 The conduct of the electoral campaign in your district 
Fair to significant extent 5 6 5 
Fair to some extent 16 14 19 
Fair to insignificant extent 42 50 40 
Not fair at all 36 29 35 
Total 100 100 100 
N 1,819 883 1,029 
Source: Russian Research Survey 2018, Belarus Research Survey 2006, Ukraine Research Survey 2010. 
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Russia: support for democracy index (WVS) 
 
 
Source: World Values Survey 1981 - 2014 aggregate longitudinal file. 
 
 
 
Question  Coding Mean 
 RUSSIA  1996 2011 2017 
I'm going to 
describe various 
types of political 
systems and ask 
what you think 
about each as a way 
of governing this 
country. For each 
one, would you say 
it is a very good, 
fairly good, fairly 
bad or very bad 
way of governing 
this country?  
 
E114 Having a strong leader who does 
not need to bother with parliament and 
elections 
1 Very bad, to 
4 Very good 
2.47 2.01 2.37 
E115 Having experts, not government, 
make decisions according to what 
they think is best for the country 
1 Very bad, to 
4 Very good 
2.4 2.23 2.59 
E116 Having the army rule 1 Very bad, to 
4 Very good 
3.08 3.26 3.16 
E117 Having a democratic political 
system 
1 Very bad, to 
4 Very good 
2.53 3 2.97 
Democratic 
support 
Reverse-code E114-16 
Sum all in pro-democratic direction 
0 - 12 6.6 6.5 7.11 
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Belarus: support for democracy index (WVS) 
 
 
Source: World Values Survey 1981 - 2014 aggregate longitudinal file. 
 
 
 
Question  Coding Mean 
 BELARUS  1996 2011 2017 
I'm going to 
describe various 
types of political 
systems and ask 
what you think 
about each as a way 
of governing this 
country. For each 
one, would you say 
it is a very good, 
fairly good, fairly 
bad or very bad 
way of governing 
this country?  
 
E114 Having a strong leader who does 
not need to bother with parliament and 
elections 
1 Very bad, to 
4 Very good 
2.41 2.52 2.12 
E115 Having experts, not government, 
make decisions according to what 
they think is best for the country 
1 Very bad, to 
4 Very good 
2.43 2.36 2.08 
E116 Having the army rule 1 Very bad, to 
4 Very good 
3.3 3.42 2.99 
E117 Having a democratic political 
system 
1 Very bad, to 
4 Very good 
2.99 3.15 3.41 
Democratic 
support 
Reverse-code E114-16 
Sum all in pro-democratic direction 
0 - 12 7.26 7.45 6.59 
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Ukraine: support for democracy index (WVS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Values Survey 1981 - 2014 aggregate longitudinal file. 
 
 
Question Coding Mean 
 UKRAINE  1996 2011 
I'm going to 
describe various 
types of political 
systems and ask 
what you think 
about each as a way 
of governing this 
country. For each 
one, would you say 
it is a very good, 
fairly good, fairly 
bad or very bad 
way of governing 
this country?  
 
E114 Having a strong leader who does 
not need to bother with parliament and 
elections 
1 Very bad, to 
4 Very good 
2.36 2.07 
E115 Having experts, not government, 
make decisions according to what 
they think is best for the country 
1 Very bad, to 
4 Very good 
2.37 2.3 
E116 Having the army rule 1 Very bad, to 
4 Very good 
3.34 3.32 
E117 Having a democratic political 
system 
1 Very bad, to 
4 Very good 
2.94 3.15 
Democratic 
support 
Reverse-code E114-16 
Sum all in pro-democratic direction 
0 - 12 7.09 6.84 
 214 
Russia: support for democracy index (Research Survey) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question  Coding Mean 
 V29 To what extent do you agree with 
the following statement: ‘Democracy 
might have its shortcomings but it is 
still better than any other form of 
government?’ 
1 Entirely disagree 
2 Disagree to some extent 
3 Hard to say/didn’t answer 
4 Agree to some extent 
5 Entirely agree 
3.51 
There are 
different opinions 
about the 
character of our 
state. To what 
extent do you 
agree with the 
following 
statements? 
V30 It would be better to restore the 
communist system 
 
 
 
1 Entirely agree 
2 Agree to some extent 
3 Hard to say/didn’t answer 
4 Disagree to some extent 
5 Entirely disagree 
3.56 
V31 The army should rule the country 4.35 
V32 It would be better to get rid of the 
Duma and elections and have a strong 
leader who could resolve all problems 
quickly 
3.26 
V33 It would be better to restore the 
monarchy 
4.29 
Democratic 
support 
Reverse-code E114-16 
Sum all in pro-democratic direction 
1 - 20 13.97 
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Belarus: support for democracy index (Research Surveys) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question  Coding Mean 
 V72 To what extent do you agree with 
the following statement: ‘Democracy 
might have its shortcomings but it is 
still better than any other form of 
government?’ 
1 Entirely disagree 
2 Disagree to some extent 
3 Hard to say/didn’t answer 
4 Agree to some extent 
5 Entirely agree 
3.81 
There are 
different opinions 
about the 
character of our 
state. To what 
extent do you 
agree with the 
following 
statements? 
V10 It would be better to restore the 
communist system 
 
 
 
 
1 Entirely agree 
2 Agree to some extent 
3 Hard to say/didn’t answer 
4 Disagree to some extent 
5 Entirely disagree 
3.99 
V11 The army should rule the country 4.53 
V12 It would be better to get rid of the 
National Council and elections and 
have a strong leader who could 
resolve all problems quickly 
3.83 
V13 It would be better to restore the 
monarchy 
4.33 
Democratic 
support 
Sum all in pro-democratic direction 1 - 20 15.49 
 216 
Ukraine: support for democracy index (Research Survey) 
 
Question  Coding Mean 
 B6a To what extent do you agree with 
the following statement: ‘Democracy 
might have its shortcomings but it is 
still better than any other form of 
government?’ 
1 Entirely disagree 
2 Disagree to some extent 
3 Hard to say/didn’t answer 
4 Agree to some extent 
5 Entirely agree 
3.48 
There are 
different opinions 
about the 
character of our 
state. To what 
extent do you 
agree with the 
following 
statements? 
B10a It would be better to restore the 
communist system 
 
 
 
 
1 Entirely agree 
2 Agree to some extent 
3 Hard to say/didn’t answer 
4 Disagree to some extent 
5 Entirely disagree 
3.81 
B10b The army should rule the country 4.5 
B10c It would be better to get rid of 
the parliamen and elections and have 
a strong leader who could resolve all 
problems quickly 
3.29 
B10d It would be better to restore the 
monarchy 
4.3 
Democratic 
support 
Sum all in pro-democratic direction 1 - 20 13.48 
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